LEBANON: SINIORA: WHAT I ADVISED SLEIMAN TO RAISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001381

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA: WHAT I ADVISED SLEIMAN TO RAISE
IN U.S. TRIP

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) PM Siniora told the Ambassador that President Michel
Sleiman, in his upcoming visit to Washington, would raise
UNSCR 1701; Sheba'a; protecting Lebanon against regional
shocks, the need for continued U.S. political, economic and
military assistance to Lebanon; and assurances that Lebanon
will not be a "prize" for "good behavior" by Syria. He said
he encouraged Sleiman to overcome his initial reluctance to
go to Washington. He urged the USG to convince March 14
leaders to avoid unnecessary battles. Siniora will travel to
Saudi Arabia September 21 for a brief pilgrimage and will
also see King Abdullah. Siniora showed keen interest in
follow up actions related to his August trip to Iraq, both
for an agreement on oil and to work on bringing Iraq back
into the Arab fold. End Summary.

SLEIMAN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador and DCM met with PM Fouad Siniora and his
aide Rola Noureddine at the Grand Serail on Saturday,
September 20, the day before President Michel Sleiman
departed for his U.S. trip. Ambassador asked Siniora what
would be Sleiman's messages with President Bush. Siniora,
who is proud of his good relationship with Sleiman, said that
he had advised the President to raise UNSCR 1701, Sheba'a
Farms and protecting Lebanon against shocks in the region.
Elaborating, Siniora said there is a role for the U.S. on
Sheba'a (by which meant urging Israel to withdraw),the
Palestinian issue and providing Lebanon military, economic
and political assistance. He also urged Sleiman to ask the
U.S. President what might be "coming in the region", in
particular with Israel and Iran, and seek assurances that
Lebanon will not be a "prize for good behavior" for Syria or
others.


3. (C) Siniora admitted that Sleiman had had initial doubts
about going to Washington. Hinting that he had had a role in
persuading him to go, Siniora said Sleiman needed to be -- at
this point, he made a pushing motion with his two hands while
he searched for the right word -- "encouraged." But, as he
has before, Siniora praised Sleiman for the role he has
played since becoming President in May. Siniora thought the
U.S. trip was important to send a message about Lebanon's
sovereignty; that there is no longer the need for Lebanon's
president to ask "permission" for such a trip (presumably in
contrast to the time when Syria would have had a veto on such
a trip).


4. (C) When Ambassador asked if there had been any new
developments on Sheba'a, Siniora said UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon had
sent him a very general response to his recent letter. He
commented that UN Deputy SYG Asha-Rose Migiro, who visited
Beirut the previous week, was clearly "out of the loop" on
sensitive Lebanese political matters and that media reports
that there had been substantive discussions with her had been
much exaggerated.

SINIORA, SAFADI TRAVELING TO SAUDI ARABIA
--------------


5. (C) Earlier in the day, Siniora joined the Saudi
Ambassador and Education Minister Bahia Hariri to announce
that the Saudi government had donated $44 million for payment
of school fees, books and other education-related expenses.
Siniora told us this would be distributed throughout Lebanon.
The PM mentioned that he would be leaving the next day for
Saudi Arabia to perform a "mini-pilgrimage" but also to meet
King Abdullah. (Note: At a dinner that evening, Economy
Minister Safadi told the Ambassador that he, too, would be
traveling to Saudi Arabia to seek from the King some help for
his native city of Tripoli. The trips by Siniora and Safadi,
nominal March 14 allies in the cabinet, are apparently not
coordinated. End Note.)


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U.S. SHOULD PUSH MARCH 14 TO AVOID UNNECESSARY BATTLES
--------------


6. (C) Siniora attended the first session of the National
Dialogue on September 16, and reported that Sleiman did well
to keep the agenda and participation list from being expanded
as the opposition sought. Siniora said he sees this is a
period of "repositioning" by political parties (apparently
referring to the Jumblatt-Hizballah-Arslan and possible
Hariri-Hizballah meetings) and thought that process would
continue during the Dialogue, which apparently will move very
slowly, with the second session scheduled for November 5. He
urged he Ambassador to persuade March 14 leaders to
coordinate better with each other and avoid "side battles."
He mentioned specifically unnecessary March 14 battles with
Syria.

RECONCILIATION
--------------

7, (C) Siniora said that the importance of the agreement on
which he worked that ended the recent violence in Tripoli was
that civil society in that city now had a stronger role to
resolve tensions. He implicitly blamed Syria for the
trouble, saying the Syrians were looking to set up a
situation in which Lebanese authorities would be seen as
ineffective at preventing violence, leading to an invitation
to Syria to return to Lebanon to restore order.

USG ASSISTANCE
--------------


8. (C) PM Siniora highlighted the need for support to
Lebanon's army. The Ambassador noted the continued support,
including enhanced training to both the LAF and the ISF.
Siniora focused on the need to provide the army with needed
equipment in a timely manner, recounting delays encountered
during the fierce fighting at Nahr al Barid camp in 2007.
The Ambassador also said the USG is interested in carrying
out development activities that will promote economic
development and support the institutions of the state.
Siniora revealed that he had a number of ideas for projects
in various parts of Lebanon and wanted to follow up with us.
He is consulting with others on these projects, he said, and
has ideas for the North, Metn and Chouf areas, but needs to
finish consultations regarding the Bekaa and South.
Ambassador agreed to discuss these with him when he had
completed his consultations.

FOLLOW UP ON HIS TRIP TO IRAQ
--------------


9. (C) Siniora was eager to discuss Iraq. He said that his
visit there in August was intended to promote economic
cooperation, especially Iraq supplying oil to Lebanon, but
also to promote Iraq's return to the Arab fold. He said
Finance Minister Chatah and Energy Minister Tabourian would
travel to Iraq to follow up on energy issues. He noted that
in the past, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq had been effective
at curbing Syrian aggressiveness, but this has changed.


10. (C) As he walked her to the door, Siniora grumbled to the
Ambassador about Michel Aoun and his appointees in the
cabinet of the national unity government, singling out
Telecommunication Minister Gebran Bassil and Energy and Water
Minister Alan Tabourian as particularly unhelpful. Tabourian
cuts a fine figure with a Harvard degree, but some of his
actions are irrational, Siniora complained.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) We expect that President Sleiman likely will raise
with President Bush the issues that Siniora described, since
they track with views Sleiman has expressed to us and senior
USG visitors in the past months. Siniora was very relaxed
and at ease except when discussing the Aoun members of
cabinet. We have heard complaints from many in the new,
national unity cabinet about meetings that last as many as

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seven hours, with much time spent on matters that are not
significant. End Comment.

SISON