MIXED SIGNALS ON HMONG REPATRIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000737

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL TH LA
SUBJECT: MIXED SIGNALS ON HMONG REPATRIATIONS

REF: A. 07 VIENTIANE 205 (21 HMONG GIRLS)


B. 07 BANGKOK 596 (THAIS MOVE TO DEPORT HMONG)

Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Thai MFA provided a read-out on the
February visits to Laos by the Thai Foreign Minister and
Prime Minister. According to the Thai side, the Lao
showed some flexibility on the ultimate solution to the
problem posed by some 7800 Lao-Hmong illegally in Thailand,
currently in a camp in Petchaboon province. Lao officials
indicated that they would not insist on the return of Hmong
who did not want to come back to Laos. The Thai MFA
believed the Lao could, ultimately, tacitly accept some
third country resettlement of this group. The MFA found
less flexibility so far on the group of Lao-Hmong in
immigration detention in Nong Khai. The Lao and Thai hope
to make further progress on this issue before the March 31
meeting in Vientiane of the military-led bilateral General
Border Commission, which has the lead on resolving the
problem. The Lao side hoped that the repatriation of the
group could be completed before the end of this year. We
reiterated US concerns about the repatriation of
individuals who could face mistreatment if returned to
Laos. END SUMMARY


2. (C) MFA Director for Southeast Asia Kallayana
Vipattipumiprates gave us a readout on March 5 of the
recent visits by Foreign Minister Noppadon and Prime
Minister Samak to Lao PDR. The Foreign Minister visited
Laos with the Prime Minister on February 29, following up
on his solo visit the week before. In both visits, the
issue of the Lao-Hmong who illegally entered Thailand was
the most important issue discussed. Kallayana said that
the Lao and the Thai agreed that the General Border
Commission (GBC),headed by the military on both sides,
would carry on further discussions on the issue. PM Samak,
in his role as Defense Minister, would head up the Thai
side at a GBC meeting in Vientiane on March 31. "Whatever
the GBC decides will be the policy," Kallayana said. He
indicated that they were hoping for significant progress on
working out the remaining issues by the time of that
meeting.

LAO MAY NOT INSIST ON RETURN OF ALL HMONG
--------------


3. (C) Kallayana divided the problem into two categories.
For the approximately 8000 Lao-Hmong at Petchaboon, he said
that the Lao side showed some encouraging flexibility.
Although third country resettlement was not directly
discussed in the meetings, on the sidelines Kallayana spoke
with Lao MFA spokesman Yong Chantalongsy, who said that
Laos would not insist on the return to Laos of Hmong from
Petchaboon who do not want to come back. At the same time,
Kallayana reported, Yong said that the Lao government would
never say directly that any of this group could stay in
Thailand. Kallayana interpreted this to mean that the Lao
would not publicly agree to anything but the return of
their citizens, but would probably also not really object
if some of the Petchaboon Hmong stayed in Thailand or
subsequently went to third countries.


4. (C) The group in Nong Khai is, however, different,
according to Kallayana. (Note: The Nong Khai detainees have
been recognized by UNHCR as refugees, and several of them
are well-known for their role in publicizing alleged abuses
against Hmong by the Lao government. End note.) The Thai
side had asked the Lao to be more flexible about this group
as well. The Thai had even proposed resolving these cases
first. However, in the Foreign Ministers' meeting, the
Lao side had said that issues regarding this group "had to
go to a higher authority." Kallayana said that the Thais
were trying to come up with some option for the Nong Khai
group that would satisfy the Lao, but they weren't sure
what "the bottom line" for the GoL was, and therefore were
not sure what might work. The GoL appeared to want to have
some more significant role in the eventual disposition of
this group, he said. The Thai were at this point
brainstorming on ideas that might satisfy the Lao, one of
which was the proposal that the group would return to Laos
first, and then depart for whatever third-country
resettlement was possible.

INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OVER REPATRIATION PLANS
-------------- --


5. (C) We warned Kallayana that there were some serious

BANGKOK 00000737 002 OF 003


problems with that proposal. First, resettlement
countries might not be able to work with this arrangement
for a variety of legal or administrative reasons. Perhaps
more serious, the group in Nong Khai was unlikely to
cooperate in any return to Laos -- or, indeed, in any move
from their current location -- if they did not have faith
that they were not being sent back to Laos to face an
uncertain future. The group, we have been told, lives in a
constant state of apprehension that they will imminently be
returned, and any attempt to do so will likely spark that
same reaction that thwarted the attempted deportation in
early 2007 (when the group barricaded themselves in their
cells and successfully held off Lao and Thai authorities
who attempted to repatriate them.) We reminded Kallayana
that Thailand would bear the brunt of the international
blame if there were another incident like that one. We
also reminded him of the treatment of the deported Hmong
girls, who were missing for over a year after they were
sent back to Laos in 2005 and some of whom subsequently
reported physical and sexual abuse while in detention in
Laos. This case lent credence to the fear of some Hmong
detainees about their treatment if they were returned. We
urged Kallayana to think carefully through any plan, and to
consider seeking someone trusted by the Hmong detainees to
work with them when the time came to move them from Nong
Khai IDC, regardless of where they were going. Kallayana
acknowledged these points, but admitted that he had not so
far come up with another likely alternative.


6. (C) The Lao and Thai sides had discussed the practical
issues surrounding the deportations, Kallayana reported.
The Lao side said they could take back 200-250 at a time.
They hoped to have the entire population repatriated by the
end of the year. The Thai side continued to press the Lao
to permit some kind of international monitoring of the
returnees; they pointed to the Lao invitation to
Vientiane-based ambassadors to visit one of the
resettlement villages this month as a positive step, but
recognized that it fell somewhat short. We took the
opportunity to emphasize again that it was important for
the Thai screening process to meet international standards
and ensure that no one with a well-founded fear of
persecution was returned. We also reiterated our concern
over the conditions in which the 150-plus Hmong in Nong
Khai were held, asking again that the RTG take steps to
address this urgent humanitarian situation.


7. (C) On the deportation of the 11 Hmong last week, we
noted concerns that some of the group may not have departed
voluntarily. Kallayana emphasized that the MFA had gotten
strong assurances from the military officials handling the
deportations that all of the individuals had left
voluntarily. Kallayana said that he had checked with
military officials shortly before the group was sent across
the border. He acknowledged that, in the period leading up
the deportation, some of them might have been of two minds,
but officials on the scene told him that all 11 had said
they agreed to return before they were send back on Feb

28. We reiterated our concerns, and noted that, in the
absence of a more transparent process, neither of us could
be completely certain of what had happened.

CAN THE US RESETTLE THE HMONG?
--------------


8. (C) Kallayana asked, if the Lao and the Thai ultimately
had no objections to third country resettlement, could the
US guarantee it would take the Hmong as refugees? We
explained that we could not make any guarantee in advance
to take any individual, as each case had to be considered
based on whether they were refugees under US law and were
otherwise admissible to the US. However, we did point out
that new legislation passed late last year appeared to
address some of the problems that had affected Hmong and
other groups, inadvertently caught up in our anti-terrorism
legislation. We did not have guidance on the new
procedures we would be using yet, but we hoped to have this
information soon, and would provide them with more
information as soon as possible.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The Foreign Ministries on both sides of the Mekong
appear to be groping for a satisfactory solution for the
majority of the Hmong would-be refugees in Thailand. On
the Thai side, the military, which has the lead on the
issue in the General Border Committee, is inclined to take

BANGKOK 00000737 003 OF 003


a harder line than MFA. The military sees the influx of
illegal migrants crossing all its borders as a threat to
security. Repeated statements by both sides about not
forcing returns are encouraging; the more negative comments
about the Nong Khai group are troublesome. We will continue
to raise these issues with appropriate Thai officials.


JOHN