LEBANON: ACTING ARMY COMMANDER MASRI PUTS ATTACK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001301

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MCDERMOTT
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
OSD FOR EDELMAN/LONG/STRAUB/DALTON
JOINT STAFF FOR RANK/NICHOLSON
CENTCOM FOR ALLARDICE/MACLEAN/PADDOCK
DIA FOR LARSON/CRONIN/KRAUSE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MCAP MARR IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ACTING ARMY COMMANDER MASRI PUTS ATTACK
HELOS AT TOP OF LIST

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an August 29 meeting with a visiting DOD
delegation, a confident and open Acting Lebanese Armed Forces
Commander Masri explained the Army's most pressing needs,
chief among them attack helicopters. Masri explained that
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would remain in support of
the Internal Security Forces (ISF) during the 2009 elections,
but that he expected the LAF to play a large supporting role.
Masri informed the delegation that many countries are
courting the LAF with offers of security assistance, but that
the LAF is rebuffing their efforts, preferring to stay with
the U.S. as its primary supplier. End Summary.


2. (SBU) During a one-day visit to Lebanon on August 27,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (OSDP-ISA) Mary Beth Long and Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities (OSDP-SOLICIC) Michael Vickers
met with Lebanese Minister Acting Army Commander Shawki
Al-Masri at Lebanese Armed Forces Headquarters in Yarze.
Long and Vickers were accompanied by Major General Robert
Allardice, CENTCOM J-5; Colonel Dave Huggins, ARCENT
Commander Representative; Colonel Tom Henwood, ASD Long's
Military Assistant; Lieutenant Colonel Bob Paddock, CENTCOM
Lebanon Desk Officer; Commander Wyman Howard SOLICIC Desk
Officer; and Melissa Dalton, OSD Lebanon Desk Officer. Also
in attendance were Ambassador Sison; visiting Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs David Hale and
Defense Attache Lieutenant Colonel David Alley.

UNITY OF THE ARMY IS PARAMOUNT
WE MUST ALSO PRESERVE STABILITY
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3. (C) Masri opened the meeting by characterizing the many
USG delegations that have visited Lebanon as confirmation to
him that the United States is concerned about Lebanon. "Not
only concern, but also importance," replied the Ambassador.
"We want to keep the unity of the Army," said Masri, "This is
our main job. We will do our best to preserve stability."


4. (C) General Masri then recounted the recent problems in
Tripoli, the Beka'a, and in Beirut as examples of the many
security problems facing Lebanon. In his estimation, these
problems are predominantly political and require political
solutions. During the time that politicians search for a
political solution, the Army must remain united so that it
will be available to the state once the political compromises
have been made. "We interfere in situations to try and calm
them down," said Masri, "but everyone knows we have more
missions than troops we need (to perform these missions)."

THE LAF'S ROLE DURING THE ELECTIONS IS
TO SUPPORT THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
--------------


5. (C) Masri told us that he sees the current violence as a
type of communication system. "I think a lot of people are
sending messages related to the 2009 elections," he said.
Masri told us that some people blame the current state of
unrest on security problems, but the real reason for the
unrest is an unstable political situation.


6. (C) Masri expects this type of unrest to continue into the
elections next year. Regarding the LAF's role in securing
the elections, Masri said, "we work with the ISF. Elections
are the responsibility of the ISF, not the LAF. We can only
assist them." Even with this clear division of
responsibility, Masri does not think that the ISF will be

BEIRUT 00001301 002 OF 004


capable of securing the elections by themselves. "We will be
there ready to help them," said Masri. Masri said that the
LAF could not allow anything to happen in the security arena
to alter the electoral outcome. On an almost cautionary
note, Masri reminded us, "maybe the political allies will
change between now and the elections." (Comment: Masri is a
Druze officer who has direct links to Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt. End Comment.) ASD Long offered DoD assistance to
the LAF in the form of "lessons learned" from DoD's
experiences with election security in other parts of the
world.

ISF IS HALF THE SIZE OF THE ARMY
BUT THEY ARE NOT DOING VERY MUCH
--------------


7. (C) It was evident that Masri was taking pains to curb his
criticism of the ISF. Masri told us that the ISF was having
great difficulties because they have a different composition,
a clear reference to the oft-heard refrain that the ISF is
Sunni-dominated. Masri said that the LAF is working with the
ISF on many projects throughout the country, suchQs the
Common Border Force on the northern border with Syria as well
as joint security operations in Tripoli. Even so, the
majority of Lebanese still do not accept the ISF and look to
the LAF for protection. For this reason, Masri told us it is
imperative to bolster the Army's capabilities. At the same
time, Masri feels that it is important to show that the ISF
works for the benefit of all Lebanese.


8. (C) Masri told us that the ISF currently has 23,000
personnel, a little less than half the number of LAF troops.
Even with this great number, Masri assessed that the ISF is
doing little saying, "they do nothing compared to LAF
missions." Masri assured us that the LAF is trying to work
side by side with the ISF, and that the ISF Commander Major
General Ashraf Rifi is a good man, but the ISF is not getting
a good return on its investment because of its confessional
make up. "Their institution needs to build some
credibility," said Masri.

NEW LEBANESE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND STILL UNDER FORMATION
--------------


10. (C) General Masri told us that the new Lebanese Special
Operations Command (LSOC) is still in its early stages of
development. The commander, Brigadier General Charbel
Feghali, has been in place for several months now and has
started identifying possible future staff members. Masri
says that the LSOC needs much preparation and planning as
well as a location for the staff to work.

WE NEED NEW EQUIPMENT NOW
WE CANNOT WAIT UNTIL THE NEXT CRISIS
--------------


11. (C) Masri then turned to the subject of equipment for the
LAF. He tied his equipment requests to specific missions that
he has to accomplish on the ground. He is concerned about any
mission that may present itself unexpectedly, such as another
Nahr Al Bared Palestinian refugee camp scenario. This time,
Masri fears, it could be the Ain Al Hilweh camp that is a
problem. During this same period, the ever-closing elections
are going to create additional missions that are unforeseen
at this time. It is for this reason that Masri made his plea
for immediate assistance saying, "we cannot continue like
this."


12. (C) ASD Long told MG Masri that MG Allardice would review
the LAF's priorities and timelines for equipment fielding and
trainig. Additionally, he would focus on planning fortraining to commence in January 2009. When asked f his plan

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included appropriate consideration for the elections, Masri
said that, "it is not important to look through the lens of
the elections. Only look at what we need to do our security
job."

ATTACK HELICOPTERS ARE OUR NUMBER
ONE PRIORITY FOR THE ARMY
--------------


13. (C) In order to meet their security requirements, Masri
told us that the LAF's number one equipment priority was
"fighting helicopters," by which he meant attack helicopters.
Masri said he needed attack helicopters to move quickly
around the country to face threats in the camps and to face
the militias. Masri was quick to add that the LAF is not
thinking of threats from "outside of its borders" when
making this request, a clear reference to Israel. Masri told
us that the LAF is only requesting the minimal equipment,
with the minimal capability, to accomplish its assigned
missions. "What we ask for are things to protect ourselves
inside the country, against militias inside Lebanon, and
terrorists, or if someone were to cross our borders," said
Masri. In any case, Masri believes that these things are
needed no matter if there are elections or not. "We need
this equipment to face this armed group Hizballah Else, we
cannot face them."

WE HAVE HEARD MUCH DISCUSSION
BUT SEE LITTLE ACTION ON HELOS
--------------


14. (C) Masri, usually one for great understatement, leaned
forward, took a deep breath, and said, &Speaking frankly to
you from my heart, until now, the opposition tells us we
don't receive anything for our pro-American stance except
promises.8 Masri told ASD Long that the LAF must be able to
show this opposition that their decision to go with the
United States was the correct decision. Masri said, "We have
to be able to show them something. Attack helicopters are a
priority for us. We cannot wait. We have to move quickly.
Tell us if the answer is 'no' from the U.S. so we can ask
another country." Masri cited Nahr Al Barid as his principal
example of fighting breaking out suddenly, and without
warning.

WE COULD NOT HAVE WON AT BARID
WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE UNITED STATES
--------------


15. (S/NF) Masri recounted the initial days of the struggle
at Nahr Al Barid for ASD Long, saying that the LAF could not
have won without the intelligence and ammunition assistance
from the United States. "Fatah al Islam fought us for three
months without one case of resupply. We could only fight for
fifteen days without your help," said Masri. Again, Masri
insisted that the LAF cannot wait for events to happen before
the U.S. takes action. "We ask for the least amount of
things that we need. You cannot recognize an army that has
no fighting helicopters and no tanks," said Masri.

MANY OTHER COUNTRIES ARE MAKING OFFERS
BUT WE PREFER TO STAY WITH THE USA
--------------


16. (C) Masri also took some time to discuss assistance
proposals from other countries. Masri was quick to point out
that these proposals were for &free8 or &donated8
equipment. Masri told ASD Long that he has repeatedly
refused these offers because the LAF wants to stay aligned
with the U.S. "We will have a big problem if we reject them
and don't get things from you," said Masri.


17. (C) Masri told ASD Long that the current training and

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equipping plan is good, and that the LAF is quite satisfied
with the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program. Masri said he is convinced that these tracks are
crucial for the relationship, but he also warned that there
were others who needed to be convinced. "We have received
track pads for our armored personnel carriers, some spare
parts, and some ammunition, but not much else. Announcement
of fighting helicopters would change the mood in Lebanon,"
said Masri.

IF THE UNITED STATES CANNOT
AFFORD TO HELP US, WHO CAN?
--------------

18. (C) Masri rhetorically asked, "If you cannot afford to
help us with attack helicopters, who can?8 Masri cited the
United Arab Emirates' donation of light attack Gazelle
helicopters that had precision missiles. Masri recounted how
they arrived during the Nahr Al Bared conflict and were
immediately presaged into service in close combat operations.
"Only the helicopters can change the mood of the war. This is
why we emphasize attack helicopters," said Masri.

19. (C) According to Masri, Fatah al-Islam knew it was in
trouble when the LAF started dropping bombs from jerry-rigged
UH-1 helicopters that were never designed to drop bombs.
"What shall we use when we have to move to Ain Al Hilweh?"
asked Masri. To emphasize this point, Masri said, "If Ain Al
Hilweh happened tomorrow, we are not ready. Anything that
happens there will not stay in the camp."

20. (C) Assistant Secretary Long has cleared this cable.
SISON