THAI COURT DISSOLVES PPP, REMOVES PRIME MINISTER;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003529

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS ASEC CASC ECON EINV TH
SUBJECT: THAI COURT DISSOLVES PPP, REMOVES PRIME MINISTER;
OPPOSITION LEADER SEES NO END TO STALEMATE

REF: A. BANGKOK 3520 (FOCUS SHIFTS TO COURTS)

B. BANGKOK 3492 (ARMY CHIEF URGES ELECTIONS)

C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPES FOR MEDIATION)

D. BANGKOK 3192 (PRIVY COUNCILORS)

E. BANGKOK 3191 (THAKSIN PROMISES RESISTANCE)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) The Constitutional Court on December 2 issued a ruling
that dissolved the People's Power Party and two other
coalition parties, stripping the Prime Minister and other
party executive board members of their political rights and
offices. Deputy PM Chavarat Charnvirakul now serves as
acting PM until a new coalition and Cabinet form. In the
run-up to the ruling, opposition Democrat Party Leader
Abhisit Vejjajiva told the Ambassador he saw no easy way out
of Thailand's predicament. Abhisit doubted that the ruling
would end anti-government protests at Bangkok airports, as he
believed that the next Prime Minister to be elected by the
House would be another proxy of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra.
Abhisit believed Thaksin had adopted aggressive tactics,
such as attacks on People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
rallies, to destabilize Thailand, and that Thaksin would
welcome a coup d'etat and the ensuing chaos. Abhisit said
there would be a "huge risk" to the monarchy if King Bhumibol
were to try to intervene in the current environment. Before
the Court ruling, the RTG postponed the ASEAN Summit until
March 2009.


2. (C) Comment: The Constitutional Court's ruling was widely
expected, but it is unclear whether it will end
anti-government demonstrations or provoke a violent response
from government sympathizers. PAD leaders, whom we sense are
divided, may realize that their seizure of Bangkok's airports
is fast eroding the support they enjoyed from Bangkok's
middle and upper class; the ruling offers them a chance to
declare victory, end the airport occupations, and allow
public focus to return to the King's birthday celebrations.
If, as Abhisit predicted, the PAD does not choose this option
and the King does not use his December 4 annual birthday
message to send a clear signal to end the protest, the
stalemate could drag on, with no fixed end in sight. End
Summary and Comment.

ABHISIT AND AMBASSADOR MEET IN RUN-UP TO RULING
-------------- --


3. (SBU) Democrat Party (DP) Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva,
accompanied by leading DP legislator Korn Chatikavanij,
called on the Ambassador (accompanied by Political Counselor
and Poloff) at the Residence on December 2. This meeting
took place two hours before the Constitutional Court issued a
verdict dissolving the People's Power Party (PPP),the Chart
Thai Party, and the Matchima Thippathai Party, because of
election improprieties by executive board members (see ref A
and previous). In accordance with constitutional provisions,
this ruling stripped the three parties' executive board
members, including Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, of their
political rights for a five year period.


4. (SBU) The press reports that Deputy Prime Minister
Chavarat Chanveerakul -- a senior businessman who served
twice in the 1990s as Deputy Finance Minister -- will serve
as Acting Prime Minister until the House elects a new PM.
There has been no sign that the governing coalition, which
retains majority support in the House, is fracturing after
the verdict. It remains unclear how pro- and anti-government
demonstrators will respond. One of the last acts of the
Somchai Cabinet, which was meeting at the time of the Court's
verdict, was to postpone the ASEAN Summit until March 2009.


5. (C) Abhisit appeared frustrated, despairing that he saw no
easy way out of the current stalemate. Abhisit said he had
long favored Army Commander Anupong Paojinda's recent

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suggestion that Prime Minister Somchai should dissolve the
House of Representatives (ref B),although Anupong ought to
have suggested this privately rather than publicly. Abhisit
acknowledged that some PPP figures expressed concern that
royalists would take advantage of House dissolution to impede
new elections and impose rule by an ad hoc council (a
contingency not provided for by the Constitution),but he
dismissed this scenario as "crazy," "rubbish," and
"ridiculous." (Comment: We are not as quick to dismiss this
prospect; a leading Privy Councilor told the Ambassador that
he and other senior royalists hoped to bring about rule by
such a council -- ref D. End Comment.)

NOT MANEUVERING FOR PM-SHIP (YET)
--------------


6. (C) Appearing genuinely pessimistic, Abhisit denied that
he would seek to build majority support in the House for his
own potential candidacy as Prime Minister. (Note: Abhisit
formally became a candidate for PM after then-Prime Minister
Samak Sundaravej was forced out of office in September. End
Note.) Abhisit said he might be open to talks with other
parties' faction leaders if they were to approach him, but it
would be inappropriate for him to go courting their support.
He said he would watch carefully for signs of disunity among
PPP figures, noting the pace at which they would move to the
Puea Thai party, which pro-Thaksin figures formed as a backup
vehicle in the event of PPP dissolution.


7. (C) Note: On December 1, a senior PPP figure close to
Thaksin predicted confidently to us that all PPP MPs would
move to Puea Thai; it would be too difficult for any of them
to win reelection in the North or Northeast if they were to
appear publicly at odds with Thaksin, he said. Somewhat in
contrast, a PPP MP associated with Buriram politician Newin
Chidchob told us December 2 that Newin had told his faction
members December 1 that, while the government needed to be
formed within 15 days, they had 60 days under the
Constitution to join a new party and therefore did not need
to rush to join Puea Thai before the formation of a new
government.


8. (C) Abhisit dismissed the possibility of a "national unity
government" consisting of all political parties. He said
that such a government could only succeed if all parties
involved wanted it -- a scenario he clearly doubted. He said
the best course of action was to "return power to the people"
through new elections.

PAD UNLIKELY TO STOP IF THAKSIN RETAINS INFLUENCE
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Abhisit predicted that the imminent Constitutional
Court dissolution of PPP would not prompt the anti-government
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) to stop its protests at
Bangkok's airports. The PAD's fundamental grievance was that
the government was serving the interests of former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and the PAD would continue to
demonstrate against any successor to Somchai who appeared
aligned with Thaksin.


10. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the USG had sought not
to take any public stance that appeared in favor of one side
or another in the current polarized environment, but the PAD
seizure of the airports clearly contravened Thai laws and
international conventions, and this move had generated
legitimate concerns by the international community. The
Ambassador asked whether Abhisit had considered imposing any
sanction on DP MP Somkiat Pongpaiboon, one of the PAD
co-leaders. Abhisit said that, because of Somkiat's
preoccupation with the current crisis, it was difficult for
him to speak with Somkiat, but the last time that they had
spoken, Abhisit had said Somkiat should "think about
resigning" from the party.

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THAKSIN AND THE REDSHIRTS
--------------


11. (C) Abhisit noted pessimistically that PAD's seizure of
the airports had set a very negative precedent that would now
be included in both sides' playbooks for years to come. He
said that he was not willing to rule out the vague, dire
predictions from some quarters that Thailand would fall into
a state of civil war. That said, he had been surprised by
the relatively low strength of the pro-government "redshirt"
activists in recent days. He explained the low turnout by
claiming Newin Chidchob had not yet thrown his weight behind
their efforts -- if Newin were involved, the protests would
be larger and better organized. (Note: Separately, a PPP MP
associated with Newin told us that the latest round of
redshirt protests was organized by Thaksin loyalist and
former House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairath, and that Newin
would send his people into the streets only if a coup
occurred. End Note.)


12. (C) Abhisit claimed with conviction that Thaksin was
behind the recent bombing of PAD rally sites. (Note: On the
night of December 1, an explosion at Bangkok's Don Muang
(domestic) airport killed one PAD protestor and injured more
than 20 others. The press reported allegations that this and
other explosions were due to M-79 grenades fired at
PAD-occupied venues. End Note.) Abhisit claimed the modus
operandi of the attacks showed they were not the work of
amateurs; he suspected Thaksin had paid an unnamed General to
carry out the attacks, and he observed that, because Thaksin
was overseas, he could be more aggressive in his tactics
without risking harm to himself.


13. (C) Thaksin would welcome a coup d'etat, Abhisit claimed.
Recent events had shown how difficult it would be for
Thaksin to secure amnesty and avoid conviction in his
remaining court cases. Thaksin's best chance was for chaos
to erupt, enabling him to overturn the existing legal
framework. If the military were to launch a coup, Thaksin
could lead a countercoup and position himself as a champion
of democracy. Abhisit claimed that Thaksin and his proxies
would not go so far as to crack down on the PAD in order to
provoke a coup, however, because it was important for the
pro-Thaksin side to retain an appearance of victimization.


14. (C) Comment: We are highly skeptical of the argument that
Thaksin favors a military coup. Thaksin has told the
Ambassador that he was lobbying against a coup (ref E);
Thaksin ally Yongyuth told the Ambassador that he feared for
his life in the event of a coup (ref C); we see no basis to
believe that pro-Thaksin figures can prevail in a countercoup
against the military, which overall remains strongly loyal to
the King. End Comment.

THE KING'S ROLE
--------------


15. (C) Abhisit remarked that King Bhumibol was in a very
difficult position. In years past, the King had remained
above the fray and was respected by both sides in a social
conflict. Now, however, the pro-Thaksin side was trying
actively to make the monarchy appear as though it was a
biased participant in the current crisis. When asked whether
the King might be able to bring about a peaceful resolution
of the current standoff, Abhisit said the King might be able
to make a general appeal to the nation, but any specific
proposal would entail a "huge risk" to the monarchy, which
would lose prestige if the King's advice were to be ignored.
When asked whether the absence of the King's intervention at
a time of crisis would also undermine the institution, by
raising questions about its continued utility, Korn scoffed
at the notion; Abhisit replied simply: "You can already read
comments raising that question posted on the BBC website."

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JOHN