Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1390
2008-09-22 15:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 5-6 JOINT

Tags:  MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8510
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1390/01 2661533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221533Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3126
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2963
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3176
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001390 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
OSD FOR A/S LONG
PM FOR A/S KIMMITT
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 5-6 JOINT
MILITARY COMMISSION

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001390

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
OSD FOR A/S LONG
PM FOR A/S KIMMITT
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 5-6 JOINT
MILITARY COMMISSION

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The expansion of the U.S.-Lebanese military
partnership represents a historic opportunity to bolster the
cause of democracy, peace and stability in Lebanon and the
Middle East. The Government of Lebanon (GOL) has
demonstrated a commitment to strengthening our
military-to-military ties. The 2008 Joint Military
Commission (JMC) meeting offers an opportunity to confirm the
mutual benefits of the relationship and press for further
engagement in key areas. Since the departure of Syrian
forces in April of 2005, the USG has provided over $410
million in training and equipment to the LAF. End Summary.

The INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE
--------------


2. (C) There have been significant political developments
since May 2008, when the government's decision to attempt to
dismantle Hizballah's communications systems and remove the
chief of airport security sparked armed clashes between
Hizballah and Lebanese civilians. The clashes ended in a few
days and led to the Qatari-brokered Doha Agreement of May 21
which ended the months-long political impasse and paved the
way for the May 25 election of consensus candidate and former
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as
President. After much wrangling between the majority and the
opposition, Prime Minister Siniora completed formation of a
national unity government on July 11, composed, per the Doha
Agreement, of 16 majority ministers, 11 from the opposition,
and three for President Sleiman (including the key Defense
and Interior ministry portfolios). The Saad Hariri-led

majority coalition and Hizballah-led opposition coalition
have been uneasy partners in the new national unity
government. Both coalitions are intently focused on
parliamentary elections less than a year away. The Christian
vote, divided between the two groups, will be decisive in
determining who wins the next majority in the elections to be
held in the April-June 2009 period. In the short term, two
issues are likely to sharpen lines between the two groups: a
new election law parliament should approve by mid-October,
and the question of Hizballah's role and its arms in the
national defense strategy.


3. (C) On August 28, a Lebanese Armed Forces helicopter
operating in Hizballah-controlled territory in southern
Lebanon was shot down, resulting in the death of an LAF
officer. A young Hizballah fighter was arrested, and the
military investigation is ongoing. Meanwhile, sporadic
violence has plagued the northern city of Tripoli and
surrounding areas, to include villages in the Northern Bekaa
valley, although many are hopeful that a Hariri-brokered
reconciliation agreement signed September 8 will prove a
positive first step in overcoming a volatile political and
security environment. On September 10, Druze politician
Saleh Aridi was assassinated, sparking concerns over future
actions by those elements opposed to Lebanon's national
reconciliation. A clash in the north between rival Christian
groups on September 17 resulted in two deaths.


4. (C) As called for in the Doha Agreement, President Sleiman
announced on September 9 that he would launch a National
Dialogue to discuss the national defense strategy, including
the role of Hizballah's weapons. He chaired the first
session on September 16 and the next is scheduled for
November 5. Nonetheless, expectations in Lebanon are low
that the Dialogue will actually lead to an agreement whereby
Hizballah would give up its arms.


5. (C) During the summer of 2007, as Commander of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),Michel Sleiman steadfastly led
the LAF to victory against Fatah-al-Islam extremists at the
Nahr al Barid Palestinian refugee camp. However, he is by
nature a cautious man. He refrained from deploying the LAF

BEIRUT 00001390 002 OF 004


to counter Hizballah's May 2008 aggression, fearful of
putting the army in the middle of a sectarian conflict and
openly confronting Hizballah. Sleiman is trying to walk a
fine line between pro-Syrian and pro-western forces.


6. (C) We must stress to the GOL that Hizballah must be
disarmed. We should insist that the state of Lebanon must
have a monopoly over the use of force and that more must be
done to control arms smuggling from Syria. We should also
focus on the positive relationship between the United States
and Lebanon and U.S. support for the role of the Presidency.
We believe that emphasizing the U.S. commitment to Lebanon is
the best way to increase the GOL,s confidence in the U.S. as
a partner and consolidate support in Lebanon for the GOL.
The GOL may also be concerned about the impact of U.S.
elections on America's policy toward Lebanon, as well as the
status of U.S.-French cooperation on Lebanon.

REGIONAL ISSUES
--------------


7. (C) Sleiman is in the U.S. September 23-26. He will
address the UNGA and meet Secretary Rice in New York and
travel to Washington DC to meet President Bush and Secretary
Gates on September 25. He is likely to seek the President's
views on the Middle East Peace Process. He argues that
failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
fueled terrorism in the region, including Lebanon, where
extremists use the Palestinian cause to justify their actions.


8. (C) The Government of Lebanon has urged that Israel
withdraw from the disputed Sheba'a Farms territory and for
Sheba'a to be placed under the authority of the United
Nations. Government of Lebanon leadership may also urge the
United States to put an end to Israeli overflights and to
pressure the Israelis to turn over complete strike data to
aid in demining efforts.


9. (C) President Sleiman recently traveled to Damascus and
reached agreement with President Asad that Syria and Lebanon
establish diplomatic relations between the two countries for
the first time since Lebanon's independence 65 years ago.
However, Asad yielded little in terms of demarcating the
common border (including Sheba'a Farms) or providing
information on Lebanese citizens presumed missing in Syria.
The latest report by the UN's Lebanon Independent Border
Assessment Team, dated August 27, highlights the fact that
Lebanon has made almost no progress in securing its border
with Syria and points of entry as required by UNSCR 1701.
The team noted that progress in fortifying Lebanon's border
with Syria had been minimal. Sleiman and the government of
Lebanon have had no official reaction yet.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
--------------


10. (C) Since the departure of Syrian forces in April of
2005, the USG has provided over $410 million in training and
equipment to the LAF. The bulk of this aid has been Foreign
Military Funding (FMF),but also include significant amounts
of International Education and Training (IMET),Section 1206
funding, Counterterrorism Force Protection (CTFP),Joint
Combined Exercises and Training (JCET),and various other
military aid. FMF for FY 09 and FY 10 is tentatively
scheduled at $95M and $100m respectively. The LAF five year
acquisition plan is designed to take full advantage of these
historic amounts of military aid.

U.S. GAINS FROM THE RELATIONSHIP:
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC
--------------


11. (C) The benefit the USG seeks from the strong
military-to- military relationship with the LAF is to develop
a valid alternative to Hizballah for the people of Lebanon to
turn to for protection. A strong LAF also serves to
counteract Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon.

BEIRUT 00001390 003 OF 004



AREAS FOR GREATER COOPERATION
--------------


12. (C) Interoperability: Currently there is an Acquisition
and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Lebanon and the
U.S. which was used to great advantage by both countries in
the Nahr al Bared fight in 2007. There is no Status of
Forces agreement (SOFA) or Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) and no expectation the GOL would approve such
agreements in the foreseeable future.


13. (C) Training: The key component of U.S. military
training to the LAF will be the Comprehensive Training
Program (CTP). Because of the regular security threats to
official USG personnel in Lebanon, the life support of the
CTP needs to be closely coordinated with the LAF, USCENTCOM,
and the U.S. Embassy. The robust JCET program needs to be
maintained at its historic level of 6 missions per FY.
Mobile Training Teams from ARCENT, MARCENT, AFCENT, NAVCENT
and the USCG should also be programmed to assist the LAF.


14. (C) Modernization: After considerable U.S. urging,
Lebanon has drafted a five year modernization plan. Getting
Lebanon to ensure that its requests for Foreign Military
funding (FMF) acquisitions are consistent with its plan will
be key, and we should stress this in JMC discussions. We
should also encourage the MOD to think more critically about
whether they still need to retain their stock of aging and
difficult-to-maintain Soviet equipment, particularly the
T-54/55 tanks as well as the aging M-48 tanks.

WEAPONS RELEASE
--------------


15. (C) The MOD will continue to press, at a minimum, for
release of some form of Close Air Support (CAS) with a
precision weapons capability, Tactical UAVs, (RAVEN),TOW-2A
missiles, Night Vision Equipment, and perhaps precision
artillery munitions. The LAF is also in USCENTCOM-led
discussions with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to transfer
M-60 tanks to replace the aging Soviet T-55s and U.S. M-48
tanks. This transfer will require Third Party Transfer (TPT)
authority from the USG.

The VALUE OF JMC DIALOGUE
--------------


16. (C) We expect the annual JMC to be a central component in
our bilateral dialogue and gives us a valuable opportunity to
explore mutual views on the state and direction of the
relationship at a senior level. The JMC compliments the
annual Security Assistance Review (SAR) that focuses on the
action officer level of FMF cases.

ISSUES ON MINDEF MURR,S MIND
--------------


17. (C) In recent meetings, MINDEF Elias Murr has pressed
strongly for a CAS Platform with precision capability as well
as acquiring M60 tanks from Jordan. He would like to
increase the size of the LAF, especially the Special
Operating Forces, (SOF). MINDEF Murr and LAF CDR Kahwagi are
planning a comprehensive officer changeover in the entire LAF
in the very near future. Elias Murr was recently
re-confirmed as the GOL Defense Minister in August, and
Lieutenant General Jean Kahwagi was confirmed as the new LAF
Commander in September. Staff Brigadier General Edmond Fadel
was confirmed as the Director, Lebanese Armed Forces
Intelligence Directorate, G2 in September.


18. (C) We recommend that the U.S. delegation to the JMC make
the following points in the plenary session:

--Reiterate the strong and enduring U.S. commitment to an
independent and sovereign Lebanon;


BEIRUT 00001390 004 OF 004


--Stress the constructive role that a peaceful and prosperous
Lebanon can play in contributing to regional stability;

--Emphasize that the U.S. plans to continue to provide
support to strengthen Lebanon's state institutions, including
a robust package of U.S. military training and assistance, as
well as
assistance to the police (Internal Security Forces);

--Emphasize that continued USG support for the LAF,
particularly in the U.S. Congress, is tied to perceptions
that there is serious action being taken to Hizballah's use
of force under GOL control;

--Note that in addition the U.S. will continue to assist the
Government of Lebanon in building economic viability and
building governance capacity.
SISON