LEBANON: HARIRI CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAEL AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001489

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC SY IS IR RS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAEL AND
PERCEIVED U.S. MOVES TOWARD SYRIA

REF: A. BEIRUT 1407

B. BEIRUT 1454

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a wide-ranging October 15 discussion with the
Ambassador, majority leader Saad Hariri said he anticipated
meeting Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah "soon,"
explaining that such a meeting would fulfill his own
political agenda by giving other Shia a green light to enter
into discussions with March 14. Claiming that Nasrallah
feared another war with Israel, Hariri said he shared this
fear because, while it might only temporarily hinder
Hizbollah, "it would be the death of March 14." Hariri also
voiced his concern about Syrian troops on the border with
Lebanon, and complained about perceived U.S. "engagement"
with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem.


2. (C) Hariri criticized Free Patriotic Movement leader
Michel Aoun's trip to Iran the week of October 13, but noted
that it did not seem to cost Aoun any popular support. On
the spring 2009 parliamentary elections, Hariri rejected
independent MP Michel Murr's assertion that the currently
opposition-aligned Armenian Tashnaq would make a deal with
Murr and Hariri. Hariri praised the October 11 arrest of
individuals from a Fatah al-Islam linked terrorist cell,
saying it resulted in good information relating to the recent
string of attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces and
Internal Security Forces. End summary.

WILL MEET NASRALLAH "SOON"
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador and DCM, accompanied by PolOff, met
majority leader Saad Hariri, advisor Nader Hariri, and
notetaker Nadine Chehab at Qoreitem on October 15.
Responding to daily media speculation as to when Hariri would
meet with Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah,
Hariri said his advisors were "still studying" difficult
factors such as timing and location, but that it would happen
"soon."


4. (C) Recounting his meeting with Hizballah MP Mohammed Raad
in September (Ref A),Hariri said it was a "reconciliation"
meeting, adding the caveat that both sides had their own
political agendas. Hariri identified his agenda as
eliminating reasons for Shia-Sunni "in-fighting" and
better-positioning himself to talk to other Shia figures.
Hariri reasoned that if certain Shia saw Hariri talking to
Nasrallah, they would feel they also have a green light to
talk to Hariri. Ambassador noted that Hariri had launched an
effort to engage with certain Lebanese Shia after his July
trip to Iraq and asked whether these contacts had continued.
Hariri replied in the affirmative. He added that Nasrallah
needed the meeting more than he did because Nasrallah feared
an Israeli attack in Lebanon and wanted to get his domestic
house in order.

WAR WITH ISRAEL
WOULD KILL MARCH 14
--------------


5. (C) Hariri confessed that he shared Nasrallah's fear of a
war with Israel. Asserting that some in Israel and the U.S.
believe Israel should clear Lebanon of Hizballah "once and
for all," Hariri warned that such a move would only
temporarily put Hizballah out of commission because Iran and
Syria would rebuild Hizbollah's presence in Lebanon.
Moreover, he argued, the Sunnis and Christians would lose
because Israel would be fighting a nation, not just
Hizballah. "It would be the death of March 14," he portended.

SYRIA TESTING THE WATERS
WITH TROOP DEPLOYMENT
--------------

BEIRUT 00001489 002 OF 003




6. (C) Hariri railed against the recent Syrian troop
deployment. After the string of assassinations, including
his own father's, how dare Syria move its troops to the
border with Lebanon claiming that Lebanon has a problem with
terrorists, he argued. He speculated that Syria was not
preparing for an invasion, but was testing the waters. He
said that Syria typically takes an action, and then waits for
the reaction. If there was no formidable reaction, Syria
would grow bolder, he predicted.


7. (C) Nevertheless, Hariri said, Syria was not afraid of the
international community's reaction. Since Syrian President
Bashar Asad is president for life, he would not be concerned
about losing French or British contacts in the short-term.
Hariri said that if Asad thought Syria would be bombed
because of its military buildup, he would withdraw the troops.

U.S. "HARMS ITS REPUTATION"
BY TALKING TO SYRIA
--------------


8. (C) Hariri complained about perceived recent U.S.
"engagement" with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem.
Noting that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not talking to Syria,
he said the U.S. risked losing Arab support, which it
currently enjoyed, especially in Lebanon and Iraq, by
"talking to Damascus." This was particularly relevant, he
explained, when the U.S. solicited Egyptian and Saudi support
in Iraq -- their willingness to help would decrease following
any U.S. engagement with Syria. Ambassador noted that the
U.S. had clearly conveyed to FM Muallem the U.S. benchmarks,
including Syrian support for destabilizing elements in the
Middle East, Syria's support for terror, and Syria's human
rights record. The U.S. had also underscored publicly the
need for Lebanon's sovereignty. Furthermore, as Secretary
Rice had said publicly, the U.S. supported the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria, but noted
this needed to be built on mutual respect. Normalization
also had to include delineation of the border and an end to
arms transfers via Syria in violation of UNSCR 1701. Hariri
said he feared that the U.S. administration's current focus
was on "leaving a legacy," which could be to the detriment of
its popularity in the Arab world.


9. (C) Hariri acknowledged that Iranian officials continued
to invite him to Tehran, and implied good naturedly that the
U.S. was in "no position" to weigh in on his trips, since he
would not be surprised to see U.S. officials going to Syria
and Iran some day. Nevertheless, he said he would only go if
it served Lebanon's "vital interests."

AOUN'S VISIT TO IRAN:
A "LOW BLOW" TO SLEIMAN
--------------


10. (C) Hariri, who had met President Michel Sleiman earlier
in the day, assessed that Sleiman's October 11-12 trip to
Saudi Arabia, coupled with Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea's trip to Cairo the same week, were positive steps,
particularly for Lebanese Christians. However, Hariri
criticized Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun's trip
to Iran, which coincided with Sleiman's stop in Jeddah. "It
was a low blow to Sleiman," he scowled, "and also a message
to Saudi Arabia. He lamented that the trip had not seemed to
cost Aoun any public support.


11. (C) Returning to Sleiman, Hariri reported that Saudi King
Abdullah was happy with the visit and that Sleiman had made a
good impression. Hariri accused Syria of intentionally
choosing to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon this
week in order to "steal the headlines" from Sleiman's visit
to Saudi Arabia.

FOREIGN TRAVEL: RUSSIA, IRAQ, EGYPT AND EUROPE
-------------- -


12. (C) "All I want is to win the (spring 2009 parliamentary)
elections," Hariri stated. He said he was planning another

BEIRUT 00001489 003 OF 003


trip to Iraq in the near-term, and anticipated making future
campaign trips to Tripoli (Lebanon),the Bekaa, and Sidon, as
well as visits to Europe and Egypt, "to counterbalance
Syria." He added that he would travel to Russia to meet
Russian PM Vladimir Putin in October or November. According
to Hariri, Russia was working on a business deal with Saudi
Arabia that ultimately would separate Russia from Iran. He
said that he would seek Sleiman's approval before major trips.

NO TRUST FOR THE TASHNAQ
--------------


13. (C) Noting that it was too soon to form lists for the
election, he said that by the end of the year, Geagea, former
President and Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel, independent MP
Michel Murr, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and himself would
decide the lists. In the meantime, it was important for
March 14 to reestablish itself with its voting public.


14. (C) Michel Murr had expressed confidence that Hariri and
the currently opposition-aligned Armenian Tashnaq would make
a deal in the lead-up to the elections (Ref B). Hariri
rejected that prospect, calling the Tashnaq "a bunch of
liars." Claiming that the Tashnaq had betrayed his father on
a political agreement 1996, he said it was unlikely the
Tashnaq would align themselves with March 14. He added that
Tashnaq did not need an alliance because it could win seats
in Beirut likely to go to Armenians without one. Since
Tashnaq is seen as close to Iran, only a split between Iran
and Syria would pull the Tashnaq away from the pro-Syrian
opposition, he predicted. (Note: The same day, Murr
received delegations from Hizballah and the Syrian Baath
party in Lebanon. Murr reported to EmbOffs that the
delegations were pressuring him to form a joint list with
Aoun in the Metn district, an offer Murr told us he declined.
End note.)

ARRESTS IN TRIPOLI
LED TO "GOOD INFORMATION"
--------------


15. (S/NF) Hariri reported that the October 11 arrests in
Tripoli provided Lebanese security services with good
information from one detained individual, who is allegedly a
member of a terrorist cell linked to Fatah al-Islam and
responsible for attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). Hariri said that
this individual had numbers for contacts in Damascus. At a
minimum, Hariri said, it proved the Salafists had nothing to
do with the attacks against the LAF and ISF. Separately,
Hariri requested USG assistance in tracking down information
on Omar Bakri, a cleric suspected of having al-Qaeda ties and
is reportedly linked to Syrian intelligence.

SISON