Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3492
2008-11-26 11:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

MOB SHUTS MAIN BANGKOK AIRPORT, ARMY CHIEF URGES

Tags:  PGOV ASEC CASC TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBK #3492/01 3311118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261118Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5213
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6547
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1208
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5089
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9234
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1796
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5908
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003492 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC CASC TH
SUBJECT: MOB SHUTS MAIN BANGKOK AIRPORT, ARMY CHIEF URGES
NEW ELECTIONS

REF: A. BANGKOK 3454 (DEMO STARTS STRONG)

B. BANGKOK 3143 (SOMCHAI DECLINES TO RESIGN)

C. BANGKOK 2610 (EMERGENCY DECREE INVOKED)

BANGKOK 00003492 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003492

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC CASC TH
SUBJECT: MOB SHUTS MAIN BANGKOK AIRPORT, ARMY CHIEF URGES
NEW ELECTIONS

REF: A. BANGKOK 3454 (DEMO STARTS STRONG)

B. BANGKOK 3143 (SOMCHAI DECLINES TO RESIGN)

C. BANGKOK 2610 (EMERGENCY DECREE INVOKED)

BANGKOK 00003492 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Thousands of anti-government People's Alliance for
Democracy (PAD) protestors swarmed into Bangkok's
Suvarnabhumi international airport on the night of November
25, forcing the airport's closure, which continues as of COB
November 26. The Army Commander led a news conference late
in the day November 26, ruling out a coup but calling for
Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat to dissolve the parliament
in order to resolve the political crisis and for the PAD to
end its airport siege. King Bhumibol's Principal Private
Secretary told the Ambassador that the King would not
intervene in the PAD-RTG standoff; the military would not
launch a coup; a compromise could emerge; and he urged that
the USG not/not issue any statements on the matter. The
Ambassador also weighed in with a top MFA official and an
influential confidante of the Queen on the need for a
political solution; the MFA PermSec said MFA was trying to
assist foreigners stranded by the airport closure. PM
Somchai is expected to return to Thailand after 1900 Thai
time and convene a Cabinet meeting. Initial reaction from
both the PAD and government supporters to Anupong's
suggestion has been negative. Post's suggested press
guidance, for use on an if-asked basis, is in para 10.


2. (C) Comment: Leaders of the PAD publicly committed
themselves to bringing down the current government through
the mass action that began on November 24 (ref A). The PAD's
disruption of international airport operations is much more
significant than the four month-long occupation of the
Government House compound, given the importance of
international tourism to the Thai economy. The Army
Commander's public recommendation is the second time in two
months he has pushed Somchai to resign or dissolve the house
(ref B). Based on Somchai's refusal to follow Anupong's
suggestion in October, we suspect the governing party and its

sympathizers will resist this time as well and express
outrage at Anupong's pressure, although Anupong insisted the
proposal he raised is constitutional and represents the only
way out of the crisis. For its part, PAD leaders flatly
rejected Anupong's proposal for house dissolution, since it
would lead to new elections that pro-Thaksin parties likely
would win, yet again. End Summary and Comment.

KING'S SECRETARY HOPES FOR COMPROMISE
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador discussed the political situation by
phone with Arsa Sarasin, King Bhumibol's Principal Private
Secretary, on November 26, prior to Army Commander Anupong
Paojinda's press conference. Arsa said the King would not
intervene in the ongoing political standoff between the PAD
and the RTG. Arsa expected that Thai business leaders would
make an appeal for calm and for the reopening of Suvarnabhumi
airport; he believed that the RTG and PAD would be able to
reach some sort of compromise after Prime Minister Somchai
Wongsawat's return to Thailand from the APEC summit in Peru.


4. (C) In a separate call, Piya Malakul, a PAD supporter with
close ties to Queen Sirikit, told the Ambassador that he
believed the RTG and the PAD could reach a political
solution, but they would make no progress until after
Somchai's return. (Somchai was scheduled to return in the
late afternoon or evening of November 26, but it is unclear
when or where Somchai's flight will land.)

NO COUP...
--------------


5. (C) Arsa Sarasin assured the Ambassador that the military

BANGKOK 00003492 002.2 OF 003


would not launch a coup. Embassy military officers have
received similar assurances at the working level, and Anupong
reiterated this point several times in his news conference.
The Ambassador received a call in the early afternoon of
November 26 from MFA Permanent Secretary Virsakdi Futrakul,
moments before a meeting convened by Army Commander Anupong
with various senior RTG officials and other prominent
civilians. Virasakdi sought the Ambassador's views; the
Ambassador stressed that the Army should not launch a coup;
the RTG had various legal and political tools at its
disposal, and the PAD protests represented a political
problem that should be met with a political solution.
Virasakdi acknowledged the Ambassador's views and speculated
that Somchai likely would consider a range of options for
resolving the current standoff.

... JUST A HEAVY-HANDED SUGGESTION
--------------


6. (SBU) Anupong convened a three-hour Monitoring Committee
for the Situation/Unrest in Bangkok mid-afternoon which
involved all Ministry PermSecs, leading business
organizations/leaders, rectors of Thai universities, and
other top civilians. After the meeting concluded, Anupong
led a press conference. He suggested that the political
crisis be resolved by the Prime Minister dissolving
parliament, with new elections to take place per
constitutional mechanisms. Anupong also called for the PAD
to end its protests. Anupong emphasized that his suggestion
was constitutional, represented the only way out of the
crisis, and was in the country's best interests. Anupong
ruled out a coup and also ruled out the use of force against
protestors; he indicated, however, that, should the Prime
Minister reject this suggestion, various elements of the RTG
would cease to recognize the legitimacy of the Somchai
administration. He implied Somchai should comply within one
week.

AIRPORT SHUT DOWN
--------------


7. (SBU) Anupong's action came against the backdrop of a PAD
takeover of Bangkok Suvarnabhumi international airport on the
night of November 25, resulting in the airport's closure.
With several thousand demonstrators still at the facility on
November 26, the airport remained closed; PAD said publicly
Somchai must resign before the airport can reopen. MFA
Permanent Secretary Virasakdi told the Ambassador that the
MFA was working to assist Americans and other foreigners
stranded in Thailand by the airport's closure. (note: PAD
protestors also remain at Bangkok's Don Muang domestic
airport; some international flights have landed there, and
domestic flights are operating normally, but there are no
international departures from Don Muang. Our ACS section
will be staffed from 0700-1900 on the Thanksgiving holiday in
order to continue to assist stranded U.S. travelers).


8. (SBU) Police publicly said the demonstrators had to leave
Suvarnabhumi by noon on November 26, but they refrained from
taking action immediately on the expiration of that deadline.
Security officials have told us that the police would not
clear the airport of demonstrators without an order to do so
from the Prime Minister. Some of our contacts believe
Somchai will declare a state of emergency under the 2005
Emergency Decree in order to respond to the demonstrations,
though it is not clear how Somchai will react to Anupong's
suggestions.


8. (C) Comment: Declaring a state of emergency may streamline
the exercise of government authority and permit officials to
curtail certain freedoms, but it depends on how it is
implemented. In September, then-Prime Minister Samak
Sundaravej responded to PAD protests by declaring a state of
emergency (ref C),with little visible effect. Post has
e-mailed the text of the 2005 Emergency Decree to EAP/MLS.
End Comment.


BANGKOK 00003492 003.2 OF 003


EXPLOSIONS AND SCUFFLES
--------------


9. (SBU) There have been various reports of minor
disturbances in Bangkok in connection with the PAD's
activities:

- A scuffle between PAD sympathizers and pro-government
people broke out on the night of November 25 on
Vipawadee-Rangsit road in Bangkok, with up to 11 people
injured.

- Small explosive devices detonated in at least three venues
(Vipawadee-Rangsit road, Rama V road, and near Suvarnabhumi
airport) in the pre-dawn hours of November 26, injuring
several people. There were also reports of gunfire at those
venues.

- The Ministry of Public Health announced publicly at mid-day
on November 26 that approximately 20 people had been injured
in connection with the PAD's demonstrations, and
approximately five remained hospitalized.

- A Thai staff member working for the National Democratic
Institute was robbed after PAD guards boarded a bus near Don
Muang airport on the night of November 24; the guards
allegedly took passengers' food and money.

USG PUBLIC STATEMENTS
--------------


10. (C) Arsa Sarasin stated emphatically to the Ambassador
that any USG public statements on Thailand's turmoil would be
"extremely unhelpful." Recognizing the limitations on
Washington officials' ability to avoid comment, we recommend
the following guidance (if not overtaken by further
developments) be used on an if-asked basis:

Q: What is your view on the situation in Thailand?

A: We continue to monitor carefully the situation in
Thailand. We are concerned about reports of violence between
pro- and anti-government groups in recent weeks. We
understand that these are isolated incidents, however, and
that most demonstrations have been non-violent, and that the
authorities are using peaceful means to try to resolve the
disruptions that have occurred.

Q: Are you concerned about the safety of American citizens?

A: I would refer you to the notices published online by the
Embassy in Bangkok and on the State Department website; we
urge American citizens to avoid the areas of demonstrations.

Q: The protestors are calling for the downfall of the
government, which took office after an election that you said
"was conducted in a free and fair manner." Are you willing
to condemn the protestors? Is the Army Commander's call for
new elections a form of a coup?

A: We are not in a position to comment on the political
agenda of the demonstrators, or the proposals for how to
respond to the crisis. This is an issue for the Thais to
resolve. We would like to see events in Thailand proceed
peacefully and in accordance with the constitution and the
rule of law.
JOHN