Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3649
2008-12-15 09:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES ADMINSTRATION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBK #3649/01 3500949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150949Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5392
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6613
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9287
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5142
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1254
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2534
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 5972
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003649 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES ADMINSTRATION
CENTER: REFORM AND DEVLOPMENT IN THE SOUTH

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Classified By: Political Counselor George Kent, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003649

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES ADMINSTRATION
CENTER: REFORM AND DEVLOPMENT IN THE SOUTH

BANGKOK 00003649 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor George Kent, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)



1. (SBU) Summary and comment: In an early December meeting,
Vithit Powattanasuk, an MFA officer assigned to the Southern
Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) in Yala
province, told us that the SBPAC was responsible for
directing and monitoring all efforts in the deep south that
could be construed as "peace building" or development. He
said it was primarily concerned with long term efforts to end
the insurgency through educational reform, economic
development, and the promotion of justice. The MFA worked
with the SBPAC to control the involvement of foreign
stakeholders in the south, determine which ones could assist
the Thai government in ending the conflict, and facilitate
their involvement in SBPAC approved projects. The SBPAC was
particularly interested in promoting Malaysian cooperation
and involvement in educational and religious reform efforts,
and in revitalizing efforts with the Dubai World to invest in
major development projects in the south.


2. (C) Comment: Although Vithit's comments appeared to come
from approved talking points, our conversation did provide
interesting insight into the workings of the SBPAC. SBPAC is
responsible for monitoring and directing all peace building
and development activity in the South, but apparently has
little control over the activities of other government
ministries and agencies. While we agree with Vithit that
some venues of private Islamic education in southern Thailand
have played a role in feeding the insurgency, his
condemantion of pondoks may be too sweeping. Although the
Thai government needs to have some counter-radicalization
strategy, govenrnment led efforts to "reform" Islam in the
past have only exacerbated the violence. SBPAC willingness
to consult with Malaysia regarding these reform efforts is
welcome. Vithit's final remarks on the justice sector came
only after repeated prompting. It was a topic he did not

plan on addressing. We have heard little form other contacts
in the South about SBPAC efforts in this area, and remain
deeply skeptical it has any real influence to address flaws
in the justice system. End Summary and Comment.

MFA, SBPAC, and the South
--------------


3. (SBU) On December 7, we met with Vithit Powattanasuk, an
MFA liaison officer to the Southern Border Provinces
Administration Center (SBPAC). According to Vithit, his job
extended beyond serving as an MFA liaison to the SBPAC; it
involved operationalizing national level MFA policy
initiatives at the local level in southern Thailand. He said
the MFA,s foremost concern in the South was to ensure that
the insurgency remained a domestic issue. To that end, all
offers of assistance to the South by foreign governments and
international organizations were vetted against SBPAC,s
priorities and strategy for ending the violence. He
explained that the process was likely too slow for many
potential donors, but it was necessary to ensure the Thai
government remained in control of the situation. Within this
context, he said, his responsibilities involved working with
international stakeholders to provide assistance in southern
Thailand at the local level. Using Malaysia as an example,
he said the Malaysian Government sponsored over 20 events in
southern Thailand last year. He said Malaysia is key player
in the southern conflict, and he needs to ensure local
authorities understand the importance of that relationship.


4. (SBU) Vithit told us that day-to-day security affairs
were left up to the security forces and the 4th Army Area
through the Joint Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) command.
SBPAC was primarily concerned with a long-term strategy to
end the unrest by developing a tolerant and pluralistic
society in the South. He said the SBPAC operated on an
annual budget of 30 million baht (approximately $857,000 USD)
and was responsible for directing and monitoring all efforts
in the conflict zone that could be construed as "peace
building" or development. This included the administration
of justice, the protection of human rights, and coordinating

BANGKOK 00003649 002.2 OF 003


the work of all Thai agencies engaged in southern Thailand.
Showing us a wire diagram, he said the SBPAC reported
directly to the 4th Army Area Internal Security Operations
Command (ISOC),on equal footing as the CPM. The SBPAC
coordinates laterally with the CPM, all ministries,
departments and agencies that have a presence in the South,
and an organization called the Advisory Council for Peace
Building in the Southern Provinces.

Education and Religion
--------------


5. (SBU) Moving through what seemed to be prepared talking
points, Vithit said the SBPAC,s first priority was reforming
the system of education in southern Thailand, including
religious education. Focusing on the role of religion in the
conflict, he said the pondok system of religious education
(private Islamic schools) had to be changed because it led to
radicalization and fed the violence. He said the SPBAC was
looking to Malaysia for guidance on this, and in particular
was focused on Malaysian assistance on ways to promote Hadari
Islam. (Note: Hadari Islam is a form of Islam promoted by
Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi that emphasizes tolerance,
moderation and a more open attitude towards modernity.
According to press sources, it is questionable whether Badawi
has had any real success in promoting his version of Islam.
End note.) Vithit said he thinks it will take at least a
generation to fully reform this system.

It Might be the Economy
--------------


6. (SBU) The SBPAC,s next priority, according to Vithit, was
economic development. He said poverty was not as severe in
the extreme south as in other parts of Thailand, but his
assessment was that it was a contributing factor in the
violence. He said there are currently some 200,000 Muslims
from the South who work in Malaysia, many illegally, and send
back remittances of approximately 400 million baht annually.
(Note: Vithit emphasized these were not official figures. He
said his source was a consultant hired by the SBPAC to look
at economic development in the South. End note.) He
explained that the political situation in Malaysia was such
that he was concerned Malaysia would expel all the illegal
Thai workers, cutting down the remittances and pushing the
South further into poverty; fewer remittances coupled with
falling rubber prices would be disastrous for the region.


7. (SBU) The SPBAC solution, according to Vithit, was to
continue to advocate for the Exclusive Development Zone (EDZ)
in the extreme south, a concept that was approved by the Thai
cabinet in 2006, and a reexamination of the feasibility of a
large infrastructure project. Unfortunately, he told us,
there was no clear budget plan to develop the EDZ, and the
SBPAC did not have the authority to either budget money for
it, or compel other ministries to develop it. As for the
infrastructure project, he said the SBPAC was interested in
revitalizing plans to construct a "land bridge" bisecting the
South in order to connect the Gulf of Thailand and the
Andaman Sea. The land bridge would involve the construction
of deep water sea ports on both coasts, and rail and road
infrastructure connecting them. Although a memorandum of
understanding was signed with Dubai World to conduct a
feasibility study for this project several months ago, Dubai
World had suspended its involvement in the project with the
advent of the global economic crisis. He said the political
situation in Bangkok also precluded any serious discussion of
moving the project forward any time soon (note: this Kra
Isthmus canal project idea has bounced around as a concept
since the 1970s, would have massive environmental
implications, and is unlikely ever to get beyond a
feasibility study).

Promotion of Justice
--------------


8. (SBU) Vithit also commented briefly on justice sector
issues. He said SPBAC officials were well aware of the

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allegations made by NGOs and foreign observers that security
forces acted with impunity in the South and that there was no
transparency in court proceedings in southern Thailand.
According to Vithit, army and police in the South feel they
have been unfiarly maligned by misinformation spread by these
groups. While being careful not to comment on the
allegations themselves, Vithit said a bureau had been
established within the SBPAC called the Justice Bureau which
was charged with ensuring due process and transparency in
legal proceedings. He said this bureau was staffed with 50
officers from the Ministry of Justice and Department of
Special Investigation. In addition, each district in
southern Thailand has a bureau representative to ensure fair
treatment under the law. He said that if a local citizen
feels wronged by a ministry official or any of the security
forces, they should first go to the police. If, for any
reason, the police cannot or will not help, they can approach
the Justice Bureau representative. In addition, he said,
this bureau advises the courts in term of transparency.
While the court system is under no obligation to pay
attention to the Justice Bureau, the bureau tries to work
with them to ensure proceeding happen swiftly and
transparently.
JOHN