LEBANON: GHAJAR AND SHEBAA ON THE MIND OF NEW UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001515

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GHAJAR AND SHEBAA ON THE MIND OF NEW UN
SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 1498

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) New UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael
Williams stressed the need for urgent progress on Ghajar,
warning that should the Israelis fail to respond to UNIFIL's
proposal for withdrawal, the next UNSCR 1701 report would be
tough on Israel during an October 22 call on Ambassador.
Confirming that the report would address the recent Syrian
troop deployment on Lebanon's northern border, Williams
accused the Syrians of being "non-transparent" and
uncooperative on border issues, while at the same time HE
blamed the GOL for not taking ownership of its border
security. Williams also expressed concerns that the handover
from UNIIIC to the Special Tribunal would be delayed. He
also expressed concern that March 14 was not doing a good job
of preparing for the 2009 parliamentary elections, especially
in terms of presenting a unified message to voters. End
summary.


2. (C) The new UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL),
Michael Williams, accompanied by UNSCOL Political Officers
Rami Shehadeh and Salvatore Pedulla, paid a call on the
Ambassador on October 22, in which DCM and Pol/Econ Chief
also participated. Noting the long gap between his
predecessor's (Geir Pedersen) departure in February and his
own recent arrival, Williams acknowledged that he had a lot
to catch up on and relationships to reestablish. He was
currently finishing up his round of introductory calls on
Lebanese leaders, having met with majority leader Saad Hariri
the previous evening and Free Patriotic Movement leader
Michel Aoun (a meeting he likened to "a trip to the dentist")
and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Kahwagi
earlier in the day, and scheduled to have his first meeting
with Hizballah (with Labor Minister and MP Mohamad Fneish)
immediately following his meeting with the Ambassador.
Williams planned to travel to Tel Aviv (November 2-3) and
Damascus (November 5) before heading to New York in mid to
late November to present UNSCOL's next UNSCR 1701 report.

1701 REPORT WILL BE "TOUGH" ON
ISRAEL IF NO PROGRESS ON GHAJAR
--------------


3. (C) Williams said UNSCOL would deliver the next UNSCR 1701
report to the UN Security Council on November 20. He warned
that if there was no significant progress on Ghajar, i.e., if
the Israelis failed to respond to UNIFIL's proposal for
Israeli withdrawal (reftel),he would be "blunt" in his
upcoming meetings with the Israelis that the report would be
"tough" on Israel.


4. (C) Ghajar was in a delicate stage, Williams continued;
UNIFIL Commander General Graziano had secured the GOL's
support for his proposal for Israeli withdrawal and was now
waiting for Israel's response, which might not come before
the 1701 report was completed. Williams said his goal was a
"satisfactory" outcome on Ghajar, adding that Israeli
withdrawal from the northern half of the city would provide a
much better context to address the issue of Shebaa Farms.
Failure on Ghajar would make Shebaa even more complicated,
and would be "quite a blow" for the Lebanese government and
especially, he said, for the March 14 majority. So far, he
commented, Hizballah was one of the big winners from 1701,
especially after the recent prisoners exchange with Israel.


5. (C) Williams reported that in his first official call on
PM Siniora, the PM was very critical of the UN, accusing it
of having held the Shebaa and Ghajar files for two years with
no progress. Williams affirmed that Siniora, repeating his
mantra that Lebanon would be "the last in the Arab world" to
make peace with Israel, refused to entertain the idea of
indirect talks with Israel, which Williams attributed to

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Siniora's belief that he lacked the political cover to do so
and concerns about his own physical security.


6. (C) Referring to a proposal reportedly floated by March 14
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt that Syria and Lebanon should
present a joint demarche to the UN Secretary General on the
Shebaa issue, Williams said he would raise the issue with
Syrian FM Moallem during their upcoming meeting. However,
the Syrians had been "totally uncooperative" with the UN in
the past, he said, citing a 1963-64 UN border commission
case, in which documents had gone missing and were presumably
somewhere in Syrian archives.


7. (C) Williams confirmed that the 1701 report also would
include the recent Syrian troop deployment on Lebanon's
northern border, but he stressed that the numbers were far
less than those reported in the press. LAF Commander General
Kahwagi told him that earlier in the day that he had been in
constant contact throughout with his Syrian counterpart,
General Habib, Williams said, although Shehadeh noted that
the lack of prior notification on the part of Syria was
"troubling." Williams agreed, commentng that on Syria's
lack of transparency, "a wordthe Syrians can't spell."
Syrian FM Moallem had areed with UN SYG Ban Ki Moon during
their meeting at UNGA on the need to establish diplomatic
relations with Lebanon and to control smuggling, Williams
relayed. He hoped that the UN could build on this momentum
to secure better cooperation with Syria in fighting
terrorism.


8. (C) Noting that the first LIBAT report had been his idea,
Williams said both the first and second LIBAT reports were
good, comprehensive reports with good recommendations. The
GOL had acknowledged this, he said, but now needed to take
ownership of its strategy. Williams agreed with the
Ambassador that Interior Minister Baroud, while impressive,
was more focused on the upcoming elections and Tripoli
security issues than border issues although Baroud had told
Williams in their introductory meeting that the security
committee he is chairing was a useful tool for addressing
this topic.

CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


9. (C) Williams (please protect) also expressed concerns that
the handover from UNIIIC to the Special Tribunal would not
take place in January as planned. Administrative, financial,
and bureaucratic obstacles were proving difficult to
overcome, and UNIIIC Commissioner Bellemare had told Williams
he was frustrated by the lack of progress in The Hague.
Williams said there had been talk of delaying the Tribunal
for a month, but feared even this would not be enough time to
get all the pieces in place. In the meantime, the Tribunal
risked losing personnel and, more importantly, credibility.
The Ambassador noted that the U.S. was looking to step up its
technical assistance to UNIIIC, adding that expectations in
Lebanon that there would be indictments before the spring
parliamentary elections were unrealistic.

SLEIMAN PROMISES NEW PROPOSALS
FOR NEXT NATIONAL DIALOGUE SESSION
--------------


10. (C) William relayed that in his introductory call on
President Sleiman, the President said he had new proposals
for the next National Dialogue session, scheduled for
November 5. However, Sleiman was "coy" when Williams tried
to pry for details.

SKEPTICAL ABOUT MARCH 14
--------------


11. (C) Williams said that in his meeting with Saad Hariri
the previous evening, Saad has assured him that "everything
was under control" in terms of the parliamentary elections.
But, he added, "every time Saad says this it makes me more
nervous," especially since his sense was that March 14 was by
no means guaranteed an electoral victory. Williams agreed

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that to date, March 14 was doing poorly in terms of messaging
and presenting a unified front.

COMMENT
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12. (C) Williams is a frank and knowledgeable interlocutor
with a good grasp of the lay of the land, not only in terms
of 1701 issues, but of the overall political environment as
well. We expect he will, like his predecessor, become a
useful conduit to us for insights on Hizballah's thinking.
End comment.

SISON