ELECTION FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS - PPP AND COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000598

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NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: ELECTION FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS - PPP AND COALITION
PARTNERS MAY FACE FURTHER LEGAL ACTION


Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT)
expects to conclude its investigation into three important
vote fraud cases from the December parliamentary election
shortly. The cases could result in a Constitutional Court
review of a motion to dissolve three parties in the governing
coalition, including People's Power Party (PPP). It remains
to be seen whether the evidence in the PPP case is really
strong enough to result in the party's dissolution. There is
also little appetite in Thai society in general for
dissolving the PPP now, even among the party's opponents. If
any of the parties are dissolved, only their executive
members lose their seats in parliament or the government; the
remaining members are simply required to join any other
party. In the case of PPP, about 23 MPs and 11 ministers
would lose their seats. A dissolution decision would
therefore not necessarily even lead to a new general
election, but it could disrupt the delicate balance in the
six-party governing coalition. If the cases are refered to
the Constitutional Court, the process is likely to be
lengthy. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has
continued to investigate fraud allegations stemming from the
December 23 parliamentary elections, and may be releasing
their decisions on three important cases soon. The most
significant case involves the allegations of vote buying
against House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairat, a senior member of
the People's Power Party (PPP). Yongyuth was a deputy leader
of the party at the time of the alleged vote-buying (he
resigned his party position after being chosen as House
Speaker). The very tough provisions of the election law hold
the whole party accountable, in some cases, for the actions
of members of its leadership; vote fraud by members of the
party executive can be the grounds for the Constitutional
Court to dissolve a party. Two other parties -- Chart Thai
(with 34 seats in the parliment) and Matchimathipathai (with
11 seats) -- also face possible dissolution for vote fraud by
members of their executive committees.


3. (C) In mid-February discussions, the ECT
Secretary-General told us that the PPP case was "very

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difficult." He complained that it had been hard to find
neutral people willing to serve on the subcommittee
investigating the fraud allegations. (Note: Press leaks on
the case claim there is video evidence as well as eyewitness
testimony supporting the accusation that Yongyuth was
involved in payments to suborn local officials in Chiang Rai.
where Yonguth was running on the party list for the northern
constituency. However, there has been no official release of
any of the evidence in the case. End note.)


4. (C) The subcommittee forwarded its findings to the ECT on
February 19; the ECT has said publicly and privately to us
that it hopes to conclude the investigation by the end of
this month. According to press reports quoting one of the
election commissioners, the subcommittee believed the
accusations against Yongyuth. If the ECT itself also finds
the allegations credible, it will forward the case to the
Supreme Court to determine whether Yongyuth should lose his
seat in Parliament. Yongyuth would face suspension from the
Parliament as soon as the case goes to the court. Yongyuth
may also face criminal prosecution under the tougher new
sanctions in the election law. In addition, the ECT could
decide to forward the case to the Constitutional Court to
determine whether PPP should be dissolved for election abuses
by a senior member.


5. (C) In our February meeting, the ECT SecGen told us that
he expected the ECT to make its decision on the Chart Thai
and Matchimathipathai party dissolution cases by the end of
February as well. In both these cases, an executive member
of the party running in a constituency was accused of vote
fraud, and was red-carded. According to the ECT SecGen, the
election law gave the ECT very little wiggle room in these
cases. Section 103 of the law states that, "If there appears
convincing evidence that the leader or member of the
Executive Committee of a political party connives
at...(violations of the election law),the political party

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shall be deemed as committing an act to obtain powers to rule
the country by means not in accordance with ... the
Constitution. In such case, the ECT shall ... file a motion
with the Constitutional Court in order to dissolve such
political party." The SecGen said that, as a red card had
already been issued in both cases, the ECT had already
determined that there was "convincing evidence" that these
candidates had violated the election law (Election Law,
section 103.) It therefore seemed most likely that both these
cases would go to the Constitutional Court to consider
dissolving the parties. The ECT SecGen added, however, that
the Constitutional Court should have sufficient lattitude to
decide whether the transgressions really warranted
dissolution.


6. (C) The Yongyuth case is slightly different. Since
Yongyuth was a candidate on the party list, the ECT had been
somewhat uncertain how to handle the question of
disqualification. The ECT certified Yongyuth's election,
with the understanding that the investigation would continue
and the case be refered to the Supreme Court if the evidence
warranted. (The election law specifies the ECT has the sole
authority to disqualify candidates for 30 days after the
election; after that, all cases must be decided by the
Supreme Court.) Given Yongyuth's political clout, we presume
the ECT wanted to be very careful, and probably prefered to
share the heat with the Supreme Court. Thus, unlike the
other two cases, the basic issue of whether Yongyuth really
cheated has yet to be legally determined. If the evidence is
strong, however, the PPP could face a Constitutional Court
process to determine whether it should be dissolved.


7. (C) There is fairly little appetite for another major
dissolution case here, as far as we can tell. Democrat Party
Secretary General Sutheep Thaugsuban, who spearheaded the

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2007 dissolution case against the former ruling Thai Rak Thai
party, told us earlier this month that he doubted PPP would
be dissolved. The Democrat also told us that his party does
not have enough money to face elections again soon, and would
ideally like about two years to rebuild before they go to the
polls again. "Don't be surprised if you see us cheering PM
Samak on," he said. He predicted that, if the new elections
were held too soon, his party would drop from 164 seats to
around 80. Press and civil society commentators have also
complained that dissolving parties is a bad way to handle
vote fraud issues. Nonetheless, the drafters of the
Constitution and the election laws intended the rules to be
very tough, and to push the courts to mete out severe
punishments, in the hopes that this could finally address the
widespread problems of vote fraud.


8. (C) Even if these three parties were dissolved, it would
not necessarily lead immediately to new elections. Only the
party executive members would lose their MP or ministerial
seats, as we understand the constitutional provisions. The
executive member would face a five year loss of political
rights, but the remaining party members in the Parliament are
only required to become members of another political party
within 60 days (Constitution, article 106 subpara 8). PPP
learned its lesson after the dissolution of TRT; it has only
about 34 members on its executive committee (compared to the
111 executives of TRT). However, 11 PPP cabinet members are
also on the executive committee, including party leader PM
Samak Sundaravej and SecGen/Finance Minister Surapong
Suebwonglee, and around 23 are MPs. Several other ministers
from Matchima and Chart Thai are also members of their
parties' executive committees. Depending on how the parties
reacted, dissolution could destabilize the
delicately-balanced six-party governing coalition.

COMMENT
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9. (C) It is still uncertain whether the evidence in the
Yongyuth case will stand up to public scrutiny, and whether
the high courts will really have the backbone to enforce the
strict election laws if it does. Because the laws were
passed by the appointed, post-coup legislature, the PPP may
be able to make a case attacking their legitimacy and so give
the courts a loophole to avoid making another controversial

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dissolution ruling.


10. (C) In any case, the TRT dissolution case showed that
wily politicians are pretty good at getting around any legal
barriers the courts or legislatures come up with.
Dissolution of the three parties would be disruptive and, for
the smaller parties, potentially a deathblow, but PPP would
likely be able to reinvent itself yet again, provided it
still had access to backing and funding from former PM
Thaksin. Vigorous criminal prosecutions of vote buying and
other fraud, backed up by credible investigations, might be a
much more effective tool to clean up elections, but few here
believe that the criminal justice system is capable of this.
JOHN