GENERAL WARNS BASRA BATTLE LOST WITHOUT U.S. TROOPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000026

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ
SUBJECT: GENERAL WARNS BASRA BATTLE LOST WITHOUT U.S. TROOPS

REF: A) BASRAH 0025 B) BAGHDAD 0969 AND PREVIOUS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Regional Coordinator, Regional
Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S/REL MNFI) SUMMARY: MG Mared Beni-Malik (Strictly
Protect),Director of Tribal Affairs, spoke with the REO
Director on March 30 after meeting with PM Maliki in the Basrah
Palace. He said that the ISF will lose the battle for Basrah
without intervention of U.S. ground troops and increased air
support. Basrah has become an IED minefield. If the GOI wins
in Basrah, it will win against JAM in the South; if the GOI
loses, there will be a cascading effect in other southern
provinces. PM Maliki came to Basrah confident he could arrest
28 cells of extremists; he was surprised at an entrenched,
organized JAM response that has stopped the ISF in its tracks.
The PM cannot bring in sufficient troops from outside Basrah
because they are engaged with JAM elsewhere. Mared suggested
that the USG offer U.S. troop support to PM Maliki. END
SUMMARY.


2. (S/REL MNFI) REO Director conducted a telecom in the early
hours of March 30 with MG Mared Beni-Malik, GOI Director of
Tribal Affairs. Mared is in the Basrah Palace with PM Maliki.
Mared explained the origin of PM Maliki's Basrah offensive.
Maliki had developed a list of 28 "targets" that he believed
could be quickly neutralized; each target consisted of
JAM-affiliated criminal elements that were responsible for the
wave of oil smuggling, political killings, kidnappings and
crimes against scientists, doctors, academics and women. Maliki
felt the growing strength of the cells and their serious crimes
meant he needed to act quickly and decisively. Maliki was
unmoved by General Mohan's protestations that IA in Basrah were
not ready to move and thought Mohan was simply not being
aggressive enough.


3. (S/REL MNFI) Maliki, according to Mared, was wholly surprised
by the entrenched and organized resistance that JAM cells gave
to IA offensives. He did not appreciate the extent to which JAM
fighters either had already emplaced IEDs or were able to
quickly set them up. Mared said that the combination of IEDs,
combined with heavy RPG7 and accurate mortar fire, had stymied
IA movements all over the city. There was no adequate plan
(that he knew of) to regain the offensive, and Mared assessed
that the IA would be unable to secure the city. While Mared
would not specify how many members of the 28 cells had been
arrested or killed, he alluded that some had been arrested but
not enough to matter.


4. (S/REL MNFI) Majed assessed that the current offensive would
fail. Basrah city had become an IED minefield that was and
would continue to be impossible for the IA to handle. The
Iranians were too effective in supplying heavy weapons and
logistics for the IA to match. Maliki's current plan appeared,
Mared said, to use the slack period intended for weapons turn-in
as a time for the IA to regroup; however, few weapons had been
turned in and JAM were continuing a busy schedule of emplacing
IEDs and reinforcing their own strong points in preparation for
the next IA offensives. Mared saw no way to deliver
humanitarian supplies to the population without JAM either
denying the people access or quickly seizing the supplies
themselves.


5. (S/REL MNFI) Mared said operational command was now split
into two parts. Basrah BOC Commander Mohan was in command of
forces for one half of the city while the Minister of Defense
was in command of the other half. Mared was unwilling to
discuss the "secret plan" that Maliki reportedly had for a
renewed offensive to start during the evening of March 29.
(Note: Earlier in March 29, MND-SE and General Mohan mentioned
that Maliki had a secret plan of which they still knew nothing.
There were reports that IA were engaged during the night of
March 29 in a cordon operation around Al Jumhuriyah sector of
central Basrah. End Note.)


6. (S/REL MNFI) Regarding the utility of using tribal forces to
secure parts of the city (Ref A),Mared said that it would not
work. He related that he had held two conferences with tribal
sheiks and they were unwilling to take an active part in
assisting the IA. Mared reported the sheiks' alarm over
"horrifying" displays of intimidation against the tribal
residents in Basrah, showing detailed lists of names and
addresses that would be hit if tribes cooperated. Mared said
that he had received specific threats while in Basrah, with a
clear indication that JAM elements knew where his family lived
in the IZ.


7. (S/REL MNFI) Mared said the GOI needed two things to save
the battle for Basrah: increased Coalition air support for IA

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troops and the addition of Coalition, specifically U.S. ground
troops, to support IA troops. (Note: Basrah Generals Jalil and
Mohan have told REO Director the same. End Note.) He continued
that PM Maliki continued to insist the IA could handle the
situation and was unlikely to admit Coalition support was
needed. Mared suggested that if the USG offered ground troop
assistance in a call to Maliki, he might relent. REO Director
did not offer any opinion on the possibility of U.S ground
forces, but said he would pass this conversation on to Embassy.


8. (S/REL MNFI) Mared noted that President Bush's high profile
support of Maliki had raised the stakes such that if Maliki, as
a Shia, failed to secure the Shia second city of Iraq, his
government would fail. If we win in Basrah, we will win
everywhere in the South; if we cannot secure the city,
ultimately JAM will use that strength to defeat or stalemate the
GOI in other southern provinces and in key Basrah Province sites
such as Umm Qasr, Safwon, Al Zubayr and oil facilities. Because
of contests with JAM in other parts of Iraq, Mared concluded
that PM Maliki would not be able to divert IA troops from the
North into Basra; by the time Maliki prioritized such a
diversion it would be too late.


9. (S/REL MNFI) Mared listed the delegation with the PM as:
Ministers of Defense, Interior, Security and the Director of
Intelligence; the generals in charge of administration and
logistics; the "Director of Explosives" (meaning EOD); Director
of Government Investigations; and several others as well as
various aides. Mared said Maliki was still planning for to
remain at the palace indefinitely with his entourage.


10. (S/REL MNFI) COMMENT: Even more than other REO contacts,
Mared took a great risk in speaking by phone from the palace
with criticism of his commander in chief. Mared was speaking
out of relationship with our interpreter and desire to speak
candidly with REO Director and confided that PM Maliki would
probably dismiss him if he knew Mared was speaking with the USG.
REO has noted the desperation that contacts have shown in
making unsecure cell phone calls. Although not on the ground in
the city, Mared has been sitting in Maliki's equivalent of
situation room, and the REO believes his operational assessment
is credible given his 40 years as an army officer. Mared and
other contacts continue to stress that the Basrah populace wants
the ISF to root JAM out, but failure would be worse than no
attempt at all. Significantly, despite allegations from other
contacts, Mared made no mention of ISCI and other parties
influencing Maliki's decision to confront militias in Basrah.
HOWARD