BASRAH ISF COMMANDER SAYS ISF NOT READY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000021

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/17/2018
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PBTS PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PREL PROP
PTER, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH ISF COMMANDER SAYS ISF NOT READY

BASRAH 00000021 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell H. Howard, Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(c),(d)




1. (S/REL MCFI) Summary: Basrah Operations Commander, LTG Mohan
Hafith Fahad al-Fariji told us that the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) in his command are not capable of confronting the militias
given their lack of training and equipment. Mohan asked the
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) to help by
providing additional training before possibly integrating ISF
into joint missions. Mohan also confirmed that he obtains
intelligence from an independent network that he established.
His network is already investigating lethal aid smuggling from
Iran. Frustrated with the lack of logistical support, Mohan
intimated that he would purchase black-market weapons if he
could and even offered to help us acquire examples of what he
believed are new Iranian supplied explosively formed penetrators
(EFP). End Summary.

ISF NOT MISSION READY
--------------

2. (S/REL MCFI) Regional Embassy Officers (REO) met with Basrah
Operations Commander, LTG Mohan Hafith Fahad al-Fariji, on
February 19 and 23. In one meeting, we introduced CJSOTF members
to Mohan so that CJSOTF could ask how Iraqi Special Operations
and CJSOTF might integrate their capabilities with regular ISF
to strike targets. Mohan doubted the ISF's ability to perform
on joint operations, but suggested CJSOTF train the ISF up to
that level. Mohan recommended starting with one or two platoons
from each battalion in the 14th Division (IA) and gradually
integrate ISF into joint operations. This would alleviate Mohan
from overly relying on his most capable unit - 1/1/14 DIV (IA).


3. (S/NF) Mohan especially lamented how poorly trained
(particularly in urban tactics) and equipped the IA was. He
complained that the basic training UK forces provided was "too
superficial," failed to prepare Iraqi soldiers to fight the
militias, and that the British have exaggerated IA capabilities.
Soldiers fired wildly, ran out of ammunition and then ran from
battle. When it came to equipment, he said the militias
seriously outgunned the IA and called it "suicide" for his
soldiers to fight without having superior firepower. We
stressed to Mohan that the Coalition was moving away from direct
logistical support, that the central government had supplies,
and urged him to have his quartermasters requisition the
equipment he needed. (Comment: MND-SE was pleased to hear that
we reiterated the same message based on MNC-I guidance. End
comment). CJSOTF agreed to look into possible training
opportunities.

VIOLENCE IN BASRAH
--------------

4. (S/REL MCFI) Mohan also confirmed reporting that there have
been increased ISF and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) confrontations in
downtown Basrah. He roundly dismissed speculation that these
tensions were the result of ISF efforts to find the kidnapped
CBS journalist, Richard Butler. Instead, Mohan claimed that JAM
was violently responding to ISF "strong points" recently
emplaced in key areas of Basrah. JAM was attacking the strong
points and vehicle checkpoints nightly with heavy machine guns,
RPGs, and even mortars.

MOHAN'S PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE
--------------

5. (S/REL MCFI) In a February 10 meeting with Mohan's Ministry
of Defense (MoD) Advisor, Majid al-Sari, we were told that Mohan
had established an independent intelligence network. Mohan
confirmed his network's existence to us and said it was helping
him to identify militia caches and cell leaders. (Comment:
Mohan has long decried the lack of reliable Iraqi and Coalition
intelligence support to him. Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command
plans to form a fusion cell here, but Mohan's complaint that CTC
is not effective is sour grapes because CTC would not be under
his command. Given Mohan was once responsible for the military
clandestine service during the former regime, he appears to have
taken matters into his own hands. End comment.)

SMUGGLING CONTINUES
--------------

6. (S/REL MCFI) Mohan also said he recently directed his sources
to collect intelligence on the smuggling of lethal aid from

BASRAH 00000021 002.2 OF 002


Iran. He was currently compiling this information on a map,
which he wants to share with us during our next meeting. He
claimed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force brought
lethal aid to the borders where marsh Arabs received it and then
passed it off to the militias. A common method at the vehicle
points of entry was using trucks carrying fish, which made it
hard (and unpleasant) for the inspectors to search the vehicle.

LOOKING FOR BLACK MARKET SUPPLY SOURCES?
--------------

7. (S/REL MCFI) According to Mohan, the arms markets in Basrah
are fully stocked with mortars, PKCs, ammunition, RPG-7s,
rockets (107, 122, 240mm),and EFPs. He noted that there are
now four different types of EFPs - the newest version is called
the "jumper" (because it is magnetized),is comprised of two
separate parts, and each piece sells for $700-1,000 USD. He
quipped, "Because the IA is outgunned by the militias, do not be
surprised if I go out and buy weapons from the Iranians on the
black-market," but added that a lack of funds prevented him.
During our second meeting, Mohan asked us if the USG is
interested in having him purchase EFP samples for us on the
black market.


8. (S/REL MCFI) Mohan's British military advisor later told us
that Mohan had also discussed EFPs with MND-SE. However, MND-SE
reports that Mohan seemed unfamiliar with even some of the basic
components having confused a new timer with possibly the
"jumper" EFP described above.

COMMENT
--------------

9. (S/REL MCFI) Mohan's depiction of a weakened ISF is intended
to secure additional training and equipment. Mohan believes
that the current balance of power favors the militias and he is
correct to believe so in our assessment, especially since the
14th IA DIV has not reached its full operational capability. To
tip the scales in favor of the ISF, Mohan has recently
developed, with MND-SE assistance, a security plan (to be
reported septel) to bolster the ISF, frighten the militias into
submission, and if necessary confront and defeat them.


10. (S/REL MCFI) Mohan made a similar request last year after
taking command, but the MoD and MoI did little to support him
given personal rivalries between Mohan and some senior MoD
leaders. To ensure Mohan's success this time around we will
need to pressure the GOI into offering a full measure of
assistance.
HHOWARD