LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, AOUN ALLY ELIE SKAFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001285

SIPDIS

EPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND
DOD/OSD A/S LONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2010
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR IS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, AOUN ALLY ELIE SKAFF
DEFENDS HIZBALLAH ALLIANCE

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Minister of Agriculture Elie Skaff defended both his
and Michel Aoun's alliance with Hizballah in an August 30
meeting with visiting NEA DAS Hale. Skaff argued that the
West had abandoned the weak and divided Christians of
Lebanon, forcing them to make internal alliances. Skaff
strongly questioned the USG's unilateral support for the
"Saudi-minded" Hariri and Sunni bloc, fearing the Muslim
Brotherhood would topple the current Syrian regime if Sunnis
gained the majority in upcoming Lebanese elections. Skaff
avoided directly addressing USG and Israeli concerns about
Hizballah rearmament, and called a recent Hizballah attack on
a Lebanese Armed Forces helicopter an "accident."


USG FOCUS WILL CONTINUE IN LEBANON
--------------


2. (C) Newly appointed Minister of Agriculture Elie Skaff (an
ally of opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun and leader of
the opposition Zahle bloc) met with visiting NEA DAS Hale,
the Ambassador, PolOff, and ConOff on August 30. DAS Hale
opened the meeting by reaffirming the USG's commitment to
Lebanon, a relationship he said will remain robust throughout
and after the U.S. presidential elections. He highlighted
bipartisan support for Lebanon and USG interest in utilizing
the Doha Agreement as a platform to move forward peacefully.
However, DAS Hale remarked, the Doha Agreement did not solve
underlying internal issues in Lebanon. Faith must be
restored in state institutions to create a sustainable
government, he emphasized. DAS Hale continued by
highlighting recent Egyptian support for Lebanon as a
positive sign, adding that Jordan and Saudi Arabia could act
as further stabilizing forces as well.

SKAFF AVOIDS ADDRESSING HIZBALLAH
REARMAMENT
--------------


3. (C) DAS Hale then switched to the rearmament of Hizballah
in southern Lebanon, which he stressed was a grave and valid
concern for both Americans and Israelis. He highlighted that
there is an unimpeded flow of weapons to Hizballah that
matches or exceeds levels in 2006, warning that there will
inevitably be consequences for such actions.


4. (C) Skaff evaded making a direct response on the concerns
of Hizballah rearmament. Instead, he claimed not to have any
information on the topic and asked "are the weapons defensive
or offensive," implying that Hizballah's acquisition of
defensive weapons did not present a serious problem. "I
think missiles are considered offensive weapons," DAS Hale
retorted, to which Skaff had no response.


5. (C) Addressing the possibilities of an Israeli-initiated
war, Skaff noted that Israel could destroy Lebanon, but it
could not control nor eliminate the 60 to 70 million
Hizballah supporters short of detonating a nuclear bomb. "If
the Israelis are wise," he said, "they would work towards
peace." Skaff also seemed to think that if the USG solved
its problems with Iran, many of Lebanon's internal conflicts
would also be resolved.


CHRISTIANS ARE WEAK
--------------


6. (C) Skaff reminisced that in the 1970s, Christians had
greater control of governmental institutions and were much
better represented in the parliament. He said this changed
once the Sunnis and Shia each united within themselves into

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armed and politically cohesive blocks. Meanwhile, he
commented, the Christians remained divided and unarmed, many
of them leaving Lebanon altogether. This left the Christians
in a weak and vulnerable position, Skaff noted, adding "we
looked to the West for support, but the West did not care."
The more Christians feel threatened, the more they will
continue to ally with others, Skaff explained. "It's a very
simple calculation: we have to protect ourselves; you are not
going to protect us."


7. (C) According to Skaff, the focus of upcoming elections
will be whether Christians decide to ally with the Shia (the
current opposition) or the Sunnis (the current majority).
There is a fight for who will control parliament in 2009, he
noted, and then warned "if we win, don't misjudge Aoun." DAS
Hale assured that the USG's interests were to guarantee the
free and fair elections of Lebanon, not to affect the
outcome.

EXPLAINING THE HIZBALLAH ALLIANCE
--------------


8. (C) Skaff seemed eager to explain and defend his agreement
to an alliance with Hizballah, saying he "did what he had to
do" after being snubbed by Hariri in previous elections.
Hariri and the Sunnis "have a very Saudi way of thinking," he
commented, inserting that he did not like the way the Sunni
bloc dealt with other factions. Skaff cited a deteriorating
relationship with Hariri, the Sunni marginalization of the
Aoun and Zahle blocs, and the weak position of the Christians
as his rationale for allying with the opposition. "We had to
fight for recognition, and without Hizballah we had no chance
of gaining a majority" Skaff declared. "If you can't live
with the one you love, love the one you live with."


9. (C) In response to Skaff's justification, DAS Hale
asserted that an alliance with Hizballah could not, in any
way, benefit Christians or any other faction. He said the
USG would not support any alliance with Hizballah. (Note:
Skaff has had a historically tumultuous relationship with the
Hariri family due to an outstanding 12 million dollar loan
obtained from Hariri-owned BankMed. It is alleged that to
repay this loan, Skaff created a joint venture in 2007 with
Shia partners financially backed by Hizballah. End Note.)

THE SUNNIS ARE THE REAL ENEMY
--------------


10. (C) "You chose the wrong allies, Skaff commented,
blatantly questioning the USG's alliance with Hariri. "Who
were the ones that destroyed your buildings on 9/11?" he
asked, "It was the Sunnis. You have to ask yourself, who are
your real enemies, the Sunnis or the Shia?" Skaff warned that
the Sunnis have "great aspirations" and are simply waiting
for another Nasser-like leader to unite them. Meanwhile, he
said, the Shia are more defensive in nature and "peace with
the Shia is more sustainable." DAS Hale assured that the USG
is a friend of moderates across all factions and religions
and knew it could work with them, but Hizballah is not
moderate.


11. (C) Skaff persisted by repeatedly voicing his discontent
with the current administration's Lebanon policy, notably
that of supporting only one bloc and thus "dividing the
country." He attributed the creation of the opposition to
the USG's unilateral support of Hariri and March 14. Skaff
did, however, express satisfaction that, unlike before, the
USG seemed willing to work within the Doha framework.


12. (C) Continuing his complaints against the Sunnis, Skaff
speculated that if the Sunnis gain the majority in upcoming
elections in Lebanon, then the current Alawite regime in
neighboring Syria would be overthrown by a fanatical Muslim
Brotherhood. "Then it will be over for us," he conceded,
"and we will do everything to prevent this from happening."
Skaff further remarked that he does not oppose the current

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Syrian leadership, providing it remains out of Lebanon.


13. (C) Still keen on defending his alliance with Hizballah,
Skaff explained the Shia are a key ally, not only because
they are an overwhelming majority in Lebanon, but also
because they represent a consistently threatened minority
within Islam. "Israel is not their only worry," Skaff
acknowledged of the Shia, "they are in the same boat as we
Christians." Skaff called Aoun a strategist, not a fanatic,
for allying with Hizballah, and assured that Aoun had
considered all angles and believed the Shia to be a "shield
against a Sunni invasion."


14. (C) DAS Hale responded that the Syrian scenario presented
by Skaff was highly unlikely and, that for better or worse,
the Syrian regime seemed steadfast at the moment. He also
cautioned that the Christians are "riding a tiger" in
supporting Hizballah and that Hizballah's actions were much
more likely to destabilize the region than those of the
Sunnis.

HELICOPTER ATTACK WAS AN ACCIDENT
--------------


15. (C) When asked by DAS Hale to explain the August 28th
attack on a Lebanese Armed Forces helicopter, Skaff responded
that there is an on-going investigation looking into the
matter and stressed that Hizballah was being fully
cooperative. Explaining the attack, Skaff said a young
Hizballah supporter had fired at the helicopter, but the
results were unintentional. "Even President Sleiman has
mentioned that the area the helicopter was in a very
dangerous area," he commented, stating that helicopters
routinely notify UNIFIL before flying over this region.
Skaff expressed he did not expect factional tensions to
escalate as a result of this attack.


16. (C) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.

SISON