LEBANON: HIZBALLAH'S ARMS WEIGH ON SLEIMAN AS HE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001378

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HIZBALLAH'S ARMS WEIGH ON SLEIMAN AS HE
PREPARES FOR U.S. TRIP

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Advisor and confidant to President Sleiman BG
(retired) Fares Soufia said Sleiman was looking forward to
his upcoming visit to the United States and appreciated
continuing U.S. support and assistance. Sleiman was working
hard to promote reconciliation within Lebanon and therefore
was meeting with internal and external players from all
sides, with Hizballah's arms the main "problem." Soufia
stressed that the National Dialogue should not be rushed, but
that it would have a "happy ending" with the help of the U.S.
and Lebanon's neighbors. He did not rule the possibility
that the spring 2009 parliamentary elections could be delayed
if the Dialogue was not concluded before then. End summary.


2. (C) BG (ret.) Fares Soufia, advisor and friend of over 40
years to President Sleiman, a former Lebanese Defense Attache
to Washington, and green card holder, will accompany Sleiman
on his upcoming trip to the United States. The Ambassador
began by expressing enduring U.S. support for Lebanon,
stressing that the momentum of the strong U.S. commitment
would carry through the U.S. elections and beyond. The U.S.
had very ambitious plans for providing assistance to the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces
(ISF),in addition to economic assistance, she said. She
added that Sleiman's U.S. interlocutors would be interested
in hearing his views on regional developments, the recently
convened National Dialogue, and Sleiman's recent meeting with
Palestinian President Abu Mazen.


3. (C) Soufia said the GOL welcomed U.S. support, but
stressed the need for more visible assistance to the LAF.
Sleiman had succeeded in maintaining LAF unity in difficult
times, he said, including the summer 2007 fighting against
Islamic extremists in Nahr al-Barid. He was trying to do the
same with respect to recent clashes in Tripoli and other
areas, by "walking a middle path." Soufia reiterated
Sleiman's previous comments to the Ambassador that the LAF
should not do police work, and noted that the Ministries of
Defense and Interior had recently formed a committee to
coordinate on security matters.


3. (C) Soufia, saying he was "not worried," expected
Sleiman's U.S. visit to be a good one, immediately adding
that "the main problem is the resistance." He placed
Sleiman's U.S. trip in the context of complementing a
regional tour (that would include Iran and Saudi Arabia) to
talk to about the issue, adding that the U.S. role would be
to push Syria. Reverting to one of Sleiman's key themes,
Soufia said Lebanon was waiting for the regional dynamics to
change, with the peace process as the main issue.


4. (C) Citing clashes between members of Lebanese Forces and
Marada that resulted in two deaths, Soufia commented that
Sleiman was facing some very tough problems at home, where
small incidents could easily escalate into larger conflicts.
Sleiman was therefore working to promote reconciliation
between Lebanon's various political adversaries, reportedly
telling them to put the national interest above their own
partisan interests. Soufia confirmed press reports that
Sleiman had tasked advisor Nazem Khoury, working with
independent MP Michel Murr, to form a committee to work on
reconciliation issues.


5. (C) It was "delicate" work, Soufia noted, adding that the
handshake between majority Saad Hariri and Hizballah MP Raad
Mohamad at the National Dialogue was a good first step and
that Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah had "started to
apologize" for the May violence in a recent iftar speech.
First we must have reconciliation, he said, then political
discussions. Sleiman believed in the need to talk to
everyone, including Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah, his ally,
Free Patriotic Leader Michel Aoun, and Syrian President
Gashar Asad, stressing that after the 2006 war and events of
May 7, he wanted to ensure that sure that the National

BEIRUT 00001378 002 OF 002


Dialogue was successful.


6. (C) Regarding the Dialogue agenda, Soufia said Sleiman
would focus on the main issues, leaving other issues for the
cabinet. He affirmed, however, that the Dialogue would
continue to be limited to the 14 original participants.
Asked why Sleiman had scheduled the next session for November
5, Soufia said it was necessary not to rush the Dialogue, and
reiterated Sleiman's message to the Dialogue participants
that "failure is not an option." The dialogue will have a
happy ending, he said, with the help of the U.S. and
Lebanon's neighbors.


7. (C) Soufia hoped the Dialogue would conclude before the
spring 2009 parliamentary elections, so that the country
could make a "fresh start," but admitted that the elections
might be postponed if the Dialogue was not finished. "This
is an option," he said. Soufia, however, said Sleiman
forming his own political bloc was not an option. "The only
option for Michel Sleiman is Lebanon," he declared.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Despite Soufia's assurances that he was looking
forward to a "great" visit, he also indirectly conveyed
continuing underlying apprehension about the trip. His
comment that he was "not worried," immediately followed by
his reference to the "resistance," combined with Sleiman's
decision to launch the National Dialogue prior to the trip,
suggest that Sleiman continues to fear his U.S. interlocutors
will beat him up on the issue of Hizballah's arms. Sleiman
needs to hear a stern message on this topic, but it should be
tied to the "carrot" of increasing U.S. military assistance
to the LAF and ISF should U.S. concerns on Hizballah's arms
be addressed.


9. (C) Sleiman may not be looking to form his own political
bloc (at least yet; many expect he will consider doing so
before the elections),but he has indicated a desire to
regain presidential powers lost in the 1989 Taif Record.
Recently, Sleiman proposed amending the Accord to give the
President the power to dissolve both parliament and the
cabinet, and to remove time limits on the President's
response to cabinet decrees. End comment.

SISON