Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIJING4168
2008-11-07 09:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

TIBET TALKS CONCLUDE; OBSERVERS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT

Tags:  PHUM PGOV PREL KIFR CH IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #4168/01 3120937
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O 070937Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0785
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004168 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2033
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIFR CH IN
SUBJECT: TIBET TALKS CONCLUDE; OBSERVERS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004168

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2033
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIFR CH IN
SUBJECT: TIBET TALKS CONCLUDE; OBSERVERS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The most recent round of talks between representatives
of the Dalai Lama and the Communist Party's United Front Work
Department (UFWD) ended on November 5, with Embassy contacts
unanimously predicting the discussions will fail to achieve
measurable progress. The precise content of this latest
round of talks remains unclear. On November 6, the Dalai
Lama's Special Envoy Lodi Gyari issued a statement detailing
the Tibetan delegation's schedule in China, but he did not
reveal the talks' substance. The same day, China's Xinhua
news agency released a toughly worded statement by UFWD
Minister Du Qinglin urging the Dalai Lama to "change his
political views" and not support Tibet independence. In
discussions with PolOff, Chinese observers believed
compromise by China on the borders and governance of a future
"Greater Tibet" autonomous region is next to impossible. Two
contacts, however, remained hopeful that China may make
symbolic gestures, such as prisoner releases, to demonstrate
goodwill. China's central leadership is preoccupied with
economic problems and Taiwan and thus is not making a serious
effort to negotiate with the Dalai Lama, one observer noted.
China's leaders are waiting for the Dalai Lama to die,
several Embassy interlocutors asserted, at which point
Beijing expects the Tibetan movement to fracture and lose its
international influence. End Summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (U) Personal representatives of the Dalai Lama Lodi Gyari
and Kelsang Gyaltsen visited China October 30-November 5 for
the eighth round of talks with the Communist Party's United
Front Work Department (UFWD). The visit included a meeting
with Du Qinglin, Minister of the UFWD, a full day of talks
with UFWD Executive Vice Minister Zhu Weiqun and Vice
Minister Sita (Sithar),and a trip to the Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. China's official media announced the
arrival of the Dalai Lama's envoys on October 30 but did not
provide details of the itinerary or discussions until

November 6, when the official news agency Xinhua issued an
article stating that UFWD Minister Du had "received" the
Dalai Lama's "private representatives," giving an overview of
the discussions while stressing the tough line that Du had
urged the Dalai Lama "to not support, plot or incite violent
criminal activities or propositions aimed at 'Tibet
Independence'." (Note: Du Qinglin was Sichuan Party
Secretary in 2007 when local officials implemented an
extensive political education campaign in the Ganzi Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture in the west of the province. During
Du's tenure, a comprehensive security crackdown was also
launched in Ganzi in August 2007 following a large public
demonstration in the city of Litang.) Meanwhile, in New
Delhi on November 6, Lodi Gyari issued a statement that
provided a general outline of the talks but neglected to
comment on whether progress was made. Lodi Gyari's statement
noted that, as a "special general meeting of the Tibetan
people" will be convened later this month, he has been
"advised not to make statements about our discussions before
this meeting."

MANY TIBETANS IN CHINA KNOW LITTLE OF TALKS
--------------


3. (C) In discussions with PolOff, contacts in Beijing
remained universally pessimistic that the latest round of
dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and the
Communist Party's UFWD will bring any real results, with some
noting that many Chinese were unaware that the talks were
even being held. Deqing Wangmu (strictly protect),an ethnic
Tibetan English instructor at the Central University for
Nationalities in Beijing, said on November 6 that her Tibetan
students are largely ignorant of the dialogue because of the
lack of media coverage in the PRC and the "intense blocking"
of Tibet-related foreign websites. Deqing Wangmu, who is a
native of Kangding in Sichuan Province, said her family and
friends are all pessimistic about the dialogue process
because China "is not prepared to give Tibetans what we
want." The dialogue is primarily a "show" for the
international community. Tibetans inside China, she said,
are even more skeptical than Tibetan exiles "because we
understand the Chinese Government better."

TIBET "LOW PRIORITY" FOR CHINESE LEADERSHIP
--------------


4. (C) Ma Rong (protect),a Tibet expert at Beijing

BEIJING 00004168 002 OF 003


University and an advisor to the UFWD, told PolOff November 6
that the Dalai Lama, by abandoning independence, denouncing
violence and supporting the Beijing Olympics, has "done all
he can" to meet China's preconditions for progress. The core
problem, Ma asserted, is that Tibet remains a "low priority"
for President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. While the
March unrest hurt China's international image, the security
challenges in Tibet are "manageable" given the small size of
the Tibetan population and the sheer manpower available to
Chinese security forces. The top PRC leadership, Ma argued,
is preoccupied, not with Tibet, but with the problems of
slowing economic growth, maintaining social stability in
China as a whole and negotiations with Taiwan.


5. (C) Ma said he meets regularly with UFWD Vice Ministers
Zhu Weiqun and Sita (Sithar) to advise them on Tibet policy.
Nevertheless, Ma said, the fact that the Party has appointed
such low-level officials as Zhu and Sita to lead the dialogue
shows the "lack of attention" at the top to Tibet. Zhu and
Sita have "no authority" to conduct a real negotiation and
thus only "recite existing policies" to the Dalai Lama's
representatives. Ma said he recently was invited by the
Tibetan government in exile to meet with the Dalai Lama in
Dharmsala. Such a visit would have offered an opportunity to
explore possible compromise through unofficial channels.
When Ma sought permission for the trip from the UFWD,
however, he received no response. Ma cited this as evidence
of the UFWD's "weak authority" and of the lack of interest in
Tibet at higher levels of the Chinese Government. With Hu
and Wen's attention focused elsewhere, hard-line local
leaders of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),including Party
Secretary Zhang Qingli, maintain strong influence over Tibet
policy, according to Ma.

POWER GAP IS GROWING
--------------


6. (C) Wang Chong (protect),an international affairs
columnist for the China Youth Daily, told PolOff on November
4 that China's Central Government does not view the dialogue
as a real two-party negotiation because China is in a
"clearly superior" position. In the eyes of Chinese
officials, the Dalai Lama is the leader of a loose group of
exiles with no military or territory. The Tibetan government
in exile thus ranks "several rungs below Taiwan" as a
negotiating partner. This "power gap," Wang said, will
continue to grow along with China's international stature,
while China's expanding influence with its southern
neighbors, especially India, will give the Tibetan exiles
even less room to maneuver in the future. Wang said there is
no room for agreement on "greater Tibet" or "true autonomy."
The most that China could agree to, Wang said, would be
additional symbolic goodwill gestures, perhaps including a
visit by the Dalai Lama to Beijing (though not to a Tibetan
region). Wang said he personally hopes the "Dalai Lama will
live a long time," because his death would make the Tibet
problem "more complicated."

HOPE FOR PRISONER RELEASES
--------------


7. (C) Tibetan poet and blogger Weise ("Oser") (strictly
protect) and her husband, dissident writer Wang Lixiong
(strictly protect),told PolOff November 7 that they believe
"no progress" has been made in this latest round of talks and
that the Tibetan side will likely "shut down" the dialogue as
a result. Any compromise by China on core issues is
impossible, Wang said, but he is hopeful that China, in an
attempt to demonstrate "flexibility," might release a few
Tibetan political prisoners in the coming weeks and make it
easier for "sensitive" Tibetans like Weise to travel abroad.
(Note: Weise was unable to participate in the FY 08 State
Department International Visitor Program because authorities
denied her application for a passport. Weise has filed a
lawsuit against the Public Security Bureau of Changchun,
Jilin Province, to overturn the denial.)

TIBETAN EXILE MEETING A "PRESSURE TACTIC"
--------------


8. (C) Beijing University's Ma Rong said the Dalai Lama's
recent comments to the media that he is "losing patience"
with the dialogue process and his plan to call a large
meeting of Tibetan exiles later this month were aimed at
putting pressure on the Chinese Government. (Note: Chinese
newspapers, including the nationalistic Global Times, have
echoed Ma's belief that the Dalai's recent statements are
merely a "pressure tactic.") Ma, however, felt that the
Tibetan exiles will continue to stick to the "Middle Way"
approach of seeking autonomy rather than independence as long
as the Dalai Lama is alive.

BEIJING 00004168 003 OF 003




9. (C) Dissident writer Wang Lixiong largely echoed Ma's
analysis that the announcement of the November meeting served
mainly to pressure the Chinese side. Delegates to the
upcoming Tibetan meeting, Wang asserted, are mainly old-guard
Tibetan exiles unlikely to criticize the Dalai Lama's
policies. More radical Tibetan independence groups, he
added, are already complaining that they do not have enough
representation at the meeting. The Dalai Lama has thus
"designed" the conference to encourage debate but not to
completely overturn the "Middle Way" approach. "The Dalai
Lama says he wants to remove himself from politics," Wang
said, "but in fact he is still very much involved."

WHEN THE DALAI LAMA DIES
--------------


10. (C) Ma Rong said the Chinese leadership is "not hoping"
for the Dalai Lama's death, but they are "well prepared" for
it. Ma said "arrangements have already been made" for an
officially sanctioned search party to select the Dalai Lama's
next reincarnation within China. Ma predicted that there
will be a repeat of the situation with the Panchen Lama, with
the PRC Government backing a candidate that is rejected by
Tibetan exiles. Chinese authorities expect violence to break
out in the period surrounding the death and reincarnation of
the Dalai Lama, but the PRC Government nevertheless has the
security resources to maintain control. China's leaders
anticipate the Tibetan exiles will quickly lose international
influence once they no longer have a charismatic, Nobel
Prize-winning leader who is regularly received by world
leaders. With the current Dalai Lama gone, more Tibetan
refugees will seek citizenship abroad and the community will
grow more "diffuse and fractured." To the extent some
Tibetan groups grow more radical and violent, Ma opined, this
will only serve to further dilute international sympathy.
Deqing Wangmu, the English teacher, separately agreed the
movement will likely take a "radical and violent turn" once
the Dalai Lama dies. Young, frustrated and under-educated
Tibetans, she said, are less likely to adhere to Buddhist
teachings against violence, especially after the current
Dalai Lama is gone.


11. (C) Grassroots democracy activist Xiong Wei (protect)
asserted to PolOff November 5 that waiting for the Dalai Lama
to die is the "core of China's strategy." When the Tibetan
movement abroad radicalizes, Xiong predicted, this will
strengthen the hand of "hardliners" in China, who will then
be able to justify even harsher repression. Xiong believes
that Premier Wen Jiabao is more liberal and "open-minded" on
Tibet, though he is clearly not driving Tibet policy.
Rather, President Hu Jintao, together with the entire
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC),is setting the course on
Tibet, with Zhou Yongkang (a fellow PBSC member and China's
senior security official) being the "key hardliner,"
according to Xiong. (Note: Zhou Yongkang is another former
Sichuan Party Secretary who was reportedly known for being
tough on the Tibetan minority during his tenure there.)
RANDT