BASRA OPERATIONS COMMANDER ACKNOWLEDGES IMPROVEMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000080

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRA OPERATIONS COMMANDER ACKNOWLEDGES IMPROVEMENTS

REF: BASRA 000056

BASRAH 00000080 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Basra Operations Commander, Major General
Mohammed Jawad Huwaidi, acknowledged improvements in the Iraqi
police (IP). He was not concerned about the reemergence of
Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) as a credible force, but rather the
emergence of criminal gangs of former JAM members. He expressed
the need for another brigade of troops to patrol areas close to
the Iranian border and was not enthusiastic about incorporating
militias, such as the Sons of Iraq, into the military.
Relations between Mohammed and Basra Governor remain tense.
Nevertheless, the general intends to further the Iraqi Army's
(IA) already-good reputation among Basrawis by establishing good
civil-military relations. End Summary.

Security Continues to Improve
--------------


2. (C) On September 16, REO met with Basra Operations
Commander, Major General Mohammed Jawad Huwaidi.
Mohammedassessed that security improvements are continuing. He
pointed out that the IP are becoming increasingly reliable and
are contributing significantly to operations by Iraqi security
forces (ISF). He commented that many of the nefarious elements,
which once plagued the police force, have been weeded out.
Mohammed credited the IP with curtailing oil smuggling through
the Shatt Al-Arab and drug smuggling across the Iranian border.

JAM Returns
--------------


3. (C) Mohammed expressed concern over the return of JAM
members to the area. He speculated that their exodus from Iran
was the result of broken promises of support from the Iranian
government. According to Mohammed, the "era of militias in
control of Basra is over." He stressed that his immediate
security concern was not the reemergence of JAM as a credible
force to be reckoned with, but rather the emergence of criminal
gangs of former JAM members. He predicted an increase in crime
and assassinations as a result. [Note: In a June meeting,
Mohammed predicted a "period of assassinations" prior to local
elections in the fall. Reftel]


4. (C) Mohammed described his efforts to head-off potential
militia and criminal operations in the province. Using National
Intelligence Agency (NIA) reports, he is able to deploy troops
to counter potentially hostile operations. One example he cited
was the deployment of an Iraqi army (IA) unit from north Basra
to Abu Khaseeb, south ofthe city, based on an NIA report that
JAM was returning to that area. On another occasion, Mohammed
moved an army unit to the border town of Safwan because of
reported criminal activity. Mohammed hopes that ISF actions
will send a signal to gangs.

More Troops Needed
--------------


5. (C) Mohammed expressed a need for another brigade to patrol
the border area and lamented the absence of a brigade from the
14th Division IA, which had been assigned to Baghdad.
Commenting on the difficulties of subduing Iranian-backed
insurgents, he noted that Iran prefers to fight in Iraq. He
identified three general goals for the use of his troops: a) To
stop the flow of aid and weapons from Iran; b) To stop illicit
traffic along the Shatt Al-Arab; c) To have enough troops for an
effective reserve force. Mohammed was adamant that additional
forces were needed to maintain the gains made after
Charge-of-Knights.

Sons of Iraq and Sadrist Amnesty
--------------


6. (C) Mohammed was unenthusiastic about incorporating the
Sons of Iraq into the military. While admitting there were some
good reasons to do so, he believed that incorporating militias
into the IA was ultimately too risky. He said militias always
have their own agendas, are not all loyal, and lack
professionalism. Mohammad was very negative about proposals to
grant amnesty to Sadrist detainees and members in exile. "As
long as Iran is supporting and training them, there will be
trouble." He added that, "the ones in jail should stay in
jail."

Relations With Basra Governor
-------------- --

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7. (C) Mohammed indicated that his relations with Basra
Governor Mohammed Wa'ili remained strained. He contemptuously
remarked that the Governor believed he was "in charge of
everything." Stressing that the Governor was not in charge of
the Security Forces, he resented recent allegations from the
Governor that he had been accepting money from Coalition Forces
for directing his troops to assist in development projects.


8. (C) Despite cold relations with the Governor, Mohammed was
able to call together influential Basrawis for a meeting with
himself and the Coalition leadership on September 22 at Basra
International Airport's VIP reception room. Iraqi attendees
included Director Generals for ports, electricity, water;
high-level officials from South Oil Company (oil and gas); and
factory managers for steel, fertilizer, and petrochemical
plants. Coalition leadership participants included Commander of
MND-SE Major General Andy Salmon, UK Consul General Nigel
Haywood, and REO Director.


9. (C) Comment: While General Mohammed's security assessment
is generally optimistic, it is tempered by elements of realism
and thus does not come across as self-serving. The contrast
between his negative appraisal of the IP in a previous meeting
(reftel) and his more optimistic current evaluation suggests
real improvement by the IP. Clearly influenced by the
collective advice from the Coalition leadership in Basra,
Mohammed's initiative to bring together Basrawi stakeholders was
intended to further the IA's good reputation among Basrawis by
establishing good civil-military relations and to genuinely
offer the IA's support in the reconstruction of Basra.
NEGRON