Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BASRAH10
2008-02-10 06:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH BADR LEADER PREDICTS SOME BADR-JAM ELECTION VIOLENCE

Tags:  PTER PINS PHUM PGOV IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4080
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0010 0410637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100637Z FEB 08
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0676
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0259
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0711
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000010 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2018
TAGS: PTER PINS PHUM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH BADR LEADER PREDICTS SOME BADR-JAM ELECTION VIOLENCE

CLASSIFIED BY: Won Lee, A/Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000010

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2018
TAGS: PTER PINS PHUM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH BADR LEADER PREDICTS SOME BADR-JAM ELECTION VIOLENCE

CLASSIFIED BY: Won Lee, A/Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Hasan al-Rashid, Basrah's Badr leader, told the
Regional Embassy Office IPAO that provincial elections might
occur in September assuming passage of key legislation in
Baghdad. He did not rule out violent political confrontation in
Basrah during the campaign season between the Islamic Supreme
Council in Iraq (ISCI)/Badr Organization and their Sadrist
rivals, but said it was more likely in other areas. Despite the
Sadrists recent efforts to improve their image, he claimed they
were preparing to eliminate political rivals while
simultaneously preparing their own candidates for election.
Al-Rashid also complained that Basrah's military leaders
continue to keep the Provincial Council in the dark on their
plans and suggested periodic strikes against the militias to
keep them on their back-foot and from building up. End summary.


2. (C) Provincial Council (PC) member, former Basrah governor,
and Badr leader Hasan al-Rashid met February 3 with Regional
Embassy Office IPAO. Recently returned from a State Department
sponsored International Visitor Program on Elections, al-Rashid
told us that what he learned would help him prepare ISCI/Badr
for provincial elections, which he anticipated for September.
Iraqis, he said, were hopeful elections would occur this year,
but it was essential for the Council of Representatives to pass
the Elections and Provincial Powers Laws first. ISCI/Badr were
prepared to wait for the passage of those laws and would not
push for elections without them.


3. (C) According to al-Rashid, ISCI/Badr preferred an open-list
ballot system and it was better for Basrah's democracy. But, a
closed-list might be required at this stage in Iraq's budding
democracy as Iraqis simply were not ready to choose for
themselves. Iraqis knew the party leaders, but there were
unknown, yet well-qualified party members that might be
overlooked in an open-list system.


4. (C) Al-Rashid also told us that it was likely the Badr-led
Islamic bloc of parties in the PC, known as the Basrah Islamic
List (BIL) would go their separate ways in the next election.
BIL turned out the be dysfunctional, he said, because managing
the egos of BIL's other party leaders was too difficult and they
never developed a unified agenda.


5. (C) Responding to our query, al-Rashid did not expect the
rivalry between ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists to turn violent in
Basrah during the election, but he did not rule it out entirely.
Such confrontation was more likely in other areas like
Nasiriyah and Karbala. He claimed Badr already had indications
that the Sadrists were developing hit-lists to eliminate
political opponents during the campaigning. Basrah's Sadrists
were "behaving better," engaging more politically, trying to
improve their image, and preparing their candidates with the
necessary credentials to run for office.


6. (C) On a separate note, al-Rashid commented that the PC's
strained relationship with Basrah Operations Commander LTG Mohan
Hafith Fahad and Chief of Police Jalil Khalaf Shuwayl was only
marginally better. He mostly blamed Mohan for being too
conceited and failing to apprise the PC's security committee of
his plans. While the lull in attacks within the city was
helpful, al-Rashid opined that Mohan needed to periodically hit
some targets to keep the militias in line and prevent them from
getting stronger. Al-Rashid said he was meeting Mohan and Jalil
that night to encourage a more aggressive stance and to
institutionalize their relationship with the PC.


7. (C) Comment: By dissolving the BIL, ISCI/Badr is likely
positioning itself to win more seats on the PC. They are better
organized than many other parties, and by running independently,
they will not have to share a percentage of the seats they win
with candidates from other parties who run on the BIL list.
Ever the Machiavellian, al-Rashid's suggestion to keep the
closed-list ballots is likely a play to maintain his personal
control over his party by emplacing "yes-men" under him in the
PC. End comment.

WLEE