SUNNI CONCERNS IN BASRAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000077

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI CONCERNS IN BASRAH

BASRAH 00000077 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary: While anti-Sunni violence has all but stopped,
many Sunni Basrawis continue to feel victimized by the Shi'a
majority. The high unemployment rate in Basrah and the
relatively low number of development projects in Sunni areas
fuels Sunni perceptions of discrimination, although their lack
of political representation may be the real culprit. Many of
the Sunnis who fled the province to avoid sectarian violence are
eager to return, but the bleak economic outlook, more than
security concerns, continues to keep them away. End summary.

Continuous Sunni Decline
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2. (SBU) Basrah's Sunni population has steadily declined since
the 1970's, when they made up about 60 percent of the province.
By 2003, their numbers had been reduced to about 30 percent.
Once favored by Saddam Hussein, Basrawi Sunnis became targets of
Shi'a extremism after the fall of the regime. Many of them left
Basrah to escape sectarian violence. Victimized and
distrustful, Sunnis consequently boycotted local elections in

2005. The destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in 2006,
which resulted in several days of countrywide violence that was
particularly bad in Basrah (REF A),represents the nadir of
Sunni-Shi'a relations. Today, Sunnis represent approximately 15
percent of the provincial population. Of the four Sunni tribes
left in Basrah province, the largest is the Ghanimi tribe, lead
by Sheikh Adnan Majeed al-Ghanim, with approximately 20,000 -
25,000 members. (Information on provincial Sunni tribes will
follow in SEPTEL.)

No Longer Persecuted, But Feeling Left Out
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3. (SBU) Recent security gains have improved life for all
minorities in Basrah. Few Sunnis report themselves victims of
sectarian violence today. Nevertheless, many Sunnis continue to
perceive themselves as second-class citizens, with unemployment
topping the list of complaints. In a province where half the
population is out of work, Sunnis fare proportionately worse
than their Shi'a counterparts on the job market. As a result of
their 2005 election boycott, they lack local political
representation, which has done much to limit their job
opportunities.


4. (C) During a July interview (REFTEL B),Dr. Abd al-Kareem
al-Khazraji, head of the Sunni Arab Endowment for the southern
region, expressed concern that Sunnis were overlooked for
professional jobs. He complained about the politics involved,
pointing out that the Ministry of Higher Education, for example,
was controlled by the Da'wa party and as a result they only
selected Da'wa members for their professional positions.
Likewise, Sheikh Al-Ghanim complained to the REO recently that
since 2003, none of his tribal members have been able to find
work in the army, police, or government. Al-Ghanim brought this
problem to the attention of Basrah Provincial Council Chairman,
Mohammad Sa'doun Siher al-`Ubadi, in May and supplied him with
the names of 1,000 individuals looking for work. Although
Al-`Ubadi, a Da'wa member himself, promised to find jobs for the
individuals, none have found work to date. Similarly, Dr.
Sheikh Al-Dusari, of the Iraqi Islamic Party, told REO in August
that he presented a list of seven officers looking for jobs to
the Iraqi Chief of Police. The list was forwarded to the
Ministry of Interior but there has been no response.

Fewer MND-SE Development Projects in Sunni Areas
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5. (C) Sunni leaders have also voiced complaints that their
neighborhoods are overlooked with regard to development
projects. A REO review of all available MND-SE Coalition
projects for Basrah province shows relatively fewer projects in
the three largest Sunni areas of the province - Abu Al-Khaseeb,
Al-Zubayr, and the town of Umm Qasr - compared to the rest of
Basrah. Furthermore, there have been no projects recorded in
Al-Jamhuriya, the only predominantly Sunni neighborhood in
Basrah city.

Economy Keeps IDPs From Returning
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6. (SBU) Displacement is another major issue for Sunnis.
Al-Ghanim estimated that since 2003, around 10 percent of the
Sunni population has emigrated from Basrah. The wealthier of
these have moved to countries throughout the Middle East and
beyond. The less fortunate families find themselves today in
Mosul, Al-Shirgat and Baiji areas of Salahuddin province, and

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Ramadi. Between 5,000 and 10,000 families want to return to
Basrah, according to Awad al-Adnan of the National Dialogue
Front, who has followed the issue closely.

No Representation, No Funding
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7. (C) Lacking representation in the Provincial Council (PC),
Sunni leaders often feel the government discriminates against
them. Al-Khazraji discussed his request to the PC for
reconstruction funds. While the PC has funded the
reconstruction of many Shi'a mosques, his request for funds to
reconstruct a Sunni mosque was denied. In an August interview,
Deputy Governor Luai al-Battat, a Shi'a himself, confirmed that
while the PC's Religious Committee provides reconstruction funds
for mosques in general, they have not included funds for
minority religious centers, such as Sunni mosques and churches.
Al-Battat explained that since 2005 project funds have been
divided among four PC members, all of whom are Shi'a. He said
he looked forward to a time after the elections when the PC
would have no religious figures.


8. (C) Learning from the past, Sunnis appear to have their eyes
on the next elections. Provincial elections director Hazim
Jodah reports that large numbers of Sunnis verified their voter
registration information during July and August. The Iraqi
Islamic Party is poised to gain a large percentage of the Sunni
vote, as is the National Dialogue Front, which has been very
active in recent months. Of the many independent candidates
registered with the province, none have specifically identified
themselves as Sunni so far.


9. (C) Comment: Even though Basrawi Sunnis have suffered in
recent years, many of them have told the REO that tense
relations between Sunnis and Shi'as are a thing of the past.
Many of those who fled sectarian violence earlier want to
return, but they are scared to come back. Interestingly, they
have started to fear less coming back to violence than coming
back to no shelter or jobs. Furthermore, we find that Sunnis
are more often discriminated against for not being a part of the
political establishment, rather than based on their religion.
In an environment of patronage politics, they may be responsible
for their own demise. Since Coalition and PRT projects are
coordinated with government authorities and representatives, who
are all Shi'a and heavy patronage practitioners, it would follow
that such projects inadvertently may have disproportionately
benefited Shi'as. This problem should somewhat rectify itself,
as Sunni groups plan full participation in the next elections.
It is in their interest that the elections be held as quickly as
possible. End comment.
NEGRON