LEBANON: HARIRI TO MEET NASRALLAH SOON?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001375

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR SA SY IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI TO MEET NASRALLAH SOON?

REF: A. BEIRUT 1349

B. BEIRUT 1360

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Rumors are growing of an imminent meeting between
majority leader Saad Hariri and Hizballah SYG Hassan
Nasrallah, especially after Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's
representatives met with Hizballah officials earlier in the
week to discuss security issues. However, Hariri's advisor
Ghattas Khoury remains firm that Hizballah has not yet
sufficiently accepted responsibility for the May violence,
Hariri's primary pre-condition for meeting Nasrallah.
Nevertheless, Hariri told the Ambassador on September 17 that
he was feeling mounting pressure to meet Nasrallah. End
summary.

HARIRI CONDITIONS MEETING
ON AN APOLOGY
--------------


2. (C) Though rumors of a meeting between majority leader
Saad Hariri and Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah had abounded
throughout the summer months, it increasingly is appearing
that a meeting will indeed occur. Hariri told the Ambassador
on September 13 he would "probably want to do the meeting"
(Ref A).


3. (C) At an iftar he hosted on September 17, Hariri told the
Ambassador that he was feeling mounting pressure to meet with
Hizballah. His advisor, Ghattas Khoury, told LES Senior
Political Advisor that President Michel Sleiman is pushing
for such a meeting. (Note: Representatives from Druze
leQr Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and
Hizballah officials met on September 15, Ref B, to discuss
security issues in what some see as a preview of an eventual
Hariri-Nasrallah meeting. End note.)


4. (C) Hariri publicly seemed to lay the groundwork when he
publicly stated on September 16 that "reconciliations take
place with political adversaries..., and not with allies.
Those who want to go to reconciliation have to be courageous
and bold."


5. (C) Pro-opposition Al-Akhbar said in its September 18
edition that preparations were being made and that Hariri had
overcome his reservations. Khoury downplayed the report
within hours of its publication, stating, "We had informed
President Sleiman that he can proceed with the required
contacts to facilitate the meeting, but if they (Hizballah
officials) don't want to apologize to Beirut, there is no
need to open old wounds." Criticizing Nasrallah's recent
remarks in which he defended Hizballah's actions in May,
Khoury said that if the meeting is to be held, "there should
be agreement on a number of principles, because using weapons
for domestic purposes strips the resistance of its reason to
exist."

PRE-CONDITIONS, SECURITY
CONCERNS REMAIN UNRESOLVED
--------------


6. (S) Privately, Khoury told LES Senior Political Advisor
prior to his public statement that Hizballah has yet to
assume responsibility for the May violence and "heal the
wounds," a condition Hariri is requesting prior to meeting
Nasrallah. Separately, PSP Minister Wael Abu Faour described
a proposal he attributed to Sleiman in which Hizballah MP
Mohammed Raad would visit Hariri's residence at Qoreitem as a
gesture of goodwill. Abu Faour said that Hariri rejected
this proposal, demanding instead a larger Hizballah
delegation that would express some sort of apology.
Hizballah security official Wafiq Safa purportedly proposed
to Hariri bringing a large Hizballah delegation (minus
Nasrallah, due to security concerns) to Qoreitem to
apologize, paving the way for Hariri to pay a later visit to
Nasrallah (Ref B).


BEIRUT 00001375 002 OF 002



7. (C) Further, Abu Faour added, selecting a secure location
remains problematic. According to Faour, Nasrallah rejected
Sleiman's offer to hold the meeting at the presidential
palace out of security concerns.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) If Hariri were to overcome his need for some sort of
apology prior to meeting Nasrallah there still remains the
issue of selecting a location. This would not be the first
time he has backed down to Hizballah; prior to convening in
Doha, Hariri had refused to give the opposition a blocking
third in parliament, but ultimately relented during the
negotiations. Even if they could agree on a relatively
neutral ground, Nasrallah would fear security leaks. His
public appearances are rare, brief, and unannounced. Keeping
quiet about the location, while giving Hariri enough
assurances to feel comfortable, will not be an easy feat. It
is also possible that Saudi Arabia, which has influenced
Hariri's thinking in the past, has not yet given the green
light to such a meeting. End comment.
SISON