Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BASRAH25
2008-03-30 07:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH SHEIK'S SUCCESS CONFRONTING JAM

Tags:  PGOV PINS IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8317
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0025/01 0900715
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 300715Z MAR 08
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0696
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0278
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0732
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000025 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH SHEIK'S SUCCESS CONFRONTING JAM

BASRAH 00000025 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Regional Coordinator, Regional
Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000025

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH SHEIK'S SUCCESS CONFRONTING JAM

BASRAH 00000025 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Regional Coordinator, Regional
Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (S/Rel MNFI) SUMMARY and Comment: Sheik Mansur (Beni-Tamim)
told REO March 28 of tribal success in securing the Shat-al-Arab
sector of Basrah City; he asked the Minister of Interior for
permission to field 500 tribesmen from a coalition of 12 tribes
to secure his area, as well as help in removing known IED
emplacements. Mansur charged that Iranian IRCG elements have
heavily infiltrated the city with sophisticated new generations
of RPGs and mortars. Food and water shortages are critical but
he claimed the populace in his area still support ISF attempts
to secure the city; he stressed that U.S. and British troops
would be welcomed. Many of Governor Wa'eli's Fadhila members
were siding with OMS/JAM insurgents. While critical of General
Mohan's tactics, Mansur said that the current battle had to be
fought to its finish or the Iranians would win Basrah. Comment:
Coalition assistance with disarming IEDs might be a positive,
non-combat role to help win hearts and minds. END SUMMARY and
Comment.


2. In a late night telecom on March 28, Sheik Mansur Al-Kan'aw
of the Beni-Tamim tribe related to REO how he secured the
Shat-al-Arab section of Basra City for the GOI. On the first day
of the Iraqi Army offensive, JAM fighters overran the
Shat-al-Arab police station. Mansur organized that day a
meeting of tribes with members in the area to discuss how to
counter the JAM threat. The Sheiks supported direct action, as
there was no effective ISF to counter the station takeover.
Mansur, with members of his tribe visited the local JAM office
and threatened JAM with a full on attack if they did not vacate
the station. Mansur recovered 200 AK-47s that JAM had seized
from the police (who fled),along with 4 police vehicles. Also
recovered were the "Janseeah" [sic] population records that
Mansur claimed JAM was starting to burn, presumably to destroy
potential voter rolls. Mansur said that the weapons and
vehicles have remained in his compound. Tribal members secured
the station for IA forces.



3. (S/Rel MNFI) Mansur held a morning meeting the next day with
the 11 sheiks and they determined to sort out their respective
tribes' participation in JAM forces. At an evening meeting the
group reported that an aggregate of 700 of 1000 JAM fighters
that had tribal affiliations had deserted JAM forces. Mansur
related that PM Maliki called Mansur to thank him for his
efforts. Mansur went a step further and offered a list of 500
tribesmen that could be used as a local guard force to secure
this part of the city; the Minister of Interior replied that he
would give an answer on March 29.


4. (S/Rel MNFI) The Sheiks and tribal affiliations with whom
Mansur met and executed his plan were: Lazem, of Al-Hathaf;
Dayaa, of Al-Aydan; Abu Wathik, of Al- Thayamer; Armash, of
Albu Saleh; and seven others.


5. (S/Rel MNFI) Food, medicine and especially water shortages
were critical in his area, Mansur warned. The curfew was still
in effect on the one hand, and on the other JAM had emplaced
IEDs around the Al Tannumah bridge and the populace were scared
to cross. Mansur claimed that in his area there were 300 IEDs
emplaced in locations that his people had identified; he asked
the Minister of Interior for EOD assistance to remove them,
offering tribal members as a guard force to secure the area.


6. (S/Rel MNFI) Mansur lamented that Iranians were tipping the
scales in favor of OMS/JAM. He said ICRG agents had fanned out
across the city to support JAM special groups. In his area
hundreds of IEDs and other weapons were flooding in from Iran.
Mansur asserted a change in weaponry: now rockets were aimed
using laptop computers. JAM was employing new model RPG7s that
were armor piercing, and there was a new (to Basrah) mortar
larger than 120mm. Basrah Provincial Council member Said Basim
Al-Mouswi (Iraqi Hizbollah),Mansur claimed, was funneling
Iranian weapons and resources to JAM.


7. (S/Rel MNFI) REO Director asked Mansur if he thought Governor
Wa'eli and the Fadhila party could play a role in bringing
OMS/JAM elements to the table to negotiate a solution. After
noting that Wa'eli was more concerned with smuggling oil than
helping, Mansur went on to say that a number of Fadhila members
were fighting with JAM against the IA; as an example he said
that in his Shat-al-Arab sector two Iraqi Police officers and 40
policemen, all Fadhila, had joined the fight against the IA.
Mansur acknowledged that Wa'eli had contacts with OMS and could
facilitate bringing them to the table, but what was the point?
OMS demands were clear and not something the GOI could agree to
anymore: to remain free from arrest and to retain their weapons.


8. (S/Rel MNFI) Mansur pleaded for the intervention of
Coalition forces on the ground and in the air. As for the

BASRAH 00000025 002.2 OF 002


current ISF operational plan, it was not going well, he said,
but there was no recourse other than to forge ahead. Mansur
admitted that the timing of PM Maliki's offensive was wrong but
a defeat now would mean "the Iranians had won." The Sheik said,
claiming to draw on his own experience as an army officer, that
BOC Commander General Mohan's tactics showed his inexperience as
a field commander; Mohan was not employing blocking forces,
rather he simply sent his troops in for frontal assaults.


9. (S/Rel MNFI) Mansur said that U.S. and British ground forces
would be welcomed in most parts of the city (except for some
historic JAM strongholds such as Al- Hyyaniyah) and definitely
in his area. While the reputation of British troops had suffered
over the past months from perceived inaction, he opined that a
British troop presence now would help them regain their
reputation. When REO director noted that Coalition forces were
providing a supporting role, Mansur answered "may God increase
their numbers." (Note: in a separate conversation with Police
Chief Jalil, the general almost shouted that if U.S. troops did
not intervene in a matter of days, the city would be lost. End
Note.)


10. (C/Rel MNFI) Bio note: Sheik Mansur was an officer in
Saddam's army and has been a good contact of the REO and
MND-SE/FCO. He is a wealthy man with extensive farms who has
largely stayed out of Basrah politics but, like many tribal
sheiks with substantial populations, he knows all of the
political actors.


11. (S/Rel MNFI) COMMENT: Mansur is a credible contact, and
other contacts have confirmed his decisive intervention in a key
part of the city abutting Basrah's central water bridge.
Helping remove IED's from one of the few relative secure parts
of the city could further win hearts and minds and show other
members of the population the rewards for working with the ISF.
As it is unlikely that the ISF can deliver with EOD operations,
this might be an area that Coalition forces could make a visible
and positive impact without combat operations. Despite
Coalition concerns about tribal security forces in the South,
Mansur's offer to guard his area in an organize way merits
consideration in these exigent circumstances.
HOWARD