Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3504
2008-11-28 12:31:00
SECRET
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

STALEMATE, LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT: BANGKOK AIRPORTS

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC CASC TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1554
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #3504/01 3331231
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281231Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5228
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6550
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1213
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5092
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9237
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1799
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5912
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003504 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC CASC TH
SUBJECT: STALEMATE, LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT: BANGKOK AIRPORTS
REMAIN SHUT, THAI PRIME MINISTER DECLARES EMERGENCY

REF: OSC REPORT SEP20081127042008 (SOMCHAI'S SPEECH)

BANGKOK 00003504 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003504

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC CASC TH
SUBJECT: STALEMATE, LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT: BANGKOK AIRPORTS
REMAIN SHUT, THAI PRIME MINISTER DECLARES EMERGENCY

REF: OSC REPORT SEP20081127042008 (SOMCHAI'S SPEECH)

BANGKOK 00003504 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Bangkok's international and domestic airports remain
closed as of COB November 28 due to continuing
anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
protests, with no clear path out of the stalemate in the
offing. Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat on November 27
declared a state of emergency covering the airports and gave
police officials authority in the matter, but police plans
are unclear. PM Somchai fired police chief Patcharawat late
November 28, leading to speculation he wanted somone who
would take action. Ambassador engaged two leading Privy
Councilors about the possibility of King Bhumibol's
intervention in the national interest, but they rejected the
option and vowed to "protect" him from becoming involved in
the political crisis; as in the past, the King would only
intervene after significant bloodshed. Ambassador and other
mission officials continue to stress privately USG opposition
to a coup. The MFA and Tourism Ministry plan to assist
stranded foreigners. Thailand may not host the mid-December
ASEAN Summit as planned. The Embassy has expanded staffing
outside of regular working hours in order to field calls from
inconvenienced Amcits. Septels will report on Ambassador's
late November 28 meeting with deputy RTA Commander Jiradej
and the economic impact of the airport closures.


2. (C) Comment: The best, though least likely option, would
be a peaceful resolution of the airport occupation through
voluntary PAD departure so as to avoid damage to the airport
that might further hinder operations. Post recommends
issuing a statement condemning the PAD's occupation of the
airports and urging the PAD to walk away peacefully;
suggested text has been emailed to EAP/MLS and EAP/P. As of
early evening November 28, the authorities have not moved to
forcibly evict protestors from the airports. We believe the

police are following standard procedures and are starting
with an attempted negotiation before escalating to the use of
force. PAD leaders have committed themselves publicly to
bringing down the current government; some PAD supporters are
armed, and there is a widespread sense that the police will
not be able to clear the protest sites easily. Both
politicians and security officials appear to hope to avoid
responsibility for the deaths or injuries that could ensue if
the police move forcefully against the PAD. It is difficult
to predict how various key actors will react as this crisis
deepens. End Summary and Comment.

PM DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY, SACKS POLICE CHIEF
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Faced with continuing People's Alliance for Democracy
(PAD) protests that have closed Bangkok's international and
domestic airports, Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat on the
night of November 27 announced a limited state of emergency
(ref OSC report),in accordance with the provisions of
Thailand's 2005 Emergency Decree. The state of emergency
applies only to the vicinities of the airports, not to the
entire Bangkok metropolitan area. Stressing the economic
impact of the airport closures, Somchai announced that he had
placed Minister of Interior Kowit Wattana, former
Commissioner of the Royal Thai Police, in overall charge of
the situation; other police commanders would be responsible
for the airports, and they would receive assistance from
elements of the Air Force and Navy.


4. (SBU) Note: Somchai sacked National Police chief
Patcharawat Wongsuwan late on November 28, the police
spokesman confirmed to us. Details are not yet available.
However, in the run-up to the October 7 police clearance
operation against a PAD blockade of parliament, sparking a
day of violence that left two dead and hundreds injured, PM
Somchai reportedly had to order Patcharawat to conduct the

BANGKOK 00003504 002.2 OF 004


clearance operation or face dismissal. That may suggest
Patcharawat was resisting carrying out a similar clearance
operation at the airports, and Somchai wanted someone who
would. Police sources indicated to us early November 28 that
they felt they lacked the capacity to conduct the operations.

NO WAY OUT? PAD DEFIANT; KING NOT IN PLAY
--------------


5. (U) PAD leader Chamlong told supporters at an airport
stage November 28 that an important person (phu jai in Thai)
had asked him to stop the protest, but that he had replied it
was too late to do so, for the nation's sake. Chamlong vowed
that the PAD occupation of the airports would continue until
Somchai stepped down and warned of a massive uprising by PAD
supporters if core leaders were arrested. A fellow leader
acknowledged additional "lightly armed" guards were
reinforcing PAD presence at the two airports in anticipation
of police action. Several trucks bearing a medical logo/red
cross were caught on video unloading weapons at Suwannaphum
airport late November 28.


6. (S) At this point, perhaps the best option for a
non-violent, peaceful resolution of the current crises, both
airport occupation and political stalemate, would be for the
Thai King to intervene. Such extraordinary intervention,
technically outside the constitution, has happened twice
before in the King's 62 year reign: in 1973 and 1992. With
this in mind, Ambassador separately engaged the two most
politically active Privy Councilors November 28, Privy
Council Chair Prem Titsulanonda and ACM Siddhi Savetsila,
suggesting that the King's intervention now could prevent
bloodshed and resolve the crisis in the national interest.


7. (S) Both Prem and Siddhi said such intervention would not
happen, and that they would act to protect the King from
being dragged into the political crisis. Prem stated that
the King could intervene after bloodshed occurred, but not
prior. Prem lamented the stalemates -- between the PAD and
government, and the government and military -- but did not
offer any solutions. Both circled back time and time again
to Thaksin; the real problem in this crisis was not the PAD
and the airport occupation, but Thaksin, who would not
admit/accept his guilt, and would use every resource at his
disposal to fight to the end. Prem said that for the King's
intervention to be effective, as it was in 1992, Thaksin and
Chamlong needed to be in the room; Somchai and Chamlong would
not solve the matter.


8. (S) Prem in particular seemed crestfallen by Ambassador's
depiction of the international mood vis-a-vis the PAD and the
airport occupation, and the explanation of how actions by the
PAD, which claims to act in defense of the monarchy, were
actually actively undermining the monarchy's standing at a
critical moment. Prem countered that it was Thaksin who was
damaging the monarchy.


9. (C) Siddhi echoed the same themes, while acknowledging
that a Privy Council meeting November 26 concluded that the
situation would worsen; they feared bloodshed, particularly
if the pro-Thaksin redshirts swung into action. Time worked
against the PAD, said Siddhi. The best option would be for
the PAD to abandon the airports and return to Government
House, but he was not optimistic that they would do so.
Siddhi thought it possible that the Constitutional Court
might rule to dissolve Somchai's ruling People's Power Party
(PPP) December 2-3, which would offer a way out. Prem,
however, suggested the Court wished to call several more
witnesses, and that a decision was not imminent.

COUP RUMORS FLY, BUT REMAIN RUMINT
--------------


10. (C) Throughout November 27, Embassy contacts from various
sectors conveyed to us rumors of an impending coup, with
conventional wisdom holding that the Army would most likely
move against the government if Somchai were to remove General

BANGKOK 00003504 003.2 OF 004


Anupong Paojinda from his position as Army Commander. The
Ambassador spoke on November 27 with former Defense Ministry
Permanent Secretary General (ret) Winai Phattiyakul, a player
in the 2006 coup; Winai, like other high-level contacts,
believed it necessary to resolve the airport situation
quickly, but he readily agreed when the Ambassador stressed
that the Army should not respond to the crisis by launching a
coup. Other Embassy officials made the same point with
military and civilian contacts. Colonel Saranyu
Viriyavejakul, Anupong's Aide-de-Camp, repeatedly assured us
that the Army was neither launching a coup nor seeking to
intimidate the government, and that Army leaders continued to
conduct their routine affairs. In his public address on the
night of November 27, Somchai emphasized that the Army had
done nothing out of the ordinary.


11. (C) The Ambassador also stressed the undesirability of a
coup in phone conversations on November 27 with Arsa Sarasin
(King Bhumibol's Principal Private Secretary) and MFA
Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul. Both promised to
forward the Ambassador's views to the relevant authorities.
Arsa noted that the PAD was trying ardently to provoke a coup
that would lead to the formation of a new government that
would include PAD figures. Arsa claimed not to know the
King's views on the situation, but he said the King could not
intervene in a situation where he might be seen as supporting
one social group over another.


12. (SBU) A spokesman for General Anupong has stressed
publicly that the Army has been assigned only a supporting
role in responding to the crisis and would not deploy troops
in any crowd dispersing action, which have been left to the
police. General Anupong has stressed that troops will show
restraint in all activities, all actions must comply with the
rule of law and principles of democracy, and conflict must be
resolved by the political leadership, not the military.

LACK OF TOURISM ASSISTANCE BOTHERS DIPCORPS
--------------


13. (SBU) Foreign Minister Somphong Amornwiwat -- stranded in
Frankfurt by the airport closures -- told the Ambassador by
phone November 27 that the RTG planned to restore law and
order by opening the airport soon, but did not know if the
RTG had a plan. A late November 27 MFA briefing for the
diplomatic corps attended by Ambassador and poloff delivered
the same pledge. The MFA was contemplating a plan to provide
a 2,000 Baht (approximately 60 USD) daily food and lodging
allowance for stranded travelers. The RTG was contemplating
opening the Utapao Naval Air Station airfield for commercial
flights normally scheduled for Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi
airport. Some commercial flights operated out of Utapao
November 28 (Comment: Utapao, 140 kilometers from Bangkok,
lacks the facilities to substitute for Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi
airport for large scale commercial operations. End Comment.)


14. (SBU) At the briefing, numerous irate European
Ambassadors expressed deep frustration with the RTG. Citing
the increasing number of Europeans stranded in Thailand, the
diplomats angrily urged the MFA to devise a plan to help
foreigners and encouraged the RTG to retake Bangkok's
airports by force if necessary. The Japanese Ambassador,
also agitated, noted that there were 22 daily flights
scheduled from Bangkok to Japan, and every day that the
airport remained closed resulted in approximately 2-3,000
additional stranded Japanese citizens. (note: the Minister
of Tourism has convened a briefing at 1830 November 28 to
clarify what the RTG will do for stranded tourists).


15. (C) Following the briefing, the Ambassador talked with
Virasakdi Futrakul, who had just received a demarche from the
EU Troika. Virasakdi explained that the EU diplomats had
stressed that the EU would react very negatively to a coup,
including by revoking visas of the Thai military leadership.
Virasakdi said the Europeans had emphasized that using force
to clear protestors from the airport would be less damaging
to Thailand's reputation than launching a coup. Virasakdi

BANGKOK 00003504 004.2 OF 004


told the Ambassador that he passed along the Europeans' views
to Army Commander Anupong.


16. (SBU) There also has been public speculation that the RTG
will postpone or cancel its plan to host the December 15-18
ASEAN Summit. Foreign Minister Somphong told Ambassador that
he favored postponement, but he had not yet proposed this to
the Prime Minister. (Note: The RTG had already shifted the
summit's venue from Bangkok to Chiang Mai, in order to
minimize the impact of anti-government protests. End Note.)

SHOTS FIRED, VIGILANTE KILLING
--------------


17. (SBU) There continue to be press reports of small
explosions and gunfire in the vicinity of PAD demonstrations.
There have been no reports of people being injured in these
incidents in the last 24 hours. The pro-government United
Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) warned late
November 28 that if security forces did not move to clear the
airport by midnight, the UDD might take matters into their
own hands November 29. A red mob did exactly that the
evening of November 26 in Chiang Mai, pulling the father of a
radio station manager sympathetic to the PAD out of his car
in front of the station, beating him and then shooting him.

CONSULAR ASSISTANCE
--------------


18. (U) The Consular section continues to assist stranded
American citizens. The ACS section will be staffed 7 AM to 7
PM both Saturday and Sunday to field calls.
JOHN