LEBANON: GEMAYEL DOWNBEAT ON RAPPROCHEMENT WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001225

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEMAYEL DOWNBEAT ON RAPPROCHEMENT WITH
SYRIA, NERVOUS ABOUT ELECTIONS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William K. Grant for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former president Amine Gemayel reacted pessimistically
August 19 to outcomes from President Sleiman's August 13-14
visit to Syria. He assessed Syria was willing to make minor
concessions to Lebanon only to improve Syria's reputation
within Lebanon. Gemayel criticized the international
community, specifically the U.S. and France, for offering too
many "carrots" to Syria, rather than sending strong messages
to make Syria "afraid." Gemayel was adamant that serious
pressure on Syria was needed to avoid supporters of Syrian
and Iran from winning Lebanon's 2009 parliamentary elections.
Gemayel would not be drawn into a discussion of March 14's
unity or strategy for the election, instead repeating the
need for the international community to send "signals" as the
key. End Summary.

GEMAYEL: DON'T EXPECT MUCH FROM SYRIA
--------------


2. (C) Former president and March 14 leader Amine Gemayel was
in an ornery and despondent mood during an August 19 call by
Charge Grant and Poloff. Gemayel told us not to expect too
much from Syria following President Sleiman's August 13-14
visit to Damascus. He called the anticipated establishment
of diplomatic relations between the two countries "peanuts".
There was little tangible progress made, he said, on other
important issues to the Lebanese, such as Lebanese prisoners
in Syria, Syria's official denouncement of claim to Sheba'a
Farms, and the dismantling of the Higher Syrian-Lebanese
Council. In his view, Syria would take advantage of the
opportunity to open diplomatic missions throughout Lebanon to
openly increase its presence and influence here.

FRUSTRATION WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
--------------


3. (C) Gemayel said he was uncomfortable and frustrated with
the international community's current overtures towards
Syria, particularly those of France. He criticized the
attempts to lure Syria into the international community's
mainstream because, he said, if the efforts fail, it would
be Lebanon that suffers, not France or the U.S. Gemayel
defined the balance of power in Lebanon as currently tipping
towards Syria's advantage. He opined the only way to counter
Syria's open financial, military, and political support to
its allies and supporters in Lebanon would be by sending
"strong signals." Examples he gave of strong messages
included the establishment of the UN Special Tribunal for
Lebanon and the transfer of the four generals held in
Lebanese custody in connection with the 2005 Rafiq Hariri
assassination to detention in the Netherlands under the
control of the UN Special Tribunal. He said he had raised
his criticisms with French President Sarkozy and planned to
do so again when French Foreign Minister Bernard Kuechner
visits Beirut on August 23.


4. (C) Gemayel repeated several times his belief that
"perception is reality." He believed the perception among
the Lebanese now is that the U.S. has retreated from its
support for Lebanon that was shown in 2005. He called for a
stronger, more material show of support to blunt "the
Syrian-Iran influence" in Lebanon. He cautioned that Lebanon
was not strong enough on its own to confront the challenge
and could not rely on Saudi Arabia, for instance, because it
does not have the same power or means in Lebanon. Despite
Charge's explanation of the expansive USG military support in
Lebanon, Gemayel called for more. Furthermore, he assessed
the U.S. was not dealing with the threats to Lebanon (i.e.
Hizballah and Iran).

ELECTIONS 2009: CRITICAL
TO LEBANON'S FUTURE
--------------


BEIRUT 00001225 002 OF 002



5. (C) The 2009 parliamentary elections, Gemayel said, would
be critical to shaping the future of Lebanon. Within the
March 14 coalition, Gemayel admitted mistakes had been made,
particularly in its response to the May 2008 crisis. But he
also had expected a stronger response from the U.S. and the
international community during the May crisis. The March
8/Michel Aoun opposition had benefited from those events.
For the 2009 elections, Gemayel said the psychology of the
voters needs to change to prevent Aoun and Hizballah from
gaining greater support. He believed voters have the
perception Aoun and Hizballah supporters are gaining ground
in the field, although he believed the March 8/Aoun platform
is fundamentally weak.


6. (C) Gemayel favored the strategy of reaching out to
specific constituencies (i.e. in Beirut, Bikfaya, and the
Chouf) with strong messages that put pressure on Syria. He
was less convinced about the effectiveness of March 14
candidates running on a unified platform to win the
elections. In addition, Gemayel was dismissive of polling
conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) of
voter perceptions and issues of importance. (Comment. The
reason for Gemayal's dismissiveness may be that the IRI
polling shows Gemayal's support among Christian voters, his
constituency, is in the single digits. That compares to
20-23% for both his Christian rival within the March 14
coalition, Samir Geagea, and opposition Christian leader
Michel Aoun. End Comment.)

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Gemayel was in a sour mood about everything and not in
a mood to talk much about March 14 unity and strategy for the
2009 elections. When asked about that, he simply repeated
his message about the need to send signals to Syria. There
were no warm and fuzzy messages regarding his March 14
allies. The best he could manage was to claim that March 14
is "doing its homework" for the election. As we were walking
out of Gemayel's home, Selim Sayegh, vice president of his
party, tried to reassure us that in fact March 14 leaders
including Gemayel realize they must work better together as a
coalition to win the 2009 election. End Comment.
GRANT