NEW BASRAH ISF COMMANDER ON OPERATIONS AND IP REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/22/2018
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: NEW BASRAH ISF COMMANDER ON OPERATIONS AND IP REFORM

REF: A. BASRAH 21

B. BAGHDAD 1151

C. BASRAH 32

D. BAGHDAD 969

E. BASRAH 26

F. 07 BASRAH 91

G. BASRAH 03

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell H. Howard, Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C//REL MCFI) Summary: During an April 16 meeting with the
Regional Embassy Office, MG Mohammed Jawad Hawadi, the newly
appointed Basrah Operations Commander, admitted that the ISF
initially performed poorly against the militias. Thanks to U.S.
support and recent operational successes clearing some
neighborhoods, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) appeared to be
weakening. With this newfound confidence, the Iraqi Security
Forces plan to take on JAM's stronghold in Hyyaniyah on April 19
to "strike at the heart of the militia." Recognizing the
enormity of the challenges he faces, he suggested imposing
martial law. He also criticized the Iraqi Police, intends to
eviscerate it, and deny it a paramilitary role. End Summary.

OPERATION CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS
--------------


2. (C//REL MCFI) MG Mohammed Jawad Hawadi, the recently
appointed Basrah Operations Commander (BOC),met Regional
Embassy Officers (REO) April 16 to discuss Basrah's security and
his vision for the future. Mohammed admitted that the ISF
performed poorly during Maliki's late March Operation "Charge of
the Knights" (CoK) to eliminate militia influences from Basrah
(refs A-D). He attributed the ISF's failure in the opening days
of the offensive to Maliki's haste to begin without preparing
the troops, Mohan's lack of operational planning, and the
weakness of the Iraqi Police (IP). As a result, the ISF
suffered heavy losses and was demoralized.


3. (C//REL MCFI) Mohammed praised U.S. Military Transition Teams
embedded with IA units and U.S. airpower for snatching victory
from the jaws of defeat (ref E). Iraqi soldiers were gaining
confidence knowing U.S. aircraft supported them and as a result
of successfully conducting operations in Qibla, Timinyah, Maqil,
and Jubaylah. JAM, however, was disappearing, seriously
demoralized, and losing the capacity to fight. He estimated
there were more than 10,000 JAM members in Basrah, but not all
of them were fighters. Current clashes with the ISF were
ambushes involving groups of 5-6 fighters with small to medium
arms, though they were effectively employing IED screens.


4. (C//REL MCFI) Looking at future operations, Mohammed told us
that he preferred to tackle Gurnah to the North of Basrah to
pursue fleeing JAM leaders reportedly hiding there and to block
weapons from being smuggled from Maysan. Instead, GOI leaders
decided to "strike a decisive blow to the heart of the militia
and win a psychological victory" by clearing the JAM stronghold
of Hyyaniyah. (Note: We later confirmed this operation is
planned to commence April 19. End Note.) Once the city is
secure, the ISF will clear outwards. He recognized the need to
hold ground once taken and supported employment programs to
undercut militia recruitment. But, he called MND-SE's
recommendation to provide humanitarian assistance "naove" and
said, "JAM needed to be pressured, not fed."

NOW THAT I'M IN CHARGE...
--------------


5. (C//REL MCFI) Mohammed, inheriting the same problems that got
his predecessor (MG Mohan Hafith Fahad al-Fariji) fired (ref A),
told us that he reminded his superiors of the challenges that
lay ahead: the ISF is weak, the borders unsecured, neighboring
countries negatively intervened, and the political parties would
continue trying to infiltrate the ISF. Mohammed claimed to have
no relations with the political parties and did not hesitate to
call the Provincial Council and Governor corrupt. At our
behest, however, he agreed to improve those relationships
(soured by his predecessor) by occasionally engaging them (ref
F). He also suggested that Basrah needed a two-year period of
martial law to impose GOI control over a "complex social
structure."


6. (C//REL MCFI) Mohammed also laid out his vision of what
should be done with the IP - eviscerate it so it could do no
harm and limit its role to civil policing rather than
paramilitary tasks. He said that he has already spoken with
soon-to-be IP Chief, MG Adil Kamal Daham, and instructed him how

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to reorganize the police; Mohammed said he would give Adil a
free hand for three months to sort out the IP. Corrupt officers
will be sent to outlying areas (leaving the IA to fight
unencumbered),retrain the remaining officers, and then post
small numbers of them at stations. Mohammed envisioned bringing
in IP forces from outside of Basrah and rotating them
periodically to avoid further infiltration by the militias. He
criticized HMG's police training and requested U.S. assistance
instead.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C//REL MCFI) It is difficult to assess Mohammed this early
into his tenure, but there are already mixed reviews. He
presents himself as a soldier first, a nationalist, above
politics, and friendly to the U.S. Personally, he appears
friendly, quiet, unassuming, and in a stark contrast to Mohan -
humility and an eagerness to please. We believe he could be
positively influenced to support Coalition objectives. However,
Mohammed has been criticized by some for failing to organize and
decisively move his division against the Jund al-Sama'a uprising
in January, which forced IP Chief MG Jalil Khalaf Shuwayl to
take charge (ref G).


8. (C//REL MCFI) According to MND-SE, Mohammad has shown an
interest in training, particularly urban warfare training.
MND-SE trainers have also observed some of Mohammed's speeches
to his troops emphasizing devotion to Iraq over parties and
tribes and urging them to protect Basrawis rather than steal
from them. One Iraqi officer told MND-SE officers privately that
MG Mohammed genuinely cares for his soldiers and has their
respect.
HHOWARD