SECURITY CONCERNS IN BASRA RESURFACE DUE TO SOFA VOTE

S E C R E T BASRAH 000088

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR ASEC KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY CONCERNS IN BASRA RESURFACE DUE TO SOFA VOTE

REF: A) BAGHDAD 003503; B) BASRAH 00085

CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

1. (C) Summary: Sadrist and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) contacts
of the Regional Embassy Office (REO) predict a rise in violence
in Basra if the SOFA is approved by the Council of
Representatives. While the security situation has dramatically
improved since Operation Charge-of-the-Knights (COK) and
continues to be stable, rhetoric from Muqtada al-Sadr against
Coalition Forces (CF) has renewed concerns that the security
environment may become unstable once again. One Office of the
Martyr Sadr (OMS) leader is advising REO personnel to stay out
of the city until mid-December. Despite the potential for
increased violence, the local ISF commander is confident that
the situation is well under control. End summary.


2. (S) Sheikh Mohammad al-Faraji, who identifies himself as the
OMS leader of five southern provinces (reftel A),informed the
REO on November 16 that he expects random attacks against CF to
begin immediately following the announcement of a SOFA between
Iraq and the US. Faraji, who claims to have authority over
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in Basra, is concerned that many JAM
members will act individually, in spite of his instructions to
refrain from violence until ordered. Faraji said he does not
control JAM Special Groups and Al-Asa'ib (AAH) which receive
their orders directly from OMS. (Comment: All CF evidence
suggests that AAH takes its orders from Akram al-Ka'bi, who has
broken away from OMS and is no longer part of its structure.
Al-Ka'bi is currently participating in reconciliation
negotiations with Iraqi Government advisors close to the Prime
Minister. End comment.)


3. (S) According to Faraji, JAM members in Basra are already
poised to attack. He further explained that he denies daily
requests for permission to engage CF targets. He related one
incident where an American PRT member was targeted but the
mission was aborted when Faraji denied the request to fire.


4. (S) Faraji specifically warned the REO to minimize movements
in Basra between November 26 -- the date he expects SOFA passage
-- and December 15. He anticipates random attacks but believes
he will be able to convince rogue JAM elements to honor his
cease fire order within three weeks.


5. (S) Faraji's prediction of violence was echoed by Major
General Mohammad Jawad Huwaydi in a meeting at the Basra
Operations Command on November 17. General Mohammad
acknowledged that many JAM elements had returned to the city and
believed that a violent response to approval of the SOFA was a
strong likelihood. The General was confident, however, that the
violence would be kept to a minimum. Although admitting that
problems remain within the Iraqi Police (IP),he acknowledged
that they were improving and he was satisfied with the overall
performance of the ISF. He pointed out that the 14th Division
(Iraqi Army) regularly conducts cordon and search operations and
gave assurance that the ISF have complete control of the city.
Mohammad said arrests had been on the rise and the ISF had
detained 350 people on security-related charges over the past
two weeks.


6. (S) Comment: Sheikh Faraji is both a Sadrist and a
nationalist; his cooperation with the REO is clearly aimed at
boosting his own power within Sadrist circles and countering
Iranian influence among his followers in the region. In the
past, he has requested US assistance in promoting an Arab Shi'a
spiritual leader to rival Iranian religious power in Najaf.
Recently, he asked for REO assistance in finding jobs for over
750 people fired by the government during COK for their OMS or
JAM connections. Although how much power he has within OMS is
unclear, his correct description of a specific PRT member's
movements into Basra on a particular day tends to lend him some
credibility.


7. (S) Comment continued: ISF have continued to improve over
the past few months. The opening of a Basra Provincial Joint
Operations Center (reftel B) on November 20 will enhance their
effectiveness. Given JAM's weakened state, lack of funds, and
current unpopularity, it is difficult to imagine that an
increase in coordinated attacks or even large-scale violence
against CF could be sustained over time.

NEGRON