LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, UNSCOL SHARES CONCERNS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001289

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, EA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND
DOD/OSD A/S LONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, UNSCOL SHARES CONCERNS
ABOUT SECURITY SITUATION

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an August 31 meeting with visiting NEA DAS David
Hale,officials of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon
(UNSCOL) discussed the 2009 parliamentary elections, the
National Dialogue, LIBAT II, Sheba'a Farms, UNMACC's funding
crisis, and the August 28 downing by Hizballah of a Lebanese
Armed Forces helicopter and killing of the pilot. End
summary.


2. (SBU) On August 31, visiting NEA DAS David Hale,
accompanied by the Ambassador, DCM, and Poloffs, met with
United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon
(UNSCOL) Chief of Staff Jack Christofides and senior advisors
Diego Zorrilla and Judith Goetz at their downtown Beirut
headquarters.

UNSCOL CONCERNED ABOUT
AL-QAIDA LOCALLY
--------------


3. (S) Christofides stated that UNSCOL was growing and, based
on advice from UN security officials, planned to move from
its center city offices in the Solidere area to a villa in
the suburbs. Christofides believed the most serious threat
to UNSCOL was not from internal Lebanese actors but from Al
Qaida groups operating in Lebanon. Out of UNSCOL's staff of
eighty, fifty are associated with security, he noted. He
added that UNSCOL's public image needed to improve, but he
had deliberately kept a low profile with local press due to
earlier distortions of UN missions and activities. He said
that incoming new Special Coordinator Michael Williams is
expected to arrive in October.

FOCUSED ON 2009 ELECTIONS
--------------


4. (C) Zorrilla stated that Williams would focus on the 2009
parliamentary elections, including monitoring election law
developments in parliament, working to make electoral reforms
visible, and providing technical assistance to the Ministry
of Interior (MOI). Zorrilla also stressed the need to
monitor closely those electoral districts expected to be
hotly contested, estimating that 40 out of 64 "Christian"
seats will be contentious. The Ambassador stressed the need
to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),Internal Security
Force (ISF) and MOI with plans to maintain security during
the lead-up to the elections and beyond.

BORDER SECURITY REQUIRES
INCREASED LEBANESE OWNERSHIP
--------------


5. (C) Discussion turned to the recent LIBAT II report
(Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team). Zorrilla said
LIBAT II offered technical recommendations for improvements
but lacked "strategic direction" and "ownership" by the GOL.
He added that UNSCOL can play a role, but there is presently
no overriding strategy for border security, and international
efforts are not coordinated. DAS Hale commented there were
limits to the effectiveness of future monitoring capacity
unless there is some political will coming from Syria to
cooperate in border control. Zorrilla agreed with the
"enormous challenge" ahead and the need for coordinated
international support.


6. (C) Turning to the political and security situation, DAS
Hale stated the U.S. wants to demonstrate support for "forces
of moderation" and for progress on the Doha agreement and
support for the LAF and ISF. Weapons smuggling to Hizballah,
stated Hale, was of great concern to the Israelis. Coming
from a recent stop in Israel, Hale said he was passing along
his interpretation of Israeli concerns and not delivering any
sraeli messages. He said Israel wanted to preventanother

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crisis. Credible action on UNSCR 1701 was needed to convince
Israel it was not "business as usual" concerning Hizballah's
suspected rearming in the south.


7. (C) As for LAF support, all agreed that in the long term,
the Lebanese see the army as a strong national symbol that
needs greater capacity so it may play a more central role and
become a stronger "alternative."

NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


8. (C) Christofides agreed that momentum on the National
Dialogue appeared to have waned, with the start date now
uncertain. In addition, the agenda probably will not be
limited to the defense strategy, he thought. Christofides
commented that a "strong president must carry through
proposals," referring to the need for President Sleiman to
get going on the National Dialogue. He noted that UNDP had
been asked to provide technical assistance to the Presidency
to support the Dialogue.

UNMACC FUNDING CRISIS
--------------


9. (C) DAS Hale voiced his support for finding a solution for
funding demining operations in south Lebanon in the wake of
news that UNMACC (UN Mine Action Coordination Committee) has
begun to demobilize due to insufficient funds needed to
maintain the full 40-plus teams. Hale stated that he had
discussed the demining issue with the Israelis during his
earlier visit to Israel.

HIZBALLAH TAKES THE HEAT
--------------


10. (C) Christofides stated he had recently visited with
Hizballah officials and came to the conclusion Hizballah was
keeping a low profile after the May revolt. Christofides
intended to visit to discuss with Hizballah the August 28
shooting of an LAF helicopter. Hale stated the shooting was
an embarrassment to the LAF. Among the theories he had heard
mentioned during his stay in Beirut, he said, was that the
attack was a response to the recent selection of a new LAF
commander and/or recent announcements of U.S. support to the
LAF. Christofides concluded that Hizballah was not looking
to "rock the boat" in the run-up to the 2009 elections and
wanted to realize electoral gains. On this matter, Zorrilla
commented that gains would come at March 14's expense, and
Christians could gain credibility if they allied themselves
more with Michel Aoun's party.


11. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this message.

SISON