Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1112
2008-07-29 17:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MAJORITY LEADER SAAD HARIRI NOT IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8726
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1112/01 2111704
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291704Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2609
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2666
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2933
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001112 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MAJORITY LEADER SAAD HARIRI NOT IN
FIGHTING MODE

REF: A. BEIRUT 1104

B. BEIRUT 1103

C. BEIRUT 1100

D. BAGHDAD 2298

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001112

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MAJORITY LEADER SAAD HARIRI NOT IN
FIGHTING MODE

REF: A. BEIRUT 1104

B. BEIRUT 1103

C. BEIRUT 1100

D. BAGHDAD 2298

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Majority leader Saad Hariri accuses Syria and
Hizballah of masterminding recent violence in Tripoli as part
of an effort to discredit Saad and impose Syria's agenda on
Lebanon. As usual, Saad complained about what he perceives
as an ambivalent U.S. policy toward Syria, warning that March
14 could not confront Hizballah without strong international
support. Saad was upbeat on his recent trip to Iraq, which
he hoped would help ease Sunni-Shia tensions in Lebanon.
However, he was more pessimistic on the domestic front, where
he predicted March 14 would be forced to make concessions on
the ministerial statement. Finally, and of concern to us,
Saad was unwilling to discuss strategies for leading his
coalition to electoral victory in 2009, arguing the time was
not yet ripe. End comment.


2. (C) Charge Grant, accompanied by A/DCM and Senior LES
Political Advisor, met with majority leader Saad Hariri at
his residence in Qoreitem on July 28, the first meeting with
the Embassy since Saad's trip to Iraq. Hariri notetaker
Nadine Chehab also attended the meeting. Saad was in one of
his defeatist modes, noisily fingering prayer beads during
the entire meeting and leaving his unlit cigar untouched.

SYRIA AND HIZBALLAH
BEHIND TRIPOLI VIOLENCE
--------------


3. (C) Saad accused Syria and Hizballah of masterminding the
recent violence in Tripoli (Ref A) to lure the international
community into believing that Tripoli is nesting Islamic
extremism and radicalism, all in an effort to discredit Saad.

Instead, he claimed, the people who are fighting on both
sides are individual groups without central leadership, which
is more dangerous. Saad claimed that the Alawites fighting
against Sunni are trained by Hizballah and connected to
Syrian intelligence. He believed the arrest by the Lebanese
Armed Forces of one operative, Abou-Fadi Aroun, in the Bab
el-Tebbaneh area would disclose the true motives and identity
of the perpetrators. He also predicted the situation would
flare up again unless people in Sunni-dominated Bab Tebbaneh
took over the Alawite area of Jabal Mohsen, but warned that
this would result in a massacre.


4. (C) Saad argued that Syria will incite violence in Lebanon
any time it has an issue to push, whether in Tripoli,
Saadnayel (Biqa,) or Sidon. As the Syrian regime is being
rewarded by the international community, Syria will not be
deterred, he said. He lamented the role played by French
President Sarkozy and the European Union for opening their
doors to President Bashar Assad, adding that France would not
do so without a green light form Israel and the U.S. He
credited March 14 lobbying of the White House with canceling
A/S Welch's planned meeting with a visiting Syrian
delegation, criticizing the U.S. for having no clear policy
vis-a-vis Syria.


5. (C) Saad said he still favored establishing diplomatic
relations with Syria, but noted that historically Syria (and
not just the Asad regime) has never recognized Lebanon as an
independent country. Saad did not believe Syria was serious
about establishing an embassy in Lebanon, arguing instead
that Damascus was buying time until the U.S. elections and
playing games with the French in the meantime.


6. (C) Saad also claimed Hizballah is attempting to create a
new Sunni leadership by weakening him. Saad said he remains
opposed to fighting a new civil war in the country, despite
the fact that some of his supporters view this as a weakness.
As a result, many people are moving away from the Future

BEIRUT 00001112 002 OF 003


Movement he leads and going back to the traditional leaders
who are protected by Hizballah. Nevertheless, he stated
confidently, Sunnis in Lebanon will never be part of
al-Qaeda, and even those who become radicals will only fight
against Hizballah.


7. (C) Asked about his message to his Sunni constituents in
Tripoli, Saad said there is no solution to the crisis outside
the frame of the legitimate government institutions such as
the cabinet, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),and the
Internal Security Forces (ISF). He claimed the LAF is
capable of solving the crisis in Tripoli "in one night" if it
wanted, but the current acting commander, a Druze, could not
use force to settle the problem, as it could backfire on
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt in his home Chouf district.

IRAQ TRIP: PROMOTE
ARAB UNITY, NAJAF
--------------


8. (C) Saad called his recent trip to Iraq (Ref D) very good
in that it shocked both Hizballah and the Shia. His purpose
was to portray the Shia-Sunni conflict as an Arab-Persian
conflict, i.e., a political and not religious conflict,
making Arabs realize that although Shia will govern Iraq,
they are Arabs and not Iranians. Another goal was to
reinforce the position of the holy city of Najaf to counter
the Iranian influence represented by Qom. Saad said he would
follow up on his trip by visiting other Arab countries to
promote Arab support for the government of Iraqi PM Nour
al-Maliki. In his view, it was "obvious" Iraq was moving
"away from an Iranian agenda," which he predicted would have
a "tremendous" impact on Lebanon.


9. (C) While he realized that his efforts are a long-term
project, Saad said he believed the Iraqis are moving away
from the Iranian influence, and success in Iraq will help
improve the situation in Lebanon, as a lot of Shia will shift
their religious alliance to Najaf. Furthermore, independent
Shias are more at ease meeting with him because of his
increased credibility following his meeting with Sistani,
which lessened perceptions that he is "an American agent."

LESS OPTIMISTIC
ON THE HOME FRONT
--------------


10. (C) Saad was less optimistic on the domestic front,
warning that eventually March 14 will have no choice but to
cave into Hizballah's demands. "We do not want to be sitting
ducks," he explained. "Instead of Hizballah taking things by
force, we will give them what they want peacefully.
Hizballah breeds on instability, and we do not want to offer
them this." He added, however, "I am ready for a fight if I
have the required support."


11. (C) Saad noted that some U.S. critics accused March 14 of
relying exclusively on international support, but countered
that March 14 needed western support to counter Iranian and
Syrian support for Hizballah. He added ironically, "I was
criticized for welcoming Samir Kantar, while Under Secretary
Burns sat on the same negotiating table with the Iranians,
those who are funding Hizballah, who secured Kantar's
release."


12. (C) Saad confirmed reports (Ref B) that a Qatari emissary
would arrive soon in Beirut to find a compromise on the
ministerial statement, but added that the Qataris are "tilted
towards compromises that cost March 14." The Qataris are a
"dream come true for us," he said sarcastically; "They are
resolving everything in Lebanon." Saad also defended
Jumblatt's efforts to seek a compromise with the opposition,
saying, "Jumblatt needs to duck and cover." Commenting on
reports (Ref B) that the Aoun bloc was now insisting on
revisiting Lebanon's Paris III commitments, Saad said, "After
they win one thing, they go for another."

LET DUST SETTLE BEFORE BEGINNING 2009 CAMPAIGN WORK
--------------


BEIRUT 00001112 003 OF 003



13. (C) Saad said he still believes in the goals of March 14,
but that it was too early to begin planning for the 2009
parliamentary elections, which could wait until summer was
over (Note: Saad's advisor in Washington told Charge Sison
he planned to spend August vacationing in Monaco. End note.)
People had not yet digested the May events, he explained.
Furthermore, March 14 leaders' "heads were too big" following
the recent battles over cabinet formation, and March 14
needed to let hard feelings subside. However, Saad disclosed
that he was planning to gather March 14 leaders for a meeting
soon to present a unified front.


14. (C) Pressed again on his strategy for winning the
parliamentary elections, Saad said he would begin his own
campaign during Ramadan (Note: Saad traditionally hosts
1,000-invitee Iftars each night during Ramadan for his
supporters. End note.) Again skirting the issue, he said he
was confident March 14 would gain 78 seats out of the 128,
but that "even if we have this majority, we will not be able
to rule because the issue of Hizballah's weapons will not be
resolved."

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) We are very familiar with this side of Saad, critical
of the U.S. and defeatist in his approach to Syria and
Hizballah. However, we should not discount his words as mere
whining. His Sunni followers do feel bruised and betrayed
following the May events. Few within March 14 have much of
an appetite for another confrontation with Hizballah, whether
on the ground or in the ministerial drafting committee.


16. (C) Of perhaps more concern is Saad's failure to focus on
what we view should be his top priority: preparing his
coalition for the 2009 elections. He showed no signs of
taking action in response to the Saudi ultimatum (Ref C)
warning him that 2009 is his last chance. Ramadan begins in
early September, which may be a useful time for Saad to rally
his own supporters, but may not be the best time for March 14
coalition-building. And following that, the legislative
elections are only a short six months away. March 14 already
has a late start in the race to 2009 behind the more
disciplined and focused Hizballah-lead opposition, and Saad's
delay will not help to tip the balance back to the majority's
favor. End comment.
GRANT