Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1201
2008-08-18 07:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SLEIMAN VISIT TO DAMASCUS: DEVIL IN THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE 
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VZCZCXRO2695
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1201/01 2310741
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180741Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2771
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2751
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2999
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001201 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAFA, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN VISIT TO DAMASCUS: DEVIL IN THE
INTERPRETATION

REF: DAMASCUS 579

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001201

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAFA, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN VISIT TO DAMASCUS: DEVIL IN THE
INTERPRETATION

REF: DAMASCUS 579

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) According to his diplomatic advisor, President Sleiman
reportedly is pleased with his August 13-14 visit to
Damascus, although he had hoped for more on the issue of
Lebanese detainees in Syria. The advisor believes that work
will begin soon on establishing diplomatic relations and
borders, but said progress on Sheba'a Farms was impossible
for the Syrians prior to Israeli withdrawal. No date has
been set yet for President Asad's reciprocal visit to
Lebanon. End summary.

VISIT MEETS EXPECTATIONS,
FOR THE MOST PART
--------------


2. (C) Charge Grant, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with
Ambassador Naji Abi Assi, Diplomatic Advisor to President
Michel Sleiman, on August 15 to get a readout on Sleiman's
August 13-14 visit to Damascus (reftel). According to Abi
Assi, President Asad, Vice President Shara'a, Foreign
Minister Muallim, and two aides represented the Syrian side,
while President Sleiman was accompanied by FM Salloukh and
Sleiman's diplomatic, political, and economic advisors (Abi
Assi, Nazem Khoury, and Elie Assaf),as well as the SYG of
the Higher Syrian-Lebanese Council, Nasri el-Khoury. Upon
arrival on August 13, Sleiman and Asad held a 20-minute
tete-a-tete, followed by a meeting between the two
delegations, dinner, and then another private one-hour
meeting between Asad and Sleiman. The following day, Asad
and Sleiman held another 45 minute meeting before joining the
rest of the delegation for lunch.


3. (C) Abi Assi, who had relatively high expectations for the
visit, said his expectations had been met, especially on the

agreement to begin the process of establishing diplomatic
relations as of August 15, which he said was a very positive
achievement. President Sleiman reportedly had hoped to get a
bit more on the detainee issue. Abi Assi noted that the
Lebanese opposition press was portraying the visit as much
more successful than expected, but attributed this to their
lower initial expectations. He also found it interesting
that following the visit Lebanese OTV (Aoun's Free Patriotic
Movement's station) had asked FM Muallim about the detainee
issue, whereas Hizballah's al-Manar had asked about the
Middle East Peace Process, revealing where the two parties'
interests lay.


4. (C) Abi Assi's impression was that the Syrians came to the
meetings with the goal of helping to support President
Sleiman (as shown in communique text in support of the
National Dialogue under Sleiman, who represents Lebanon's
unity) and skeptical of the Siniora government and March 14
in particular, especially after the attacks in parliament by
March 14 MPs and a letter sent to Sleiman by the March 14
Secretariat immediately prior to the visit. The Syrians do
not like to act under pressure, he explained.


5. (C) Abi Assi reported that everything that had been
discussed between the two delegations was in the joint
communique, whose length he deemed significant. The Syrians
had started with a one-page draft, he explained, while the
Lebanese had presented a much longer draft (Note: That Abi
Assi helped draft. End note.). The delegations had limited
themselves to discussing non-internal Lebanese issues, he
said; internal Lebanese issues such as the Special Tribunal
or the August 13 Tripoli bombing were not discussed in the
general meeting, but may have been during the three
tete-a-tete meetings between Asad and Sleiman. Abi Assi
admitted that there may have been discussion of Palestinian
camps in Lebanon, but nothing had been included in the
communique.


6. (C) Abi Assi said that in addition to the "classical

BEIRUT 00001201 002 OF 003


issues" of the Middle East Peace Process and Palestinian
cause, the Syrians, as current Chair of the Arab League, had
insisted on including language on Iraq. The Lebanese had
inserted the phrase "in conformity with Arab League
decisions" to ensure cohesion with the Arab League.

DEVIL IN INTERPRETATION
--------------


7. (C) The devil now, he said, was not in the details, but in
the interpretation of the joint communique. For example, the
paragraph on border controls referenced international laws,
but would the Syrians interpret this to relate only to
criminal actions? Already, he noted, the French translation
of the document being circulated in the press contained
several critical errors, citing the need to keep "government
authorities" informed about detainee issues, when the actual
Arab text referred to family members, and referring to
"Sheba'a Farms" rather than the "Lebanese Sheba'a Farms."


8. (C) Regarding the Higher Syrian-Lebanese Council (formed
following the 1991 Lebanese-Syrian Friendship Treaty to deal
with "exceptional issues"),Abi Assi said the Syrians wanted
to keep it. The Lebanese position had not yet been decided,
he said, noting that the joint communique merely said the
issue would be discussed. It was now up to the Siniora
government to decide its fate, although Abi Assi was not sure
whether this issue would require two-thirds or simple
majority approval in the cabinet. Some would argue that, now
that Lebanon and Syria are establishing normal relations,
there is no need for the Council, he explained, while others
disagreed.

BORDER/
SHEBA'A FARMS
--------------


9. (C) On Sheba'a, there were three issues: 1)
"Delimitation" of what actually constituted Sheba'a (which
the two sides agreed to start according to the communique);
2) Sheba'a's identity, i.e., Syrian or Lebanese; and 3)
"Demarcation" of the Lebanese-Syrian border. On identity,
Abi Assi explained the Syrian refusal to state that the
territory was Lebanese in the final communique (despite
previous public statements to that effect) because the
Syrians viewed it as falling under UNSCR 242, whereas Lebanon
viewed it as falling under UNSCR 425.


10. (C) Abi Assi explained the exclusion of Sheba'a Farms in
the border agreement as the result of the Syrians inability
to agree publicly on any issue that was perceived as being
against the country's national interest. The Syrians do not
like to act under pressure, he explained. The Syrians had
wanted to say that border demarcation would being from the
north and move southward (i.e., leaving Sheba'a until the
end),whereas the Lebanese had taken the opposite position.
The final text did neither, merely stating the principle that
the borders would be decided.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


11. (C) Noting that cabinet would meet later the same
evening, Abi Assi said Sleiman might use the opportunity to
brief the government on his trip. The communique mentioned
that Asad would visit Lebanon, but no date had been set, with
Abi Assi opining that the Syrians would first wit to see
what the GOL's tone is vis-a-vis Syria


12. (C) Abi Assi expected to see ministerial exchanges begin
soon, as well as a reactivating of the bilateral committee to
discuss the missing Lebanese. He also expected meetings on
border control to begin soon. He suspected Sleiman would
instruct the ministries involved (Defense and Interior) to
begin work immediately, although he did not expect quick
progress on the issues of delineating and demarcating Sheba'a
Farms.


13. (C) Regarding the Higher Syrian-Lebanese Council (formed
following the 1991 Lebanese-Syrian Friendship Treaty to deal

BEIRUT 00001201 003 OF 003


with "exceptional issues"),Abi Assi said the Syrians wanted
to keep it. The Lebanese position had not yet been decided,
he said, noting that the joint communique merely said the
issue would be discussed. It was now up to the Siniora
government to decide its fate, although Abi Assi was not sure
whether this issue would require two-thirds or simple
majority approval in the cabinet. Some would argue that, now
that Lebanon and Syria are establishing normal relations,
there is no need for the Council, he explained, while others
disagreed.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Abi Assi appeared to give us a candid assessment of
the visit. In part, he is positioning himself as an
important interlocutor between the President and U.S., as
shown by his final plea for us to share any information we
had about possible upcoming regional conflicts, to help the
GOL prepare.


GRANT