BASRAH OPERATIONS COMMAND GENERAL MOHAMMED ON SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000056

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/7/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH OPERATIONS COMMAND GENERAL MOHAMMED ON SECURITY
PROGRESS

REF: BASRAH 036

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Dept. of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Lieutenant General Mohammed Jawad Huwaidi,
Commander of the Basrah Operations Command (BOC),told REO
Basrah May 24 that Basrah is now 70-80% secure. He expected
operations to continue through the summer and posited that there
was greater cooperation between Basrawis and the ISF. Mohammed
also admitted that the police force has improved since COK, but
there were still criminal and militia elements within the ranks.
Though acknowledging that the support of the tribes had been
important during the initial days of COK, he labeled them
disorganized and was indifferent to their complaints that the
GOI has failed to provide them with resources. Mohammad
outlined an ambitious border security plan to stem Iran's
"pervasive influence", He predicted a rise in politically
motivated violence during the run-up to the elections and denied
Sadrist assertions that they had been singled out for
persecution by the GOI and ISF. END SUMMARY.

GENERAL SECURITY
--------------

2. (C) During a meeting held at the Basrah Regional Embassy
Office on May 24, Lt. General Mohammed Jawad Huwaidi, the
commander of the Basrah Operations Command (BOC),assessed
Basrah province to be 70-80% secure as a result of the COK
operation. Now that Basrah City was essentially secure, the
campaign had moved to Qurnah in northern Basrah, where Mohammed
said operations had gone well. Smaller COK operations were
ongoing in other parts of the city and province. Mohammed said
that in general his forces were adequately supplied, explicitly
contradicting reports from REO contacts that IA troops were
lacking weapons and other resources. He said that wheeled armor
would be helpful but he was not insistent. (Note: His
predecessor General Mohan had constantly complained to REO that
wheeled armor was essential to his operations. End Note.)
Mohammed made a point of mentioning that the UK had given a
substantial amount of money to General Mohan to purchase weapons
for the IA, and he wondered where the weapons were. Looking to
the future, Mohammed acknowledged the importance of turning
attention to security for private investors, and he committed to
providing this security.


3. (C) Commenting on a VBIED attack at Basrah University,
Mohammed revealed that he believed the intended target was
acting Justice Minister Safa al-Safi, who was tasked by Prime
Minister (PM) Maliki to oversee, on the ground in Basrah, the
distribution of $100 million in emergency reconstruction funds;
the ISF subsequently uncovered a small cache of weapons at the
university. Deeming this an isolated incident, Mohammed did not
believe it heralded a return of militia activity. He also said
that raids were ongoing, and he expected COK operations to
continue through the summer. Highlighting the improved security
situation in the province, Mohammed said that it has resulted in
better cooperation between the ISF and Basrah's residents, which
in turn has led to better intelligence.


4. (C) Mohammed dismissed claims by Sadrists, tribal sheikhs and
many other local commentators that the COK was politically
motivated and that the ISF has singled out Sadrists while
ignoring the activities of other militias, including those
linked to ISCI/Badr and Fadhila; he said he "would never look at
it this way." Declaring that the ISF pursued wanted criminals,
he added "if there is a warrant, we will arrest them." When
pressed by the REO Director, he grudgingly conceded that there
may be some truth to the Sadrist claims, but that he merely
executed arrest warrants and was not a judge or prosecutor.

POLICE
--------------

5. (C) Though acknowledging that the performance of the Iraqi
police (IP) had improved since COK began, Mohammed cautioned
that there were still criminal and militia elements within the
ranks. He also said that he was reluctant to let them operate
independently and insisted that the Iraqi Army accompany the IP
on operations. Mohammed acknowledged that while the IA has
enough supplies, perhaps the IP did not. He compared the
generally sufficient IA supply chain with the IP system where
the IP were given an allowance to live on the economy; he
allowed that perhaps these allowances were not given out in a
timely fashion. He mentioned concern over recent reports of IP
stealing from homes and drinking alcohol on the job.


6. (C) Acknowledging the positive contribution of the tribes,
particularly in the early days of the COK, Mohammed seemed
skeptical of their current efforts, calling the Bani Malik tribe

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and others "unorganized." He appeared indifferent to their
complaints about unfulfilled promises of material and financial
support from the GOI. In a telling anecdote that may have
revealed his true feelings about tribal engagement, he shared
that when the PM had asked him during the initial days of COK if
the tribes were well trained, he replied to the PM that they
were well trained to be "gangsters and thieves." (Note: Mohammed
did not seem knowledgeable about the details of the tribal
support battalions. He clearly had not had contact with Salam
al-Maliki, the main organizer of the Qurnah battalion. The
tribal battalions are not under Mohammed's direct command, but
fall under the MOI. End Note.)

BORDERS
--------------

7. (C) Arguing that securing the borders was the only way to
stem Iran's "pervasive influence" in southern Iraq, Mohammed
outlined an ambitious plan to reinforce Basrah's borders. He
stressed that Basrah was the main staging point for weapons
smuggling to the rest of Iraq. Mohammed related that in 1979 he
was in southern Iraq on military duty and that porosity of the
border was the same problem. In the coming weeks, he hoped to
enlist the aid of several State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in
Basrah so that he could use their resources and equipment to
create a series of berms and fortifications that would resemble
those on Iraq's southern border with Kuwait; he had a meeting
scheduled with the SOE directors. Mohammed noted that he had
also asked the U.S. military for ICERP funds for this purpose.


8. (C) Coalition plans to ramp up the Shalamshah Border Crossing
were important but only a piece of what was needed. (Note:
Mohammed also did not appear knowledgeable about Shalamshah.
End Note.) He revealed that he was contemplating the relocation
of segments of the population residing in small villages along
the river in the al Faw peninsula and possibly other areas along
the border, all in order to staunch the flow of weapons
smuggling. When REO director pointed out that forcibly
relocating villagers was often a politically charged exercise
with negative humanitarian consequences, Mohammed appeared
unconcerned. He replied that the numbers of people involved
were small and that he was certain that villagers were involved
in smuggling. Mohammed also indicated concern about Maysan's
borders with Iran and the need to halt the flow of weapons into
that province.


9. (C) Acknowledging that in the marsh areas physical barriers
would be impossible, Mohammed planned to increase waterborne
patrols and, more importantly, human intelligence gathering
among the Marsh Arabs. REO Director wondered aloud whether the
Iraqi navy and coast guard would be up to this task, mentioning
other countries, such as Peru, where most of the nation's navy
was a freshwater fleet patrolling its inland borders. Mohammed
appeared lukewarm but agreed that he would need more patrol
boats and trained, armed servicemen to make his plan effective.
He also mentioned that in the past the French had supplied a
radar system for the marsh area that was helpful.

ELECTIONS AND SECURITY
--------------

10. (C) Though Mohammed revealed that he hoped to maintain his
current troop strength through the elections, he candidly
admitted that he expected the level of violence to increase in
the run-up to the elections, stating that August to October
would be the "period of assassinations -- but that this was
normal." Despite this grim outlook, he asserted that his forces
were prepared to ensure the security of the Voter Registration
Centers (VRC),and that they also have a detailed plan for
maintaining security during the elections. His security
assessment of the VRCs was in progress. (Embassy Note: UNAMI
states that the VRC security assessment has since been
completed.) Mohammed described his planned 200 to 300 meter
security zone around the VRCs, with an inner ring of IP and an
outer ring of IA. Within this zone only official government
vehicles would be allowed. He expressed concern that his best
force, the First Brigade, would be sent to Amarah for eventual
operations there. (Note: He refers to QRF1, a brigade-sized
element of the 1st IA Division, that had been brought to Basrah
for COK and that since this meeting did depart for the North.
Many observers also credit QRF1 as being the best performing
brigade during COK. End Note.)


11. (S) BIO NOTES: Shia Mohammed was Commander of the 3rd
Brigade (Bde),8th IA Division based near Al Kut, Wasit, where
he is from. In September 2007 he and his Bde were relocated to
BASRA, to become 1st Bde of the newly formed 14th IA Division.
In April he was appointed Commander of the 14th Division, based
in Basrah. While in 2007 there were allegations that Mohammed's
brigade looted and burned Sunni homes in an operation against
insurgents, prompting a request for investigation by MNF, PM
Maliki ordered officers involved in that operation, including

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Mohammed to be promoted. While meetings by MNDSE have included
a few negative impressions, the overall impression has been of
professionalism, organization and determination to bring
security to Basrah.


12. (C) COMMENT: General Mohammed has continued his reputation
(Reftel) among Coalition observers as a relatively detailed and
careful planner. He has clearly given a lot of thought to
issues such as border control, election security and reform of
the police. He has a frank, considered manner and does not
appear prone to the emotional outbursts of his predecessor
General Mohan. REO assesses him as a good partner for achieving
security in Basrah province.
HOWARD