BASRAH SADRIST: MOVEMENT DISARRAY AS IRAN GAINS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000051

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH SADRIST: MOVEMENT DISARRAY AS IRAN GAINS

REF: 07 BASRAH 072

BASRAH 00000051 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Dept. of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (S/REL MCFI) SUMMARY: In a cordial yet at times
confrontational meeting held May 23 at the Basrah Regional
Embassy Office, OMS leader Sheikh Mohammed al-Faraji, Ayatollah
Qassim al-Tai's purported representative in the five southern
provinces, called the Charge of the Knights (COK) campaign "an
Iranian operation conducted by Iraq." Sheikh Faraji alleged
that COK was a politically motivated operation to cripple the
Sadrists before the provincial elections, which would in turn
pave the way for Iran's proxies, ISCI/Badr to dominate. Sharing
examples of GOI persecution of Sadrists, Sheikh Faraji admitted
that the movement was in complete disarray, indicating that if
the status quo prevailed it might be impossible for the Sadrists
to participate in upcoming elections. Harshly criticizing
Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS) for betraying the movement by fleeing to
Iran, Sheikh Faraji claimed that the moderate Sadrist leadership
had distanced itself from MAS and his reckless policies. Sheikh
Faraji said that he would like to continue dialogue with the
U.S., as they were the only power capable of preventing Iraq
from falling under the sway of the Iranians. END SUMMARY.

COK: POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OPERATION
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2. (S/REL MCFI) During a meeting held at the Basrah Regional
Embassy Office (REO) on Friday evening, May 24, Office of
Muqtada al-Sadr (OMS) leader Sheikh Mohammed al-Faraji labeled
the COK operation "an Iranian operation conducted by Iraq." He
stated that Iranian fifth columnists had infiltrated JAM in
order to discredit the Sadrist Trend. According to Sheikh
Faraji, it was these militants, and not the moderate elements of
OMS and JAM, who were responsible for the deteriorating security
situation that had triggered COK. Claiming that despite their
anti-CF stance, the moderate, mainstream leadership of the
Sadrist Trend had abided by al-Sadr's renewal of the ceasefire;
he argued that that the Prime Minister (PM),heavily influenced
by his coalition partners ISCI/Badr, had used COK as an
instrument for trying to wipe out the Sadrists.


3. (S/REL MCFI) Sheikh Faraji said that the Iranians, working
through the "Special Groups" (SG),had infiltrated the Sadrists
because they viewed them as threat to their designs on southern
Iraq. Positing that prior to COK, SG "Sahab" groups had been
tasked to eliminate moderate Sadrist leaders as well as attack
the GOI and CF, he added that it was these elements that had
disregarded Muqtada al-Sadr's (MAS) extension of the cease-fire
in order to draw the GOI and CF into open conflict with the
Sadrists. This was part of Iran's grand plan, in that
eliminating the Sadrists would remove the only significant
election opposition to their proxies, the "House of Five," a
local term for the ISCI/Badr/Hizbollah/Sayyed
al-Shuhadah(SAS)/Tharallah bloc.


4. (S/REL MCFI) When pressed by the REO Director to provide more
evidence to support claims that the COK had been conducted by
the PM and the GOI for political reasons, the previously calm
Sheikh Faraji grew extremely agitated, questioning why other
militias and criminals have not been arrested in Basrah,
including those linked to the "House of Five," and Fadhila.
(Comment: He has a point; REO is unable to get ISF in Basrah to
disclose the names of any SAS members ISF have arrested. End
Comment.) Indicating that as a result of the GOI's crackdown,
the local Sadrist movement is in complete disarray, Sheikh
Faraji revealed that many of its leaders have fled to Iran,
Lebanon, Syria, as well as the UAE, while those who have not
been arrested have gone Qderground. He also allegedQhat the
ISF have shut down OMS offices and mosques, and he recounted an
episode from earlier in the day when ISF troops had roughed up a
group of 1,000 Sadrists attempting to pray in the 5-Mile (Basrah
City's northernmost) Section. (Note: REO Director asked the new
Basrah Police Chief about this incident on May 29 [Septel] but
the Chief clearly did not want to discuss it. End Note.)

ELECTION PROSPECTS
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5. (S/REL MCFI) Asked by the REO Director and Poloff whether
the local Sadrists planned to participate in the upcoming
provincial elections, an exasperated Sheikh Faraji replied, "How
can we? All of our leaders have either been arrested, fled the
country, or are in hiding." Injecting a bit of humor into the
conversation, he added jokingly, "but we are not going to join
ISCI/Badr." On a more serious note, he argued that if the
status quo prevailed, he doubted that he would be able to hold
his followers together, and he expressed concern that Iran would
try to co-opt the remaining Sadrists in Basrah and the south.
If this happens, ISCI/Badr, and by extension, the Iranians, will
dominate the local elections, and, in his estimation, Basrah and
the rest of southern Iraq would soon be under Iranian sway.

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MUQTADA'S BETRAYAL AND A REQUEST FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE CF
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6. (S/REL MCFI) Strongly criticizing Muqtada al-Sadr, Sheikh
Faraji that Muqtada had betrayed the movement when he fled for
Iran, adding that he will care again about Muqtada "when he
comes back to Iraq." He continued that most of the moderate
elements within the Sadrist harbor tremendous resentment towards
MAS for what they consider reckless leadership. The moderate
Sadrists had rallied around Ayatollah Qassim al-Taie, the OMS
cleric in Najaf who Faraji claimed to be a strong proponent of
Iraqi Arab nationalism, and not a puppet of the Iranians, as he
labeled Grand Ayatollahs Sistani and Hakim.


7. (S/REL MCFI) Legitimately claiming that he had risked his
life to meet with the REO Director and Poloff, Sheikh Faraji
added that he had "come to a crossroads, with the Iranians on
one side and the Americans on the other." Stating that never in
his life did he imagine that one day he would be sitting across
the table from Americans, he continued that he would like to
continue a dialogue with the U.S, as it was now the only force
that could prevent Iraq from falling under Iran's sway. Adding
that though there are many moderates within the movement who
would like to engage with the U.S., many remain unconvinced that
the Americans are serious about engaging them; the current
environment makes it extremely dangerous for Sadrists to talk to
the U.S. inside Iraq. That said, he indicated a strong desire
to meet again in the future.


8. (S/REL MCFI) COMMENT: REO Basrah has been trying to draw in
Faraji for many weeks. Our only previous Sadrist contact fled
Iraq for Kuwait after SG targeted him for assassination (for
meeting with us),although he remains in contact with us
(Reftel). The intermediaries we have been using to attract
Faraji were successful in large part because of the Sadrist
desperation after COK. Before COK, one could say that there had
been an uneasy balance in Basrah province among Fadhila, OMS/JAM
and ISCI/Badr/SAS, punctuated by regular assassinations. With
that balance upset, Sadrists probably hope to get CF, if not on
their side, then at least to recognize a common enemy in the
Iranian backed parties/militias. One of his comments was
telling, if chilling: "we aren't the only ones who have been
killing CF, so have SAS and Badr." REO will continue to engage
with Sadrists when possible, but at a discreet tempo as our
contacts (and our interpreter) still report Badr agents (in ISF
uniforms) are manning the entry gate into the Basrah Air Station.
HOWARD