BANI TAMIM SHEIKH: SUMMERTIME AND THE LIVIN' AIN'T EASY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000076

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/4/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BANI TAMIM SHEIKH: SUMMERTIME AND THE LIVIN' AIN'T EASY

BASRAH 00000076 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary: On August 25, Bani Tamim Sheikh Mansour
Tamim told the REO Director that the security situation in
Basrah was worsening and largely blamed Iran, saying that the
Iranians had infiltrated the Iraqi Police (IP). He also critized
acting Justice Minister Safi
al-Safa's allocation of the $100 million in emergency
reconstruction funds. Concerning elections, Mansour
asserted that people were fed up with the
inefficacy and rampant corruption of the local government
and wanted change. Mansur dismissed Governor Wa'ili's
current attempt to form a Basrah region as a self-serving effort
that would be disastrous to
Iraqi unity. End Summary.

Security Situation Worsening...
--------------

2. (C) In a meeting held August 25 at the Basrah Regional
Embassy Office, Sheikh Mansour Tamim of the Bani Tamim
tribe decried the worsening security situation. Claiming
that Special Group (SG) members were starting to return
from Iran, Mansour said that they were responsible for the
recent increase in attacks and assassinations. Mansour
said SGs were targeting government, political, and
religious officials, and that they had plans to attack
alcohol vendors, music stores, and public gatherings.
Though he offered no proof, Mansour asserted that this was
part of a deliberate, low-level campaign designed to
disrupt the normalcy that has returned to Basrah. Pointing
the finger at Iran, Mansour asserted that the Iranian
smuggling of weapons and funds into the province has
resumed in full-force. In addition, he contended that
despite efforts to reform the Iraqi Police (IP) after the
Charge of the Knights operation, the SG and JAM maintain a
significant presence in the Iraqi Police (IP),acting through
sympathizers, agents, and corrupt policemen.

While Reconstruction Lags...
--------------


3. (C) Scoffing at the progress of reconstruction in the
province, Mansour directed most of his venom at acting
Justice Minister Safa al-Safi, stating that most of the
contracts from the $100 million emergency reconstruction fund
had been directed to Safi's business associates and family
members, and that his tribe and others had not been
consulted during the process. He also claimed that the
work performed on some of the projects was shoddy and
unprofessional, pointing to the slipshod renovation of a
clinic in one of his strongholds near the Shatt al-Arab as
an example. (Note: While some contracts have been awarded, we
are not aware that any of Safi's projects have been completed.
End note.)

Elections and Local Government
--------------


4. (C) Mansour said he has a bad relationship with the Governor
and the Provincial Council (PC) and admitted that he and his
newspaper, al-Ashar, are regular critics of the local
government. Claiming that people were upset with the lack of
services as well as what he claimed to be rampant corruption
within the local government. Mansour dismissed the current
provincial leadership as motivated by their own self-interests,
while also claiming that many
members of the PC "were puppets of the Iranians."

Regions Formation Law and Federalism
--------------


5. (C) Mansour dismissed Governor Wa'ili's campaign to create a
federal region in Basrah as a power grab to control Basrah's
economy
and resources.,
Mansour thinks the campaign does not enjoy popular support and
doubts that it could succeed, claiming that it would be
disastrous for Iraqi unity. Commenting admiringly on his
recent trip to the United States, where he had a firsthand look
at a federalist system, Mansour revealed his preference for a
similar arrangement. However, he said that it
would take considerable time, education, and efforts for Iraqis
to truly understand federalism. If done prematurely and
haphazardly, he opined, federalism would fail in Iraq and lead
to sectarian dislocation and
conflict.


6. (C) Comment: Mansour paints a dim picture of the security
situation. But his description is more closely aligned to -- as
seen by Coalition intelligence and Basrawis alike -- the worst

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case scenario for Basrah during the next six months, rather than
the current situation. While there have been some targeted
assassinations recently, with an average murder rate of 20 per
month among Basra's 2.5 million, it would be a stretch, to say
the least, to conclude that there is a pattern of worsening
security in Basrah. Likewise, it is worth noting that many of
our Iraqi contacts tailor their message to a `US audience' by
using Iranian influence -- with catch-all terms like `Iranian
puppets' -- to explain why a given person/organization/political
party is particularly bad. Our contacts, however, are usually
reluctant to expound on their general accusations with more
specific evidence. With regard to federalism vs. regionalism,
Governor Wa'ili's campaign is bound to be popular if he is able
to make a scapegoat out of the central government in the eyes of
Basrawis. However, most Basrawis, like Mansour, seem to take
issue with the existing dysfunctional Basrah-Baghdad
relationship, rather than the current structure of that
relationship. Besides, it will be hard to convince Basrawis,
even if the province were able to use more of its own resources
unencumbered by Baghdad, that their local government would
necessarily deliver more.
NEGRON