Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIJING2965
2008-07-31 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

CHINESE SCHOLARS ON PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV MNUC CH PK AF IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002965 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2033
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MNUC CH PK AF IN
SUBJECT: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA
AND THE SAARC

REF: NEW DELHI 2012

Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002965

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2033
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MNUC CH PK AF IN
SUBJECT: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA
AND THE SAARC

REF: NEW DELHI 2012

Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chinese contacts agree that continuing
political uncertainty and the resulting diffusion of
authority in Pakistan have distracted Pakistan's leadership
from addressing counter-terrorism and economic concerns.
They say that the Pakistan Government's negotiation approach
with tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) is a "trap" that only hinders counter-terrorism
efforts, and that traditional cross-border tribal ties among
Afghani and Pakistani Taliban elements will limit coalition
forces' efforts to defeat the Taliban militarily. China
fears that extremist activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan
will lend strength to separatist activities in western China.
The implementation of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear
agreement will diminish China's influence in India. India's
mistrust of China and other South Asia Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members' hostility toward India
limit China's efforts to assist integration efforts in SAARC.
End Summary.

Pakistan
--------------


2. (C) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) South Asia
scholar Ye Hailin said Pakistan continues on a "negative
trend," with government leaders more and more "distracted" by
self-interested jockeying among Pakistan's political parties.
Furthermore, he added, the current political uncertainty in
Pakistan has splintered authority among President Pervez
Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani,
PM Yousef Raza Gilani and the Pakistan People's Party
leadership and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) leader Nawaz
Sharif.


3. (C) CASS scholar Ye said he recently submitted a report to
the Chinese Government that argues that the problems of loose
Federal Government control in the FATA are "over 100 years
old" and not easily addressed. He said the fundamental
problem is that most of the 20 million Pashtuns in Pakistan

are hostile to the United States and China and do not view
the Taliban as a terrorist organization. He described the
"soft then hard" (negotiations followed by military
operations) approach as a "trap" for the Pakistani Government
that encourages local tribes to seek concessions in the
negotiation phase, and, after tribal leaders fail to keep
their commitments, stokes tribal opposition to the Government
during the military operations phase. "Every time there is a
deal," Ye said, "the government claims it has achieved
progress, then three months later, more violence." Claiming
that Pakistani PM Yousef Raza Gilani is "not FARSIghted," Ye
criticized the Pakistan Government's practice of negotiating
with local tribal chieftains because it leaves intact the
"social system" in the FATA that encourages support of the
Taliban. Ye said that, for the Pakistan Government, the
problem of control in the FATA is "not a lack of willingness,
it is a lack of ability."

Afghan-Pakistan cross-border activities
--------------


4. (C) Ye said cross-border links between Taliban elements in
Pakistan and Afghanistan are "natural" because of similar
social systems and customs and because the locals "don't
respect the border." He said extremist elements have growing
influence in both FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP) in Pakistan, and predicted that if elections were held
again, the more secular Awami National Party (ANP) would not
win a majority in the NWFP. Ye said Afghani President Hamid
Karzai should support and "show more confidence" in the
Pakistan Government. "The Taliban period is over" and
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) does
not have the influence it once had, he said.


5. (C) Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes
for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) scholar Yuan
Peng said China recognizes that Pakistan is a "crucial
country" for U.S. international strategic policy and
counterterrorism efforts, but the United States should
understand that China is even more concerned about
instability in Pakistan than the United States is. The
Chinese focus is on the East Turkestan Movement seeking

BEIJING 00002965 002 OF 003


independence for the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. This
movement gains strength from its association with
fundamentalist and terrorist sources of support in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. The situation in Pakistan, by China's
estimation, is likely to deteriorate in the short to medium
term, because a new American presidential administration will
begin shifting focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. As the United
States increases pressure on Afghanistan, China expects
Pashtun militants will be driven south into FATA and the
NWFP, thus increasing the factors that generate instability
there.


6. (C) That, Yuan Peng said, will increase the pressure from
the United States on Pakistan either to act strongly in these
areas or allow the United States to do so. There is also the
possibility of unilateral action by the United States inside
Pakistan, which China feels would create much greater risk of
political fallout, or even political collapse, in Pakistan.
CASS' Ye was less optimistic aboutthe coalition forces'
military prospects. He suggested the coalition forces will
never be able to defeat the Taliban insurgency militarily,
adding that at some point political negotiations with the
Taliban will be necessary.

U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement
--------------


7. (C) Ye said that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement
reflects the current Indian Government's need for U.S.
support as well as its desire to enhance its reputation. Ye
echoed similar analysis in the Indian media (reftel) that no
consensus foreign policy exists in India and that political
parties are now defining foreign policies that range from
pro-American (the current government) to pro-China (the
Left). Ye said "China will be the loser" if the agreement
passes because the United States and India will draw closer
together. Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated Chinese
Institute for International Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar
Zheng Ruixiang said that, on non-proliferation issues, China
"does not like exceptions" and, if accepted by members of the
IAEA and the NSG, a similar agreement should be applied to
Pakistan. He warned that the agreement will start an arms
race not only in Pakistan but "in the region," noting recent
Indian tests of missiles that could reach China.

China-India
--------------


8. (C) Ye said Chinese-Indian relations are increasingly
close, but almost exclusively in the bilateral trade context.
(Note: The Indian Embassy confirmed that bilateral trade
volume for the first half of 2008 totaled USD 29 billion,
already surpassing the 2007 total of USD 28 billion.)
Commenting on the subsiding media stories on incursions on
the Finger of Sikkim and other border areas, Ye stated that
given the Olympics and China's other domestic concerns, it
has "no time" to apply military pressure on India at the
border. Ye stated that at the "global" level, despite joint
pronouncements and cooperation in some international fora,
China views India's rise as a dilution of China's global
influence. He cited India's increased voting weight in the
IMF and a possible future permanent seat in the UN Security
Council. At the regional level, India mistrusts China's
intentions, and hence cooperation in regional bodies such as
SAARC is minimal.

SAARC
--------------


9. (C) Ye stated that of all the regional coordinating bodies
in South and Southeast Asia, SAARC has been "left behind"
other regional groupings and is the "least coordinating."
Despite "fantastic statements" articulating the group's
intention to increase integration, SAARC members have taken
no practical steps to realize this goal, adding that "this
tendency will not change." Comparing SAARC with other
regional bodies around the world, Ye noted that the EU
functions through the leadership of France and Germany, and
that ASEAN functions because none of the member countries has
clear dominance over the others. In contrast, according to
Ye, SAARC's membership includes "India and six countries
hostile to it." (Note: Ye apparently was not including
Afghanistan, the eighth member of SAARC.)


10. (C) CIIS' Zheng said that because SAARC has yet to

BEIJING 00002965 003 OF 003


adequately define the role of observer countries, China has
been limited in its efforts to promote integration within
SAARC. In the past, China has proposed poverty reduction and
exchange programs and has provided some financial support to
SAARC. However, China realizes that India still harbors
suspicions of China's intentions in South Asia, and therefore
China will have to rely on bilateral rather than multilateral
channels to develop its ties in the region.
RANDT