LEBANON: MINISTERIAL STATEMENT 95 PERCENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001103

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MINISTERIAL STATEMENT 95 PERCENT
COMPLETE, BUT DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAIN

REF: BEIRUT 1086

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Minister of State Nassib Lahoud, a member of the
committee currently drafting the cabinet's ministerial
statement, said the statement was "95 percent done."
Hizballah's weapons remained the primary stumbling block,
with the majority holding firm on keeping language that
would acknowledge the state's exclusive right to decide when
to use arms. Hizballah is resisting. Lahoud said the Aoun
camp, represented on the committee by Telecom Minister and
Aoun advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil, had thrown up new
demands on Paris III and Palestinian refugees.


2. (C) The March 14 camp remained solid on the arms issue,
despite suspicion that the recent violence in Tripoli is
intended to put pressure on the majority. Lahoud reported
that a Qatari envoy was expected to arrive in Beirut later
that day to help mediate and, if there is no agreement, that
President Sleiman was expected to provide a compromise text
within the next few days. End summary.

HIZBALLAH ARMS REMAIN
MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK
--------------


3. (C) Charge Grant, accompanied by A/DCM, met with March 14
Minister of State Nassib Lahoud at his office on July 28.
Hizballah's only issue with the draft cabinet statement is
language on its arms, Lahoud reported, adding that the March
14 representatives had proposed many formulae, all of which
included the need to preserve the rights of the state to wage
war. March 14 reportedly had suggested using the language
from President Sleiman's inaugural speech, then language
stating the defense of Lebanon was the responsibility of the
Lebanese state by all legal and available means, "including
popular resistance," and finally proposed deferring
discussion of the issue to the national dialogue.


4. (C) Hizballah rejected all of these options. It continues
to insist on language stating that the resistance is a
"natural right." Lahoud said this essentially would give
Hizballah an "unlimited proxy to launch an attack against
Israel," warning that Hizballah would then its arms for any
issue it deemed worthy, including Sheba'a Farms or the issue
of "tawteen" (Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon). Lahoud
rejected Speaker Berri's so-called compromise, which included
Hizballah's language plus a reference to UNSCR 1701, as "not
enough."


5. (C) At the previous day's meeting, March 14 changed its
approach, telling Hizballah that it knew what the majority
needed in the statement (language on the state's monopoly on
the use of weapons),so Hizballah should propose something.
Lahoud said March 14 reps had made it clear to Hizballah that
the majority was not trying to strip Hizballah of its arms in
the short term. "We're willing to accommodate the de facto
situation," he explained, as long as that state retains it
rights.


6. (C) Hizballah MP Mohamad Raad, not a drafting committee
member, made a threat to the majority in public remarks on
Sunday, warning that any attempt to remove the word
"resistance" from the statement would be considered an "act
of war," in the same vein as the government's May 4 decision
to dismantle Hizballah's fiber optic network. Lahoud called
Raad's statement unacceptable, and asked him to withdraw his
threat. Lahoud said President Sleiman, whom he met earlier
in the day, also was "shocked" by Raad's statement. Inside
the committee, Hizballah was more civilized, Lahoud added,
referring to Labor Minister Mohamad Fneish.

AOUN CAMP THROWS
UP NEW DEMANDS
--------------

BEIRUT 00001103 002 OF 003




7. (C) Lahoud explained Bassil's latest demand to revise the
paragraph on Lebanon's Paris III commitments as an attempt to
discredit the previous Siniora government, which had made
those commitments, and provoke argument within the committee
to demonstrate that Hizballah's arms was not the only
contentious issue. "We spent four hours on this on Saturday,
on something that should not be questioned!" Lahoud
complained.


8. (C) Similarly, the Aoun campaign is seeking to insert
language essentially "inciting" the Palestinian refugees to
leave Lebanon, which Lahoud deemed to be bordering on racism.
This was part of an Aounist anti-Sunni program to show that
there was not just a Sunni-Shia problem in Lebanon, but also
a Sunni-Christian problem. Lahoud suspected both tactics
were posturing aimed at helping Aoun's Christians in the 2009
legislative elections.

MARCH 14 CAMP
HOLDING FIRM
--------------


9. (C) Asked about recent sectarian violence in Tripoli,
Lahoud said the "conventional wisdom" is that it was intended
to put pressure on the drafting committee, with the threat of
violence breaking out next in the Akkar region, north of
Tripoli. For the time being, however, he confirmed that the
negotiations remained professional, albeit "tough."


10. (C) Lahoud said that if the ministerial statement is not
completed within 30 days of the government's formation, it
would be considered resigned and a new government would be
formed. However, he believed PM Siniora would remain solid.
Lahoud cited Finance Minister Mohamad Chatah and Information
Minister Tareq Mitri as "top class" in terms of supporting
the majority's efforts to hold firm.


11. (C) Speaking of March 14 leaders who are represented in
the drafting committee, he dubbed the March 14 Christians,
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Kataeb (Phalange) leader
Amine Gemayel and others, as "solid," and majority leader
Saad Hariri as "reasonably solid" up until that point.
(Note: Saad, with whom Charge met immediately thereafter,
was not in fighting mode, leaving us to wonder how solid he
really is, septel. End note.)


12. (C) Lahoud was less sure of Druze Minister of State and
MP Wael Abu Four, who reflects the views of Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt, and who was exhibiting "flexibility."
Jumblatt was trying to reach an accommodation with rival
Druze leader Talal Arslan without disrupting his ties to the
March 14 alliance, Lahoud explained, which risked causing
problems with March 14 allies Geagea and Gemayel. However,
this "accommodation" would not extend beyond the cabinet
statement to including Arslan candidates on the 2009 lists,
Lahoud stated confidently.

QATARIS AND/OR PRESIDENT
SLEIMAN TO THE RESCUE?
--------------


13. (C) Lahoud said that Qatari Sheikh Jaber bin Youssef,
Press Advisor to PM and FM Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, was
traveling to Beirut July 28 to help mediate an agreement. He
also believed President Sleiman would step in at some point
soon with a compromise text, which he hoped (not sounding
very confident) would not lean too far toward something the
majority could not accept. Lahoud said he hoped instead
Sleiman would "cut and paste" the language from his inaugural
speech.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Despite initial optimism, no one here really expected
the negotiations to be easy, with Hizballah's arms the key
bone of contention. The Aoun camp's efforts to throw up
other obstacles is yet another indication that the opposition
will continue to move the goalpost whenever it senses blood.

BEIRUT 00001103 003 OF 003


This move also is at odds with the purported interest of
Aoun's representative in the drafting committee, new Telecom
Minister Gebran Bassil, in pursuing Paris III benchmarks such
as telecom privatization, reftel. We hope that, if it comes
down to Qatari or Sleiman intervention to resolve the
impasse, these interlocutors will insist on their own
language (the Doha agreement and inaugural speech) as the
basis for any compromise. End comment.
GRANT