BASRAH AVOIDS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS WHILE PREPARING FOR FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000027

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/10/2018
TAGS: EAID ECON PGOV IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRAH AVOIDS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS WHILE PREPARING FOR FUTURE
CRISIS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Regional Coordinator, Regional
Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C/REL MCFI) SUMMARY: Limited Government of Iraq (GOI)
planning and poor coordination with the Coalition for the
potential humanitarian consequences of the March 24 "Charge of
the Knights" operation in Basrah left all concerned
parties--most importantly, Basrawis themselves--unprepared for
the resulting economic disruptions. Fortunately, kinetic
operations were short-lived, and a humanitarian crisis never
materialized. Essentials such as basic foods, potable water,
medical supplies, and cooking gas remained generally available,
albeit at sharply increased prices, but distribution was a
challenge because many Basrawis could not travel in the city.


2. (C/REL MCFI) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Recognizing the risk of a
humanitarian crisis when news of the operation broke, officials
from Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) and the Coordinator for
Economic Transition in Iraq (CETI) engaged colleagues in the
GOI, the interagency, Coalition partners, and the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to assess and address the
situation. The GOI and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) played key
roles distributing the multilateral assistance. GOI, ISF,
MNF-I, CETI, UK, and UNAMI humanitarian assistance officials are
now coordinating in Baghdad and Basrah through regular meetings
and video teleconferences. All hope that future ISF operations
in Basrah will be targeted, well executed, and short lived, as
an April 8 deadline for militias to turn in their heavy weapons
expires. Preparations, especially by the Basrawis themselves,
have left the city better positioned if a resumption of
hostilities leads to more acute economic disruption. But much
work remains to be done. END SUMMARY

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BACKGROUND: PM TAKES EVERONE BY SURPRISE, EXCEPT JAM
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3. (C/REL MCFI) On March 24, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and
an entourage of national security ministers and advisors
traveled to Basrah, purportedly to assess preparations for a
plan by Basrah Operations Commander LTG Mohan Hafith Fahad
al-Fariji to root out militias. Without notifying Mohan, Basrah
Governor Mohammed Wa'eli (with whom the PM has strained
relations),the Basrah Provincial Council (PC),local Directors
General (DGs) of the services ministries, or the Coalition well
in advance of his intentions, Maliki instead ordered the ISF to
deliver a knockout blow to the JAM militia. Based on Basrah's
Provincial Iraqi Control arrangements, Mohan is responsible for
the security portfolio, while the Governor and the DGs, in
coordination with the PC are responsible for providing public
goods and services to the populace. Word of an imminent
offensive leaked to JAM, and fighters attacked the IA, seized
key bridges, and planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
throughout the city. Major combat operations ground to a
stalemate until an interim ceasefire was brokered on March 31.
Many parts of the city remained outside of IA control.

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THE GOI AND THE COALITION COORDINATE A RESPONSE
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4. (SBU) The unforeseen hostilities caught even Basrah's
conflict-accustomed residents unawares. Essential service
providers and private citizens took no special steps to
stockpile medical supplies, food, potable water, and cooking
fuel. MNF-I and CETI officials immediately recognized the
potential for a humanitarian crisis to materialize if the
fighting lasted and reached out to counterparts in the GOI, ISF,
REO Basrah, Multi-National Corp Iraq (MNC-I) C9, Multi-National
Division South East (MND-SE) J9, UK Basrah Embassy Office,
UK-led Basrah PRT, and UNAMI to coordinate a humanitarian
assistance effort.


5. (SBU) A Baghdad-based coordinating committee stood up
quickly, including two high-level GOI officials: Dr. Ali
al-Yasiri from the Office of the National Security Advisor (NSA)
and Mr. Kifa al-Amin, advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Barham
Saleh. On March 31, Dr. Yasiri and Mr. Amin traveled to
Basrah--with UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary
General (DSRSG) David Shearer and officers from both USAID's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the UN Office
of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA)--to assess
the situation and develop a humanitarian assistance program.
MND-SE, the Basrah PRT, and the REO supported all aspects of
their efforts.


6. (C/REL MCFI) Ongoing fighting challenged the humanitarian

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coordination group's efforts to assess the situation, but local
officials and NGOs provided much needed information and
atmospherics. The day after their arrival in Basrah, Dr. Yasiri
and Mr. Amin led efforts to develop a fifteen-point list of
priorities to address the humanitarian situation, focusing on
health, food, water, and fuel.


7. (C/REL MCFI) The twelve hospitals in the Basrah city urban
area continued to function, under great adversity, throughout
the battle. Fighting prevented some staff members from
reporting to work, with those doctors and nurses caught in the
hospitals as hostilities began having to sleep in the hospital
and work around the clock. The facilities needed additional
trauma supplies (reports of wounded exceeded 1,000),medications
for chronic disease sufferers, potable water, and fuel for
generators. Militia tactics also disrupted ambulance service:
JAM fighters fired on some emergency vehicles and
misappropriated others to transport and plant IEDs. Basrah's 80
smaller health clinics mostly stopped functioning altogether,
with their staffs unable to commute and their limited supplies
exhausted.


8. (C/REL MCFI) Markets remained relatively well stocked with
food, but many Basrawis could not leave their homes to shop and,
when they could, prices had risen sharply. Prices for some
fresh produce and other perishables reportedly increased by
500-700 percent at the peak of the fighting and then decreased
to double their pre-battle levels. A kilo of tomatoes, for
example, sold for roughly 500 Iraqi Dinars (ID) on March 23, ID
2,500 during the fighting, and ID 1,000 by April 4. To help
ensure adequate supplies, the ISF exempted food from a general
shutdown of land points of entry (POEs) on the Kuwaiti and
Iranian borders. (NOTE: Militia reportedly smuggled newly
manufactured weapons from Iran to Iraq on some produce trucks.
END NOTE.) Prices for most items presently remain at their
April 4 levels, elevated by Basrawis hoarding in case the
fighting resumes, according to local media and NGO contacts.
Most Basrawis rely in whole or part on the Ministry of Trade
(MOT) administered Public Distribution System (PDS),which
provides monthly rations of wheat flour, rice, dried milk, and
other items. PDS operations were temporarily disrupted because
truck drivers would not or could not travel from Basrah to the
Port of Umm Qasr (PUQ),through which most PDS commodities are
imported. Ship unloading faced similar delays due to absence of
a work force.


9. (C/REL MCFI) Basrah's water system continued to function
throughout most of the fighting but briefly shut down due to a
power cut. Basrah's main water supply is not potable, however.
Those who can afford it normally purchase their drinking water
from private delivery trucks but found themselves needing to
boil tap water instead, which in turn increased demand for
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),normally used for cooking. A can
of LPG sold for ID 5,000 on March 23, ID 25,000 during the
fighting, and ID 12,000 as of April 4. Many of Basrah's poorest
residents--e.g., those in the southwest neighborhoods and
Sadrist strongholds of Hyyaniyah and al-Jameat--were hit
hardest: they do not have main water service at all and normally
rely on aid agencies such as UNICEF and Mercy Corps to deliver
their water.


10. (C/REL MCFI) Once apprised of the most pressing issues, the
GOI and ISF--with significant engagement by urgently embedded
MND-SE and MNC-I staff--played important roles in addressing
short-term needs and logistical difficulties. The Central Bank
of Iraq (CBI) and its Basrah branch ensured that local banks had
sufficient liquidity for wage earners to draw their salaries.
The Iraqi Air Force delivered five tons of medical supplies from
MND-SE J9 reserves to the downtown Basrah Palace, which also
served as the PM's operation center. Trucks from the Ministries
of Defense and Health delivered trauma supplies to the Az Zubayr
hospital. The IA distributed 4,000 halal food rations and
200,000 liters of bottled water to the Hyyaniyah-Jameat
district. The Ministries of Trade and Transport cooperated to
move PDS commodities out of the PUQ and into the city, their
efforts facilitated by the IA taking over port security from the
militia-infiltrated Facilities Protection Service (FPS). For
his part, Governor Wa'eli put his water and electricity crews on
the street as soon as possible. These initiatives, together
with substantial support from the Coalition, the UN, aid
agencies, and local NGOs helped avert localized humanitarian
crises, but the relatively quick agreement of an uneasy
ceasefire was the key to preventing broader, more profound
suffering.

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COMMENT
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11. (C/REL MCFI) The GOI, the ISF, the Coalition, the UN and,

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most important, Basrawis themselves have seized the tenuous
truce to prepare for a possible resumption of kinetic
operations. The PM has announced that USD 100 million in
assistance will be made immediately available for Basrah, though
early indications are that this will be used for longer term
reconstruction, or short term employment projects, not
humanitarian assistance per se. To implement the funds, the GOI
has created a Baghdad-based coordination committee involving key
service ministries--oil, electricity, trade, transport, and
water resources--led by Minister of Justice Dr. Safa al-Safi.
Deputy Ministers from these ministries are planning to come to
Basrah in the next couple days. All the interested GOI,
Coalition, and international parties continue to coordinate
their activities in Baghdad and in Basrah and will feed input
into al-Safi's effort. Most important, Basrawis have been
stockpiling food, water, and medical supplies, which should help
prevent acute shortages in the first 72 hours of any rejoined
Battle of Basrah.


12. (C/REL MCFI) But much work remains to be done. Early
intelligence reports suggest that, if fighting were to resume,
it could be fiercer and longer lasting than the recent
hostilities. JAM fighters remain entrenched in the poorest
neighborhoods most at risk for a humanitarian crisis. By some
indications the next phase of ISF operations could involve more
invasive, house-to-house street fighting that could devastate
those poor neighborhoods where many IEDs are emplaced.


13. (SBU) The GOI, the ISF, the Coalition, the UN, and the
international aid agencies should further formalize their
collaboration. Contacts made among representatives should
evolve into institutionalized relationships among their
respective entities, so that effective coordination outlasts the
presence of particular individuals. Also crucial will be
preparations to assist Basrah's poorest, most marginalized, most
vulnerable residents, of whom local NGOs estimate there are
4,000 families. These benighted souls--many, again, found in
Sadrist strongholds--are dependent on aid agencies for food and
potable water at the best of times. Geography, logistics, and
violence may cut them off completely if fighting resumes in
their neighborhoods, unless clear plans are in place to ensure
they receive the assistance they need.
HOWARD