Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1139
2008-08-04 18:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MINISTERIAL STATEMENT: RESISTANCE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1139/01 2171818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041818Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2647
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2689
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2951
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 001139 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MINISTERIAL STATEMENT: RESISTANCE
REMAINS, BUT AUTHORITY OF STATE ENHANCED

REF: A. BEIRUT 766

B. BEIRUT 733

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 001139

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MINISTERIAL STATEMENT: RESISTANCE
REMAINS, BUT AUTHORITY OF STATE ENHANCED

REF: A. BEIRUT 766

B. BEIRUT 733

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The ministerial committee charged with drafting the
government's policy statement reached an agreement on August
1, and the full cabinet is expected to approve the statement
on August 4. The statement is an improvement over the
previous 2005 ministerial statement in that it gives
increased prominence to the role of the state, including a
clause stipulating the state's authority over all issues. In
the 2005 statement, the clause governing Hizballah, or "the
resistance," seemed to give Hizballah exclusive rights for
resistance activities. Although in the 2008 statement,
Hizballah was successful in maintaining a reference to the
"resistance", the clause addressing the issue broadens the
right to the resistance to include "Lebanon, its people, army
and resistance." March 14 ministers who participated in the
drafting committee told us they were pleased with the outcome
but recognized that each side could interpret the key clauses
to its own advantage. The statement also calls upon the
government to adhere to international resolutions,
specifically citing UNSCR 1701 (but not 1559),as well as the
Special Tribunal.


2. (C) The statement outlines the government's agenda from
now until the spring 2009 parliamentary elections. The very
ambitious program includes issues such as raising the minimum
wage, accelerated WTO accession, telecom privatization, and
electoral reform. Given the government's short lifespan and
financial difficulties, it is unlikely the Siniora government
will be able to implement many of these plans.



3. (C) With the battle over the ministerial statement over,
President Sleiman is expected to travel to Damascus as soon
as August 6. The next showdowns between the March 14
majority and the opposition will be in the national dialogue,
where the national defense strategy, including the role of
Hizballah's arms, will be discussed again, and in the
cabinet's consideration of key government appointments,
including the new commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF). End summary.

PROCEEDING ON TIME
--------------


4. (C) After 14 meetings, the ministerial committee charged
with drafting the government's policy statement reached
agreement on August 1, three weeks after PM Siniora's
national unity government was formed on July 11. The full
cabinet must now approve the statement, expected to happen at
a session scheduled for 1700 local time on August 4, by a
two-thirds majority. PM Siniora must then send the statement
to parliament for the final step of the cabinet formation
process, a confidence vote, where a simple majority is
sufficient. Speaker Berri's Senior Advisor Ali Hamdan
believes parliament will take up the issue beginning August

9. This schedule would put the government in conformance
with Article 64 of the Constitution, which gives the
government 30 days following the decree forming the cabinet
to submit the statement to parliament.

MARCH 14 BALANCED "RESISTANCE"
REFERENCES WITH ROLE OF THE STATE
--------------


5. (C) How to address the "resistance" was the main hurdle
during the drafting sessions. Hizballah insisted on
repeating the pro-Hizballah language from the 2005 agreement;
March 14 refused. However, as expected, Hizballah's cabinet
minister on the drafting committee was successful in
enshrining the concept of the "resistance" in the
government's policy statement. March 14 members of the
committee, knowing that there would have to be reference to
the resistance, focused their negotiating efforts on adding

BEIRUT 00001139 002 OF 006


language on the role of the Lebanese state, to try to weaken
Hizballah's virtual "state within a state" status. Hizballah
was unable to translate its apparent political gains in
recent months (including securing a blocking third in the
cabinet at Doha and a recent boost in popularity following
the release of Samir Kantar and other Lebanese prisoners from
Israel) into significantly stronger language legitimizing its
arms.


6. (C) The 2005 statement reads:
"The Cabinet considers the Lebanese resistance a natural and
sincere expression of the national right of the Lebanese
people in liberating their territory and defending their
dignity in face of the Israeli aggressions, threats, and
desires, and working on the continuation of liberating
Lebanese territory."

In contrast, the 2008 statement makes it clear that the right
to the resistance is not exclusive to Hizballah:

"Based on the right of the state to preserve the sovereignty
and independence of Lebanon and its unity and the safety of
its territories according to the constitution, the cabinet
asserts the following: The right of Lebanon, through its
people, army, and its resistance, to liberate and regain
Sheba'a Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills and the Lebanese part of
Ghajar, and the right of Lebanon to defend any aggression or
confrontation, and to adhere to its right in its waters by
all legitimate and available means."

A later provision in the statement, Article 25, calls for
putting Sheba'a under UN control, as called for in PM
Siniora's seven point plan following the end of the 2006 war.


7. (C) The subsequent two clauses stress the government's
commitment to UNSCR 1701 and all of its provisions, and to
planning a national defense strategy to protect Lebanon. The
upcoming National Dialogue, to be called for by President
Sleiman in partnership with the Arab League, is intended to
develop the national defense strategy. Article eight states
that the government "emphasizes adherence to the concept of
President Michel Sleiman's oath of office and his call for
dialogue, commitment to the constitution and the national
charter." Sleiman's inaugural address spoke of the
resistance in the past tense (Ref A) -- a tactic March 14
reportedly also tried, but failed, to use in the ministerial
statement. Sleiman also spoke of the need "to develop a
defensive strategy that preserves the nation in parallel with
a calm dialogue so as to take advantage of the resistance's
energies and put them to the service of this strategy."

MAJORITY SUCCEEDS IN
CODIFYING ROLE OF STATE
--------------


8. (C) Importantly, the statement gives increased prominence,
compared to 2005, to the role of the Lebanese state. Article
seven states:

"The government emphasizes its adherence to the principle of
state unity and its authority over all issues related to the
general policy of the country to safeguard Lebanon and its
national unity and regulate the paths, decisions and
commitments made by the government. This principle governs
all clauses of the policy statement."

In a statement following the committee's last meeting,
committee member and March 14 Minister of Information Tareq
Mitri affirmed that, "The unity of the state and its
authority are the guiding principles of all the decisions in
the government." He said this principle of state authority
applied to the entire ministerial statement, implying that
the state's authority also applies to the resistance.

HIZBALLAH CLAIMS
STATEMENT SUPPORTS
ITS ARMS, ACTIVITIES
--------------


9. (C) Hizballah Deputy SYG Naim Qassem said on August 2 that

BEIRUT 00001139 003 OF 006


the statement shows Lebanon is "keen on maintaining" its
resistance and the defense strategy discussions would focus
on how to make use of Hizballah's strength and how to benefit
from all of Lebanon's capabilities and resources. Hizballah
MP Hassan Fadlallah stressed that the intent of the statement
was to demonstrate that the army and resistance should
cooperate to liberate Lebanon, and that the resistance
weapons are necessary to defend Lebanon's territory and
resist Israeli aggression.


10. (C) PM Siniora, however, stressed that the resistance is
a general Lebanese cause that is not restricted to one party.
"Upon reading the ministerial statement," he said, "you will
realize that the state is the authority in charge of
providing security and safety for the people...liberation is
also part of the state's duties. Nobody wants to ignore the
sacrifices that the resistance has made in the past years to
end (Israeli) occupation, but no party can monopolize
resistance and accuse others of being against it."


11. (C) Minister of State Nassib Lahoud, representing March
14 on the drafting committee, proposed language stating that
the "resistance should operate under the wing of the state,"
a phrase the drafting committee did not agree on. Lahoud
told us on August 4 that he will propose his idea again in
the full cabinet meeting, but will not seek to block approval
of the statement.


12. (C) Kataeb member and Minister of Tourism Elie Marouni
shared Lahoud's concern, and planned to meet later on August
4 with Kataeb leader and former President Amine Gemayel to
decide whether to make a formal reservation. However,
Gemayel's advisor, Michel Mecattef, told A/DCM the final text
was much better than Kataeb had expected based on what he had
seen a few days earlier.


13. (C) Ghattas Khoury, advisor to majority leader Saad
Hariri, told CDA the statement was good for three reasons:
March 14 was able to incorporate strong references to the
state's responsibility for security, the army as a partner
with the resistance, and 1701, even though it had not been
successful in including language on disarming Hizballah.


14. (C) Druze MP and Minister of State Wael Abu Four, also a
committee member, told A/DCM the statement was better than
the 2005 statement, which stated that the resistance was
necessary and therefore could not be questioned. In
contrast, the 2008 statement highlights the ole of the state
and army, in addition to the resistance, and clearly
highlights the state's authority over all issues and the need
to comply with UNSCR 1701. The language on the resistance
was much weaker than what Hizballah Minister Mohamad Fneish
had originally proposed, Abu Four noted, adding that after
three weeks of tough negotiations Hizballah had only
succeeded in achieving a "vague paragraph that gives them
nothing and leaves the issue open."


15. (C) Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea also was not
satisfied with the language on the resistance, saying that
"protecting and defending Lebanon should be the exclusive
duty of the security and armed forces." Geagea advisor Elie
Khoury told PolOff that LF members had hoped for language
that would allow further movement on addressing Hizballah's
arms, and were disappointed the statement did not place the
resistance under the authority of the government. He added,
however, that "words alone will not change Hizballah's
actions," and therefore deemed agreement on the statement to
allow the government to function more important than the
final text.


16. (C) On the opposition side, Berri advisor Ali Hamdan told
A/DCM that formal reservations will have no practical effect
on the statement; once PM Siniora submits it to parliament,
Berri must convene a confidence vote. Hamdan deemed the
statement "ok," commenting that "this is the season of
compromise." He expressed dismay that the Lebanese were
divided over the issue of the resistance, when they faced a
common Israeli enemy. He also lamented the fact that,
although the document contained many "excellent ideas," there
was nothing in the document to outline how the government

BEIRUT 00001139 004 OF 006


would implement its program, especially regarding
socio-economic issues such as combatting poverty and the high
price of oil.

COMMITMENT TO SPECIAL TRIBUNAL,
PARIS III, ELECTORAL REFORM
--------------


17. (C) The statement reaffirms the government's commitment
to the Special Tribunal as a means to achieve justice for the
assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri and others, without
politicizing the Tribunal. The GOL also pledges to implement
Paris III reforms, taking into consideration the domestic and
international economic changes over the past two years, as
well as Lebanon's exceptional circumstances. The statement
calls for free and fair elections and electoral reforms as
agreed at Doha (Ref B) and using the draft Boutros law as a
basis for discussion.

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
--------------


18. (C) The statement calls for diplomatic relations with
Syria, based on mutual respect and sovereignty, and the
delineation of the border between the two countries. It also
calls for the return of Lebanese detainees in Syria as part
of the normalization of the relationship between the two
countries. Lebanese president Sleiman had made clear he
would travel to Syria shortly after the cabinet statement was
approved. We hear the visit may be as soon as Tuesday,
August 6.

NO PERMANENT SETTLEMENT
OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
--------------


19. (C) Article 27 rejects the resettlement of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and calls upon the international
community to ensure the Palestinians' right to return to
their homeland. The committee members, including Hizballah,
reportedly refused to adopt language proposed by Aoun
representative Gebran Bassil encouraging Palestinians to
leave Lebanon; language which Nassib Lahoud told us bordered
on racism. Included in this article is a victory for the
Aoun camp, but at the same time, it eliminates the ability of
Aoun to accuse the Siniora government, of which his bloc is
now a part, of favoring "tawteen" (resettlement) as a means
to tip the demographic balance in favor of the Sunnis.
Articles 28 and 29 address the issue of weapons outside the
camps and the need to extend the authority of the state over
all of the Lebanese territory, as well as the need to improve
conditions within the camp and to rebuild the Nahr al-Barid
camp.

CONFRONTING TERRORISM
--------------


20. (C) Article 18 states that it is the duty of the
government to prevent terrorists from endangering Lebanon's
stability. The article mentions the LAF's victory in
defeating extremist elements in Nahr al-Barid, noting that
this victory earned the LAF and the government the trust of
the Lebanese people.

NEXT ROUNDS:
NATIONAL DIALOGUE
MILITARY, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
2009 ELECTIONS
--------------


21. (C) The relationship between the state and Hizballah will
continue to be debated in the national dialogue chaired by
President Sleiman that will address, among other issues, a
national defense strategy. Sleiman is expected, in
partnership with the Arab League, to begin the dialogue once
the cabinet obtains the parliamentary vote of confidence on
its program.


22. (C) The next challenge for the government is appointing
top government officials. The key appointments include the

BEIRUT 00001139 005 OF 006


new commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and LAF G-2
Military Intelligence Director, the 10 member Constitutional
Council, and possibly the chiefs of the Internal Security
Forces (ISF) and Surete Generale. Current predictions are
that either Second Brigade Commander BG Jean Qahwaji or
current G-2 Director BG Georges Khoury will become the next
LAF Commander, while either BG Joseph Njeim or BG Ghassan
Salem will become the G-2 Director. General Nabil Mehri,
head of the Beirut area ISF, is rumored to be a possible
replacement for ISF Director General Ashraf Rifi, although it
is unclear whether either Rifi or Surete Generale chief Wafiq
Jezzini must be replaced.


23. (C) Former Telecom Minister and Druze MP Marwan Hamadeh
predicted difficulties in appointing military and security
commanders, as well as other key public sector posts, before
the 2009 elections. Furthermore, March 14 contacts have
frequently warned that Aoun and Hizballah will attempt to
"govern by proxy" by securing key positions within the LAF
and other institutions as a means to rule from within.

VICTORY FOR CHRISTIANS?
--------------


24. (C) Many of Aoun's ideas intended to benefit the
Christians are included in the text, including the need to
battle corruption, resolve the issues of Lebanese detainees
in Syria and Christians displaced during the civil war, as
well as Lebanese who disappeared during the war, prohibit the
resettlement of Palestinian refugees ("tawteen") in Lebanon,
and seek the return of Lebanese who fled to Israel during the
2006 war with Hizballah (an issue that Hizballah opposed in
2005, but this time allowed its Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)
allies to include). Druze MP Abu Four, a committee member,
told A/DCM that, with the exception of "tawteen," Aoun
representative Gebran Bassil was not very active in the
negotiations, and that even there the committee had rejected
his efforts to include language giving the state the right to
ask the Palestinians to leave. Furthermore, Gemayel advisor
Michel Mecattef told A/DCM that these are issues March 14
itself has been pushing.


25. (C) Nevertheless, Bassil has been quick to claim credit,
saying the FPM was successful in including issues that were
considered taboo in the past. Bassil told A/DCM the
opposition was "quite satisfied" with the statement, which
included many issues for the first time, such as revisiting
the 1995 decree allowing Arabs residing in Lebanon to be
naturalized. (Note: The decree resulted in the
naturalization of many Sunni Arabs. End note.) Bassil also
cited the government's commitment to ensuring there would be
no "tawteen" and the call upon the international community to
bear responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians as key
successes, as well the fact that the document addressed the
relationship between the state and "armed factions," which he
said were clearly under the rule of the state. Bassil said
he hoped the cabinet would approve the document unanimously.


26. (C) Geagea advisor Elie Khoury told PolOff he predicted
the statement would give the impression that March 14 had
conceded to the opposition, citing Bassil's August 2
televised remarks claiming credit for a number of issues. We
will urge March 14 Christians to highlight these achievements
to avoid letting Aoun use them to argue once again that he is
the best advocate of Christian interests.

COMMENT
--------------


27. (C) The statement exhibits the deliberate lack of clarity
typical of Lebanese consensus-driven agreements, leaving
something for each side to claim victory. The majority will
point to the preamble's recognition of the authority of the
state over all issues in the statement, while Hizballah will
tout the references to the resistance as quasi-legal
justification for its arms.


28. (C) Overall, however, we view the 2008 statement as an
improvement over 2005 in terms of enhancing the role of both
the state and army. In addition, there are numerous

BEIRUT 00001139 006 OF 006



29. (C) The absence of UNSCR 1559 is not surprising. Speaker
Berri has long lobbied to omit any reference to UNSCR 1559
(which calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias),arguing it is
incorporated into 1701 (which calls for no weapons "without
the consent of the Government of Lebanon," leaving a loophole
for Hizballah to argue that its weapons have the consent of
the government).
GRANT