Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BASRAH52
2008-05-30 12:02:00
SECRET
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BANI MALIK SHEIKS ON COK, GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN

Tags:  PGOV PINS IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO7007
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0052/01 1511202
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 301202Z MAY 08
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0338
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0755
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0792
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000052 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ
SUBJECT: BANI MALIK SHEIKS ON COK, GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN
SOUTHERN IRAQ

BASRAH 00000052 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Dept. of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000052

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ
SUBJECT: BANI MALIK SHEIKS ON COK, GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN
SOUTHERN IRAQ

BASRAH 00000052 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Dept. of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (S/rel MCFI) Summary: In a May 22 meeting at the REO, Sheikh
Salam Maliki, leader of the Bani Malik tribe, and his brother,
Sabah Maliki, expressed dissatisfaction with the ongoing Charge
of the Knights (COK) operation in their tribal area, Qurnah.
Both claimed the government had yet to fulfill the promises of
financial and material support after their tribe had pledged to
support COK. Though acknowledging that the security situation
in Qurnah had improved, both men expressed fears that the
militias would ultimately return. Sabah claimed that the
Iranians would work through ISCI/Badr to influence the upcoming
elections. Both also said that many of their followers are
reluctant to participate in the upcoming elections, as in Basrah
the 2005 provincial elections was fraudulent and they did not
expect the 2008 election to be any different. End Summary.


2. (S/rel MCFI) During a frank discussion held May 22 at the
Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Sheikh Salam Maliki, the leader
of the Bani Malik tribe, and his brother, Sabah Maliki, relayed
their criticisms of the ongoing COK campaign in Qurnah, which is
in their tribal area. Though admitting that the security
situation has improved in Qurnah and acknowledging the
performance of the Iraqi Army (IA),they also asserted that the
sudden departure of the militias had been a contributing factor.
Both were especially dismissive of the police (IP),stating
that not only did the police lack direction and leadership, but
they also suffered from a lack of supplies and equipment.
Claiming that many of the militants who fled to Iran were now
regrouping and retraining, the two men appeared concerned that
militants could soon return, and lamented the poor performance
of the ISF in securing the borders between Iran and Iraq. (Note:
some intelligence reports label Sabah as a Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)
commander. End Note.)


3. (C) Stating that the GOI had promised to incorporate their
tribal battalion into the ISF, both men seemed extremely
frustrated with the GOI's unfulfilled promises, stating that to
date, their men had not received salaries, equipment, or

weapons. Noting that he had met with the Prime Minister (PM)
during the hectic first days of the COK and had received a
personal pledge of support from him, Sheikh Salam appeared
visibly disappointed. Despite a ministerial order from the MOI
and an administrative order from Basrah Police headquarters,
nothing had been given to his men, and he was skeptical that he
could hold his force together much longer.


4. (C) Both men were also critical of the GOI's distribution of
the promised $100 million emergency reconstruction fund, which
they deemed essential to maintaining security. He laid the
blame solely on the shoulders of Safa al-Safi, Acting Justice
Minister and in charge of the fund. Sheikh Salam is the
chairman of the North Basrah Tribal Regional Support Council
(set up by al-Safi),and he claimed that he had personally given
Safi a list of projects; to date nothing had been implemented or
even announced. His more vitriolic brother, Sabah, went
further, alleging that Safi has no intention of distributing the
money. (Note: al-Safi has yet to produce a list of projects that
he and his Committee of Deputy Ministers will execute in Basrah.
Al-Safi is reportedly turning management of the fund over to
the ISCI/Badr-allied head of the Basrah Business Center. End
Note.)


5. (S) Recounting his trip some weeks ago to Egypt, an obviously
emotional Sabah al-Maliki said that following the murder of his
son, which occurred after Sabah had publicly criticized the
growing Iranian influence in southern Iraq, he and a group of
influential tribal leaders petitioned the Arab League and the
United Nations for assistance. Subsequently invited to Egypt by
the Arab League to discuss this issue, the group met with the
Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa and several
high-ranking Egyptian officials. While in Cairo, they urged the
Arab League and the Egyptians to play a more visible role in
Iraq to counter Iran's presence, and they also asked the Arab
League to provide election monitors for the upcoming provincial
elections. The Arab League officials said that they would take
this idea up with the UN and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.


6. (S) Unable to hide his contempt for Iran and ISCI/Badr, which
he labeled as Iranian proxies, a fiery Sabah ranted that the
Iranians will do whatever possible to influence the upcoming
elections. Not only will ISCI/Badr attempt to intimidate
independent candidates, but he also argued that they would use
local clerics and religious leaders to sway voters, particularly
the uneducated. In addition, he alleged (but could not
substantiate) that ISCI/Badr has already infiltrated the IHEC
office in Basrah (GEO). (Note: most REO contacts describe the
Basrah GEO director as connected to Badr, although many paint

BASRAH 00000052 002.2 OF 002


him as nevertheless reasonably neutral so far. End Note.) Both
men warned that if something were not done to counter the
Iranians, Basrah and the rest of the south would become
ISCI/Badr strongholds. Ending the meeting on a disappointing
note, both said that because many of their followers believed
the last (2005) elections were fraudulent, they were reluctant
to participate in the upcoming provincial elections. They did
not expect these ones to be any different.


7. (S/rel MCFI) COMMENT: The two Maliki brothers had refused to
talk to each other some months, feuding over a personal dispute
that they would not specify. We had been trying to get them in
together to help them patch things up, and they finally
relented. REO Director asked the new Police Chief on May 29
(Septel) about the lack of provisions for the tribal battalion;
he agreed that it was a problem, but said he could not solve it.
The chief asked that the Embassy try to persuade the Minister
of Interior to allocate salaries and equipment for the Basrah
tribal battalions. These tribal leaders echo two themes we have
heard over and over in Basrah: doubt about long term benefits of
COK and a prediction that Iran will dominate the Basrah
provincial election.
HOWARD