LEBANON: GEAGEA WARNS DAS HALE THAT ISRAEL IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001273

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD A/S LONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC PINR MARR IS IR FR SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA WARNS DAS HALE THAT ISRAEL IS
STRENGHENING HIZBALLAH, DESCRIBES MARCH 14 DIVISIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an August 29 meeting with visiting NEA DAS David
Hale, Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea stressed the
importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue to
facilitate resolution of other regional issues. He said
Israel is making a huge mistake by publicly criticizing the
Lebanese government instead of Hizballah's Syrian suppliers.
Geagea said the U.S. could be most helpful to Lebanon by
keeping up pressure on Iran and Syria, and said an indictment
by Special Tribunal for Lebanon by the end of the year would
be good for March 14's election chances.


2. (C) Geagea claimed divisions within March 14 were not
among its Christian leaders, but between Saad Hariri and his
coalition partners. He was confident parliament would pass
an electoral law by the end of September, and that the
cabinet would appoint the new army commander soon, but asked
for USG support for his choice for the G-2 Director of
Military Intelligence. Looking at the opposition, Geagea
believed there would be no way to put a wedge between Michel
Aoun and Hizballah. (The cabinet chose Gen. Jean Kahwagi is
the new army commander later that day.) End summary.

NO PALESTINIAN NATURALIZATION
--------------


3. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale, accompanied by
Ambassador, NEA/ELA Lebanon Desk Officer, and PolOffs met
with Samir Geagea on August 29 at his home in Maarab.
Geagea, noting warmly that DAS Hale was the last diplomat to
see him before his imprisonment in 1994, began by insisting
on the fundamental importance of resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and determining the fate of the
Palestinian refugees, particularly those in Lebanon. He said
he hoped the next administration would tackle the issue
seriously. He worried that some in Lebanon were in favor of
the naturalization of the Palestinians in Lebanon. He told
Hale that the USG should speak out against this idea.


4. (C) DAS Hale agreed that resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian issue was crucial to peace and security
in the region, and told Geagea that the Administration is
working very hard on it in its final months in office. He
explained the USG view in the Middle East, that Iran is an
overarching threat to many friends in the region, including
Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and the Palestinians. Geagea insisted
that resolution for the Palestinians would make dealing with
Iran easier; "You can't have peace when there are people
living without a state," he said.

"WE CANNOT STOP THE WEAPONS"
--------------


5. (C) Geagea said Israel was making a huge mistake in
threatening the Lebanese militarily. He maintained that the
recent Lebanese ministerial statement, which prompted Israeli
criticism, was "ten times better" than the previous statement
from 2005, and yet the Israelis insisted on threatening the
Lebanese state based on the rhetoric of Hizballah. Hizballah
had lost a lot of ground politically in May, he said, but the
prisoner exchange the Israelis negotiated with them gave them
legitimacy. The continued threats, he said, merely make
Hizballah stronger.


6. (C) DAS Hale explained the deep pessimism he perceived
among Israeli officials and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
officers, saying the IDF found the weapons flow to Hizballah
alarming. He said the Israelis perceived a "creeping"
Hizballah power grab from the state, and they viewed Doha as
a Hizballah victory. He told Geagea that the Israelis needed
to see something tangible to slow the flow of weapons.


7. (C) "We cannot," said Geagea. "That does not mean we do
not want to, but we cannot. Siniora moved one guy from the

BEIRUT 00001273 002 OF 003


airport in May, and look what happened. What will they do if
we try to move people at the border? The Lebanese are
willing but not able. The Syrians are able but not willing.
Why are the Israelis not threatening them? Why do they
threaten us? They are hurting the good forces in Lebanon."


8. (C) DAS Hale asked Geagea his thoughts on recent French
overtures to Damascus. Geagea shrugged, saying that maybe
overall it is not a bad thing. They should do their
experiment, the Syrians will not deliver, and then no one
will be able to say it had not been tried, he said. Asked
what he thought the French objective was, Geagea replied,
"They want a bigger role."

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL INDICTMENTS,
MARCH 14 CHRISTIANS KEY TO ELECTIONS
--------------


9. (C) Turning to the spring 2009 elections, Geagea
reiterated that Israel should put more pressure on Syria.
"Without Syria, there is no Hizballah." He asked what kind
of progress there was on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
DAS Hale and the Ambassador replied that it was becoming
operational and that UNIIIC was gathering evidence for
potential indictments. Geagea said that indictments would be
good for the March 14 coalition, particularly if the timing
was right, before the end of 2008. He told Hale that the
most important thing the U.S. could do in advance of the
elections was to stay tough with Syria and Iran.


10. (C) Asked whether March 14 was managing to work together
effectively and stay unified, Geagea said that some party
leaders in March 14 refused to give seats to the parties
delivering the votes for the March 14 bloc. While there had
been a few disagreements between Geagea and Kataeb leader
Amine Gemayel ("They refuse to acknowledge their actual
size," he complained),he maintained that the Christians in
March 14 were largely united. Saad Hariri, he said, was
causing the problems. "Hizballah delivered the Christian
part of its gains to Aoun. Our partners (meaning Saad) are
not delivering to us. Saad says 'I refuse to be a Sunni
leader. I want to be a multi-confessional leader.' He
can't! He needs to give us seats in the Christian parts of
Sunni areas."


11. (C) Geagea was confident that parliament would pass the
new electoral law by the end of September. However, he was
pessimistic about the National Dialogue, saying that talk of
expansion of the dialogue participation was merely a delaying
tactic.

RESIGNED TO KAHWAGI AS ARMY COMMANDER,
FOCUSED ON G-2 INTELLIGENCE SLOT
--------------


12. (C) Geagea predicted the cabinet would vote in General
Jean Kahwagi as Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
Geagea said he did not know Qahwaji and so the LF ministers
would not vote for him, but they would not object to his
appointment. (Note: The Cabinet did approve Kahwagi's
appointment later the same day. Geagea's two ministers
abstained, as did the two ministers of another March 14
leader, Walid Jumblatt. End note.)


13. (C) Geagea said he was very concerned, however, about the
appointment of the LAF G-2 Director of Military Intelligence,
which should happen within a few days of Kahwagi's
appointment. He claimed there were three candidates
remaining for the position: Joseph Njeim, Albert Karam, and
Maroun Hitti. Njeim, he said, was out of the running,
because "too many people do not like him." Albert Karam, he
said, is incompetent, with a temperament that is not
sufficiently tough for the job. Geagea said Maroun Hitti was
a tough officer, the right one for the job, and that he had
convinced PM Siniora of this. Geagea pushed for USG support
for Hitti.

AOUN AND HIZBALLAH
--------------

BEIRUT 00001273 003 OF 003




13. (C) At the close of the meeting, DAS Hale asked Geagea
about General Michel Aoun's popularity in Lebanon, and the
nature of his relationship with Hizballah. Geagea said that
Aoun is not as popular as one might think, that his
popularity had actually reached a low. Nonetheless, he said
Aoun will always have a base of supporters who will stay with
him regardless of how he performs. Geagea said he thought
Aoun was firmly allied with Hizballah. "I thought at first
it was tactical, just to get the presidency, but now he is
totally there."


14. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.

SISON