Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK487
2008-02-14 10:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR AND FORMER PM ANAND DISCUSS ELECTION,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000487 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FORMER PM ANAND DISCUSS ELECTION,
BURMA, AND U.S. ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA


BANGKOK 00000487 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000487

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FORMER PM ANAND DISCUSS ELECTION,
BURMA, AND U.S. ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA


BANGKOK 00000487 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun spoke with
deep pessimism about the new Thai administration. In a
February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Anand complained
that he saw no alternative to the dominance of pro-Thaksin
politicians, whom he considered poorly qualified and lacking
in legitimacy. Anand declined to speculate about the new
administration's policy toward the South. When the
Ambassador emphasized the importance of improving the
political situation in Burma, Anand sought to discourage the
USG from focusing on the Thai-Burma relationship; instead, he
encouraged the USG to work with an independently-minded Japan
to help ensure that China and India do not exert excessive
influence over Southeast Asia. End Summary.

DISGUSTED AND DISCOURAGED
--------------


2. (C) Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun welcomed the
Ambassador for an introductory call on February 12. After an
exchange of pleasantries, Anand expressed in strong terms his
dismay with the December 2007 election results and with the
administration of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej. He called
this "the least trustworthy government ever," deploring the
influence of figures outside of the formal government (read:
deposed PM Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates). Citing
Samak's false claim to the international media that only one
person died during a period of political upheaval in 1976,
Anand deplored Samak for having "no respect for the truth,"
and he characterized Samak as having politically
self-destructive tendencies.


3. (C) Anand lamented that the cabinet consisted largely of
"nominees" -- people put forward by former Thai Rak Thai
officials who were themselves ineligible to hold government
posts because of the May ruling of the Constitutional
Tribunal. Anand envisioned the cabinet members dividing up
the spoils that traditionally accrue to office-holders in

Thailand. He denounced Interior Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung
as a "criminal." Acknowledging the popular support in rural
areas for Thaksin, Samak, and their cohorts, Anand complained
that in the current climate he could envision no viable
alternative, and Thailand could end up like Zimbabwe under
President Mugabe. Thai voters who had elected the PPP
government were "gullible" and "damn stupid," Anand despaired.

THE SOUTH
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Anand believed that his
National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) report might become
the basis for the new administration's policies toward
southern provinces plagued by separatist violence. Anand
admitted he did not know how the new administration would
formulate its policy toward the South. Thaksin's government
did not have time to implement NRC recommendations (the NRC
issued its report in June 2006, just a few months before the
coup). The Surayud administration tried to heed the NRC's
recommendations but did not make sufficient efforts. Anand
admitted that he was not currently in contact with decision
makers on this matter and mostly received his information
from the media.

BURMA
--------------


5. (C) The political situation in Burma would inevitably
affect U.S.-Thai relations, the Ambassador explained; the USG
would pay attention to Thailand's actions, and Thai public
statements encouraging democratic reforms in Burma would be
welcome. Anand indicated he had little hope for positive

BANGKOK 00000487 002.2 OF 002


developments in Burma in the near future, saying nothing the
USG could do would influence domestic conditions there. The
Burmese junta may be misguided, Anand assessed, but they were
proud and "not stupid." Anand said the USG would be better
off trying to deal with Burma in an ASEAN context, rather
than pressing ASEAN members on Burma, which could have the
unfortunate effect of increasing Chinese and Indian influence
in Burma. The Ambassador stressed this was a high-level
priority for the USG.

CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN
--------------


6. (C) Anand commended the Chinese government for effective
use of "soft power," particularly in Southeast Asia. China
was devoting much attention to the region, and many Thais had
a positive view of China. Anand encouraged the Ambassador to
help to bring high-level USG officials to the region, saying
a U.S. presence in Southeast Asia was essential and in
America's interest, given projections of strong economic and
population growth in the region in the next 15 years. Anand
believed that the U.S. and Japan -- especially if Japan
positioned itself as increasingly independent of the U.S. --
would help to provide balance that would offset what would
otherwise prove to be overwhelming influence on the part of
China and India. The Ambassador agreed that the USG had
important interests in Southeast Asia, had taken note of
China's increasing influence, and encouraged Japan to play a
positive role in the region.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) In a revealing moment, Anand quipped dismissively that
Samak's administration's only claim to legitimacy was that
his party had won the election. Anand clearly does not
believe that Samak and his crew are capable of good (much
less wise) governance. Time may prove Anand correct, but he
nevertheless should acknowledge that a peaceful transition
back to rule by elected leaders is a positive and necessary
step back toward political normalcy -- even if the Thai
majority's preference differs from Anand's.
JOHN