Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BASRAH63
2008-07-02 19:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH TRIBAL BATTALIONS FLOUNDERING

Tags:  MASS MOPS PBTS PGOV PINR PREL PROP PTER IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8484
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0063/01 1841933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021933Z JUL 08
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0777
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0360
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0814
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000063 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2018
TAGS: MASS MOPS PBTS PGOV PINR PREL PROP PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH TRIBAL BATTALIONS FLOUNDERING

REF: A. A. BASRAH 28

B. B. BASRAH 25

C. C. BASRAH 35

D. D. BASRAH 52

E. E. BASRAH 50

F. F. BASRAH 31

G. G. BASRAH 40

BASRAH 00000063 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Won Lee, A/Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000063

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2018
TAGS: MASS MOPS PBTS PGOV PINR PREL PROP PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH TRIBAL BATTALIONS FLOUNDERING

REF: A. A. BASRAH 28

B. B. BASRAH 25

C. C. BASRAH 35

D. D. BASRAH 52

E. E. BASRAH 50

F. F. BASRAH 31

G. G. BASRAH 40

BASRAH 00000063 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Won Lee, A/Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C//REL MCFI) SUMMARY: The tribal battalions established in
Basrah by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to assist the
Iraqi Security Forces during Operation Charge of the Knights are
dying a slow death due to a lack of GOI support (ref A). The
Bani Tamim and Bani Malik tribes each organized a battalion in
their respective areas of Tannumah and Qurnah. Leaders from
both battalions complained that the GOI's failure to pay or
equip them is causing dwindling troop morale and desertion. One
sheikh claimed that Finance Minister Bayan Jaber refused to fund
them, despite the local police chief's pleas to remain active.
They asked for direct Coalition assistance or pressure on the
GOI to pay them. Barring any improvement, both battalions may
shortly cease to exist. End Summary.

AL-QURNAH BATTALION (BANI MALIK)
--------------

2. (C//REL MCFI) Sheikh Salam al-Maliki, head of the Bani Malik
tribe, told us June 21 that the tribal battalion formed in
Qurnah mostly hailed from his tribe and was comprised of 750 men
organized into ten platoons. According to sources in Qurnah,
this battalion mostly secured key facilities at the direction of
the Iraqi Police during Charge of the Knights. Salam said that
the battalion currently trains four hours each morning at its
headquarters in the Al-Thagher district under the leadership of
former Iraqi Special Forces officer, Colonel Fuad al-Maliki.
After their morning training is completed, the members return to

their homes or jobs.

SHATT AL-ARAB BATTALION (BANI TAMIM)
--------------

3. (C//REL MCFI) The 760-member battalion dominated by the Bani
Tamim tribe was formed in the Shatt al-Arab (aka Tannumah)
district east of Basra city and has been the more active of the
two units (ref B). During Operation Charge of the Knights, they
netted several large weapons caches, arrested known JAM members,
secured key infrastructure in their area, provided intelligence
to the ISF, and converted the Office of the Martyr Sadr office
into their headquarters. The tribe's leader, Sheikh Mansur
Kanaan al-Tamimi, and the battalion commander, Colonel Louway,
told us June 30 that the GOI equipped them with only 170 AK47s,
12 PKC, and 10 vehicles for which a meager 20 liters of petrol a
day is issued. Thus, only five of the vehicles are used at a
time and most members are expected to bring their own weapons to
duty.


4. (C//REL MCFI) According to COL Louway, the battalion
currently patrols the Iranian border from Schalamcha to
al-Neshwa. Their patrols, he noted, discovered that insurgents
look for old weapon caches in bunkers from the Iran-Iraq war and
use the bunkers to operate from. His battalion planned to
establish checkpoints along the border at key crossing sites,
but gave up the idea lacking equipment and trailers to man the
checkpoints.

LACK OF GOI SUPPORT YIELDS DIMINISHING MORALE
--------------

5. (C//REL MCFI) Both battalions complained that the GOI is
failing to equip and pay them as PM Maliki promised during
Operation Charge of the Knights (refs C, D & E). As a result,
morale is dwindling. Police Chief Major General Adl Darham has
promised both battalions that salaries are forthcoming. His
encouragement has helped in Qurnah, but according to COL Louway,
members of the Tannumah battalion have become so frustrated that
60 members resigned in June and he expects to loose more than
that in July. Louway added that it was becoming more difficult
for the officers to control the soldiers without salaries.


6. (C//REL MCFI) Both Mansur and Salam flatly denied rumors that
Acting Justice Minister Safa al Safi made USD 19 million in
salary payments to the tribes out of the USD 100 million taken
from the provincial budget for reconstruction projects (refs F &

BASRAH 00000063 002.2 OF 002


G). Mansur also claimed to have heard-through IP Administrative
Director Brigadier Abdel Hameed-that Finance Minister Bayan
Jaber refuses to fund tribal initiatives and that PM Maliki is
allegedly working to resolve the dispute. Both sheikhs
requested Coalition training and financial assistance, or
Coalition pressure on the GOI to pay them.

COMMENT
--------------

7. (C//REL MCFI) Typical of Arab governments during military
crisis, the GOI likely made promises to tribal leaders to elicit
their support during Operation Charge of the Knights without any
intention of fulfilling those promises. PM Maliki was opposed
to any Sons of Iraq-like initiatives before Charge of the
Knights and his change of mind in the middle of operations was a
surprise. By not paying or equipping the battalions, the GOI is
allowing the initiative to die a slow death. Frustrated by the
GOI's broken promises, Mansur and Salam both accused Iran and
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim of pressuring the GOI not to support tribal
initiatives in southern Iraq fearing empowered tribes could
oppose Tehran or ISCI/Badr's designs on Basrah. True or not,
the lack of support will inhibit both tribes from throwing
around the added weight they hoped to possess during future
provincial elections. For now, local ISF units have not
complained that the tribal battalions have exceeded their
authority, but without Coalition support, we anticipate both
battalions will cease to exist in three months. End comment.
WLEE