Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BASRAH34
2008-04-21 15:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

UMM QASR DEPUTY UPBEAT ABOUTPORT'S PROPSECTS

Tags:  EWWT ETRD ECON PINS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3586
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0034/01 1121512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 211512Z APR 08
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0719
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0302
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0756
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000034 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/2018
TAGS: EWWT ETRD ECON PINS IZ
SUBJECT: UMM QASR DEPUTY UPBEAT ABOUTPORT'S PROPSECTS

REF: BAGHDDA 1149

BASRAH 00000034 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000034

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/2018
TAGS: EWWT ETRD ECON PINS IZ
SUBJECT: UMM QASR DEPUTY UPBEAT ABOUTPORT'S PROPSECTS

REF: BAGHDDA 1149

BASRAH 00000034 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C//REL MCFI) SUMMARY: REO Officers met with merchant marine
Captain Hussain Mohammed Abdullah, Assistant Director General
(A-DG) for Management at the Port of Umm Qasr (PUQ). The GOI
has sacked PUQ A-DG for Technical Affairs Safa Abud al-Hussein,
who with militia influence had been appointed less than a year
ago. Hussain said the security situation and working
environment had improved markedly with the Iraqi Army (IA)
having displaced the JAM-saturated Facilities Protection Service
(FPS). Hussain also confirmed that the GOI Council of Ministers
approved commercialization plans for the PUQ that broadly follow
a proposal advanced by the Embassy's Office of the
Transportation Attachi (OTA). Hussain's committee of port
technocrats will meet next week to discuss selection of a
reputable, international consultant to help write tender
documents to bring in a management company for the north port
and a long-term concessionaire for the south port. END SUMMARY.

2. (C//REL MCFI) REO Officers met April 17 with ex-merchant
marine Captain Hussain, A-DG for Management at the PUQ. Hussain
confirmed that the GOI sacked PUQ A-DG for Technical Affairs
Safa Abud al-Hussain, who with militia influence had been
appointed to his position a little less than a year ago.
Hussain advised that Mr. Hamid al-Husseini, a former PUQ A-DG
for Management, would replace Safa. Hussain said Hamid is
technically competent and a welcome addition to the port staff.
The down side: Hamid is three months away from mandatory
retirement; Hussain hoped that the General Company for Ports of
Iraq (GCPI) will work out a way for Hamid to extend past the
retirement age for approximately six months so that GCPI can
identify a permanent replacement to take the position. Hussain
said he knew of no plans to purge more militia-affiliated GCPI
"special appointees" at the PUQ but indicated that others should
indeed go; he said the majority of the staff, however, was

comprised of technocrats like him.

3. (C//REL MCFI) Hussain was sanguine about prospects for the
port. He said the security situation had improved markedly with
the IA having displaced the JAM-saturated FPS. (NOTE: Hussain
could not confirm earlier REO reporting that the Iraqi Navy has
taken over PUQ security responsibilities from the IA. END NOTE)
Hussain remarked that, when the FPS was "handling security" at
the port, he never felt free to take decisions in the best
interest of the PUQ. Hussain said that, with the FPS out and
the IA in, the working environment at the PUQ has changed
completely: he now feels at liberty to take decisions in the
port's best interests.

4. (C//REL MCFI) Hussain recounted one incident in
which--shortly after leaving his house for a trip to Tokyo to
discuss a Japanese Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC)
project at the PUQ--militiamen slid a note with a bullet
attached under his front door; the note advised his wife to call
Hussain and tell him not to go to Japan, lest his family be
murdered in his absence. Hussain went regardless (at his wife's
urging; he described her as a "strong woman") after confirming
with Basrah Governor Mohammed Wa'eli that the Governor's office
would protect his family in his absence. (COMMENT: Though
apolitical, Hussain's recourse to the Governor's office for
protection suggests he may have some relationship with the
Fadhila party and that Fadhila is connected to the militia
elements that had controlled the port. END COMMENT.)

5. (C//REL MCFI) Hussain confirmed that the GOI Council of
Ministers approved commercialization plans for the PUQ that
broadly follow a proposal advanced by the Embassy's Office of
the Transportation Attachi (OTA)(Reftel). He said he was
leading a committee of port technocrats that would select a
reputable, international consultant to help the GCPI write
tender documents to bring in a management company for the north
port and a long-term concessionaire for the south port. The
committee would be meeting to discuss the matter next week.
Hussain enthusiastically supports the approach but admitted that
others within the GCPI were more skeptical. Hussain was
nevertheless confident that the GCPI would implement the
commercialization plans. Hussain asked the REO to provide GCPI
with a list of consultants whose services the company might
contract; OTA is already developing such a list and will forward
it to both the Deputy Minister of Transportation and Hussain.

6. (C//REL MCFI) Hussain said he had recently been in Baghdad
for two days to discuss with Minister of Planning Ali Baban,
among other things, the so-called "Grand Port of Iraq," a
Pharaonic proposal to build a new, multi-billion dollar port
facility on the al-Faw peninsula. Hussain said he thought the
idea unrealistic and, worse, a distraction from the more
pressing concern of improving operations at the PUQ. He advised
that Gulf maritime boundary disputes and the presence of Iraq's
oil export infrastructure were among the many obstacles to
building a new port at al-Faw. Though the Grand Port scheme has
some supporters within the GOI, Hussain strongly advised his

BASRAH 00000034 002.2 OF 002


superiors against pursuing the initiative.

7. (C//REL MCFI) COMMENT: Captain Hussain--an avowedly
apolitical, career port technocrat and long-time port DG until
the GOI brought in a political appointee--came across as
pragmatic and cagey, yet earnest. He held himself out as an
Iraqi patriot and a survivor: he talked proudly of being one of
a few Iraqi maritime technocrats from his class who trained in
the UK but returned to, and remained in, Iraq to work. He
boasted of not having fled his native country during the Saddam
era--save for a few acutely bad years in the mid-1990s when he
worked as a ship captain and lectured at the maritime academy in
Libya--despite difficult relations with the former regime.
Similarly, he managed to find a modus vivendi with JAM when it
dominated the PUQ.

8. (C//REL MCFI) Hussain was notably reserved and circumspect
with his comments about JAM, always referring to the group
obliquely and never by name, but expressed confidence that the
IA's continued presence at the port would prevent JAM's return.
He seemed keen for the PUQ to prosper. He described his
affiliation with the port as a "family tradition," noting that
two of his three sons worked there as well, one in the finance
department and another as an engineer (the third son is a
physician). He said educating and training the next generation
of technocrats to operate the PUQ would be a key priority. A
practicing Muslim, during our meeting an alarm on his cell-phone
sounded with the mid-day call to prayer. He speaks English very
well and seems a USG ally in championing within the GOI OTA's
proposed commercialization plans for the PUQ. END COMMENT.
HOWARD