PM MALIKI'S TRIBAL INITIATIVE IN BASRAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000028

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/11/2018
TAGS: MOPS MCAP PGOV PREL PINS PINR PARM PTER IR UK
IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI'S TRIBAL INITIATIVE IN BASRAH

REF: A. A) BASRAH 25

B. B) 07 BASRAH 120

C. C) 07 BASRAH 112

D. D) 07 BASRAH 107

E. E) 07 BASRAH 78

F. F) 07 BASRAH 73

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell H. Howard, Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(c),(d)




1. (S/REL MCFI) SUMMARY: Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
has reversed his previous opposition to a tribal initiative in
Iraq's Shia south. Shunning Coalition involvement, Maliki
affirmed the nascent scheme will be GOI-led and appears to be
under the direction of Acting Minister of Justice Safa al-Safi.
Locally, tribal and political committees have been formed with a
coordinating committee representing both reporting directly to
Safi. So far, only one tribal battalion has been organized
under the lead of Sheikh Muzahim al-Tamimi, while recruits for
other battalions are being vetted. The GOI has provided little
logistical support leaving that matter to the tribes, and
Muzahim has already asked for Coalition help. Potential
problems include: political interference, the lack of logistical
and strategic planning, and ensuring the tribal battalions'
mission dovetails with that of the Coalition. USG involvement
may be required to shape, and potentially salvage, this
initiative. End Summary.


2. (S/REL MCFI) PM Maliki, when his late March "Charge of the
Knights" operation to tackle Basrah's militias appeared to be
failing, called upon tribal leaders to form armed auxiliaries to
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Previously, Maliki had opposed
a tribal engagement strategy modeled on the USG-organized
Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) - now called Sons of Iraq (SOI) -
initiative, asserting that the tribes would constitute new
militias unaccountable to the GOI. Maliki's reversal was the
consequence of a desperate need to identify additional help
during the critical stages of the Battle for Basrah when ISF
members had refused to fight or had outright deserted.

WHO'S IN CHARGE?
--------------

3. (S/REL MCFI) By April 4, Maliki made it clear that this
tribal initiative would be GOI-led. However, the precipitous
manner of its implementation led to the GOI reaching out to
local sheikhs and politicians before determining which ministry
would have oversight. It now appears that logistical/financial
responsibilities fall to the MOI, but the local committees
overseeing efforts are accountable to Maliki through Justice
Minister Safa al-Safi. We also hear that MOI Director of Tribal
Affairs MG Marid al-Ardi may be involved and on April 7, the GOI
sent a delegation from the Implementation Follow up National
Committee for Reconciliation (IFNCR),the PM's Office (PMO),and
the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) to help local
leaders organize. The IFCNR team consisted of Shaykh Husayn
al-Faiz, Dr. 'Abbud Wahid al-'Isawi, Ahmad Hassun Hamadi and
Staff Colonel Muhammad Sawballah.


4. (S/REL MCFI) In terms of tribal leadership, Maliki asked
Sheikh Muzahim al-Tamimi to take charge. Muzahim's tribe, the
Bani Tamim, is among Basrah's largest and most influential
tribes; Muzahim, despite his former Ba'ath Party membership, is
highly respected -- a nationalist with military experience and
strong command presence. (Note: Muzahim is among a group of Shia
sheikhs whom REO nominated for a White House visit. End Note.)
He has already asserted control, with his cousin, Mansur
al-Kana'an, acting as his right hand (See Ref A). Muzahim told
us that currently only a limited number of sheikhs are
participating because the program is in a formative stage and
Mansur and Muzahim want to closely consider which tribes to
involve.

THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES
--------------

5. (S/REL MCFI) Organization at a local level is also ad hoc and
GOI-driven. According to Muzahim, Maliki originally established
just a Tribal Committee, but the political parties complained
and Maliki allowed them to "save face" by creating a Political
Committee as well. Safi also wanted the two groups separated to
prevent the political parties from influencing the Tribal
Committee to accept politically affiliated recruits for the

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tribal battalions.


6. (S/REL MCFI) The Political Committee's role is still unknown
at this time. Muzahim believed that 14 members would be
appointed, but the size of the committee and appointments have
yet to be finalized. Though invited, the Sadrists are
boycotting the political committee or if they have not yet
agreed on a candidate. Known members are:
- Hasan al-Rashid (Badr)(Basrah Provincial Council member
and former governor)
- Dagher al-Mousawi (Sayyid al Shuhada, COR member)
- Furat al-Shar'a (Head of ISCI in Basrah)
- Dr. Abd al-Jabar al Ghanduri (Head of Basrah National
Independent Movement)
- Muhammad Sihr al-Ubadi (Central Dawa)(PC Chairman)
- Sayyid Baha Jamal al-Din (Basrah National Independent
Movement - Central Dawa)(PC member)
- Khalaf Shammoud Bustan (Iraqi National Accord, also
represents Communists and Iraqi National Gathering)(PC Member)
- Muntasir al-Imara (Iraqi Future)
- Abu Mujahid al-Maliki (Iraqi Hizbollah)
- Muhsan Hamed (Fadhila)(alternate: Dr. Dargham)

TRIBAL COMMITTEE
--------------

7. (C/REL MCFI) According to Muzahim, the Tribal Committee, is
responsible for nominating and approving tribal recruits for the
battalions, pressuring tribal members with JAM affiliations to
lay down their arms, encouraging Iraqis in their spheres of
influence to obey the law, and directing district-level problems
to the GOI for resolution. It remains to be seen if other
sheikhs are invited to participate. The following are members:
- Muzahim al-Tamimi (Bani Tamim)
- Mansur al-Kana'an al-Tamimi (Bani Tamim)
- Abd al-Amir al-`Atbi (al-`Atab)
- Abd al-Amir al-Aydani (al-Aydan)
- Amr al-Faiz (Bani Amr)
- Mohammed Ali al-Maturi (al-Mitur)
- Sabri al-Baydani (al-Baydan)
- Salam al-Maliki (Bani Malik)
- Ya'rib al-Imarah (al-Imarah)
- Hasan al-Kheyum (Bani Asad)
- Adnan al-Ghanim (al-Ghanim)
- Nazar al-Jabri (Sada al-Jawaaber)
- Najeh Shinawa (Rabiah)
- Sabah Hatem Ridah (Shaghanbeh)
- Jabar al-Ubadi (al-Ubadi)
- Dakhil Abd al-Zahra (Selmi)

COORDINATING COMMITTEE
--------------

8. (C/REL MCFI) The Coordinating Committee, comprised of three
members each from both the Political and Tribal Committees, will
report directly to Safa al-Safi and forward through him
proposals to the PM's Office. It consists of:
- Muzahim al-Tamimi
- Mansur al-Kana'an al-Tamimi
- Amr al-Faiz
- Hasan al-Rashid
- Muntasir al-Imarah
- Dagher al-Mousawi

WHAT HAVE THEY ACCOMPLISHED?
--------------

9. (C/REL MCFI) Reporting indicates that by the second day of
fighting on March 25, several tribes - namely the influential
Bani Tamim and Bani Malik - decided to support Maliki's efforts
to restore law and order. Muzahim told us that the tribes were
able to effectively secure some neighborhoods, including the
Tunnumah district east of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and Albu
al-Khaseeb (SE of Basrah). Tribes also helped ISF units isolate
areas, prevent militia movements, confiscate and deliver weapons
caches to the Iraqi Army (IA),and even restore stations,
vehicles, and weapons taken by Jaysh al-Mahdi to the Iraqi
Police (IP). The Bani Tamim not only returned the Shatt al-Arab
IP station (in Tunnumah) and provided a 60-man guard force, but
also confiscated the OMS office and turned it into a tribal
headquarters (Ref A). Mansur wryly noted, "The ISF did 10
percent and we did 90 percent of the work to secure these
areas." He claimed they could also have cleared out areas they
isolated, but were prevented by government officials because of
GOI links to the militia leaders.


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10. (C/REL MCFI) Tribal battalions are also assisting the GOI's
weapons turn-in program by manning collecting points,
transporting arms to the ISF, and using their influence to
pressure militias to hand weapons over. On the day of the
deadline (April 8),Mansur told us that a pitiful seven AK
variants and three PKCs had been turned in. The next day, the
GOI delegation reportedly gathered around 70 tribal leaders at
Basrah Palace who committed to gathering and turning in weapons
in their areas.


11. (C/REL MCFI) Muzahim told us that Maliki has authorized
25,000 tribesmen to be recruited, while media sources are
reporting a figure of 10,000. One tribal battalion has stood up
in the Tunnumah and Shatt al-Arab districts. The Tribal
Committee is currently recruiting and vetting names for
additional battalions in the Zubayr, Gurnah, and Albu al Khaseeb
districts. Muzahim said that recruits hailed from different
tribes in each district to avoid organizing a militia for any
one tribe. Those already recruited have been provided the blue
uniforms of the Facilities Protection Service and wear a red
armband. There have also been reports that 2,500 tribesmen have
been allowed to enlist in the IA.


12. (C/REL MCFI) Muzahim is currently seeking GOI approval to
return 55 former regime IA officers to serve as platoon, company
and battalion commanders. They allegedly have no political or
religious affiliations and would initially serve a trial period.
If they perform well, their postings would be made permanent.
Since the GOI has yet to train any of these tribal units,
Muzahim has already ordered these officers to teach basic
training skills. Despite the intention of setting up a tribal
battalion in the Sunni dominated area of Zubayr, the leading
Sunni sheikh there, Muhammad al-Dosari, has told us that no
Sunni tribes have been invited to participate so far.

GOI SUPPORT LACKING - TRIBES ORGANIZE THEMSELVES
-------------- ---

13. (C/REL MCFI) Logistical support for this tribal initiative
has been lacking, owing to the lack of planning. It may also be
intentional as the GOI determines if this is to be a long-term
project and/or to possibly limit the empowerment of the tribes
as a counter to the political parties. While long-term funding
remains a question, we understand that Justice Minister al-Safi
has informed Muzahim that the tribes may apply for some of the
$100M USD that Maliki has promised for Basrah's re-development.


14. (C/REL MCFI) Thus far, the GOI has only provided some
uniforms and ammunition and has yet to pay salaries. Tribesmen
have been told to bring their own weapons and sheikhs have been
gathering arms from within the tribes to arm fighters; some
reports state that the MOI handed out some small/medium weapons.
Muzahim strongly criticized the GOI's failure to supply them,
but also called it `shameful' that the MOD and MOI are failing
to feed, re-equip and pay their own troops. Over the past week,
the Bani Tamim fed not only their own men, but also the IA
battalion in Tannumah.

REQUEST FOR SUPPORT
--------------

15. (S/REL MCFI) Tribal leaders have for some time expressed
frustration that the UK ignored them and considered them
irrelevant. In fairness, they are also frustrated with the lack
of USG intervention over the last year. Still, they appreciate
the rapport the REO has established, express optimism that the
USG will provide support, and are eager to share information and
cooperate with us.


16. (S/REL MCFI) Muzahim provided us a list of needs including
light to heavy weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles, uniforms,
housing trailers, computers, an ambulance, water and fuel
trucks, generators, anti-riot equipment, fixed and portable road
blocks, latrines, cooking equipment, and office equipment. That
list has been given to MNC-I.

WHAT IS NEXT?
--------------

17. (S/REL MCFI) Some observers believe the tribes' influence in
the city has degraded as people have urbanized; therefore, a
tribal initiative will only be successful in Basrah City's
outskirts and provincial rural neighborhoods. This may be true,
but it has yet to be seen whether the tribes, if given the
opportunity and a bit of muscle, could shape urban environments.
Leaders of the tribal initiative may be trying to find out. As

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of April 8, we learned they have plans to divide Basrah City
into seven sectors where they eventually intend to deploy their
forces. This contravenes the conventional wisdom that tribal
units would operate in their rural, traditional areas of
influence. We also assess that tribal units could be used (Ref
B),more effectively to conduct anti-smuggling operations east
of the Shatt al-Arab Waterway from Faw to Amarah, patrol/secure
the Iranian border and major supply lines, gather intelligence,
provide static security for key infrastructure, and if
necessary, surge into urban areas to assist ISF/CF.

COMMENT: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AHEAD
--------------

18. (S/REL MCFI) Comment: The success of this initiative will be
dependent on this early, formative stage. Unfortunately, there
already are several negative warning signs. Maliki's decision
not to involve the Coalition in lieu of a GOI-led scheme could
be viewed as a positive indicator that the GOI wants more
ownership of Iraq's affairs. However, the program could
obviously benefit from the USG's SOI experience in Anbar,
Baghdad, Diyala, and other provinces. Another concern is the
involvement of the political parties. Maliki may have created
the Political Committee as more than a "face saving" measure.
The parties greatly fear empowering the tribes at their expense
and likely wanted a role to prevent the diminution of their
power. Furthermore, the committee's composition heavily favors
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)-led parties, raising
concerns among many Iraqis of potential Iranian influence.
After Mansur's appointment to the Coordinating Committee, he
told Safi and Interior Minister Jawad al-Boulani that they put
him on a committee being run by Iranians. Numerous sources are
concerned about Dagher al-Mousawi's significant role given
reporting of his ties to Iran and nefarious activities.


19. (S/REL MCFI) The lack of planning, long-term vision, and
adequate support are also potential problems. Questions remain
as to how long the tribal battalions will be employed, whether
they will be integrated into the ISF, how much funding they will
receive and where it will come from, how quickly the GOI can
organize logistic support for them and what type of training
they will get. Consideration will have to be given to the
disposition and use of the tribal battalions.


20. (S/REL MCFI) The Battle for Basrah is not over; despite the
current calm, the underlying problems here will continue to
require CF attention. The proper usage and integration of these
tribal battalions will be essential to the success, rather than
the hindrance of our operations. These issues may necessitate
some level of Coalition involvement - even if it is only to
provide advice and help shape the initiative into something more
palatable. End Comment.
HHOWARD