Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3426
2008-11-20 10:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

LETHAL EXPLOSION AT BANGKOK PROTEST SITE KILLS ONE

Tags:  PGOV ASEC TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5128
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6529
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1200
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003426 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC TH
SUBJECT: LETHAL EXPLOSION AT BANGKOK PROTEST SITE KILLS ONE

REF: A. BANGKOK 3386 (THAKSIN'S DIVORCE)

B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN ADDRESSES RALLY)

C. BANGKOK 3255 (GRENADE ATTACKS)

D. BANGKOK 3154 (EX-COP THREATENS)

E. BANGKOK 3032 (CRISIS RETURNS)

F. 07 BANGKOK 3625 (BACKGROUND ON PALLOP)

G. 07 BANGKOK 15 (ASCRIBING BOMBINGS)

H. BANGKOK 3425

BANGKOK 00003426 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003426

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC TH
SUBJECT: LETHAL EXPLOSION AT BANGKOK PROTEST SITE KILLS ONE

REF: A. BANGKOK 3386 (THAKSIN'S DIVORCE)

B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN ADDRESSES RALLY)

C. BANGKOK 3255 (GRENADE ATTACKS)

D. BANGKOK 3154 (EX-COP THREATENS)

E. BANGKOK 3032 (CRISIS RETURNS)

F. 07 BANGKOK 3625 (BACKGROUND ON PALLOP)

G. 07 BANGKOK 15 (ASCRIBING BOMBINGS)

H. BANGKOK 3425

BANGKOK 00003426 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) A pre-dawn explosion at the Government House compound
on November 20 killed an anti-government protestor and
wounded at least 20 others. The explosion is the latest in a
long string of politically motivated bombings in Thailand,
although some of the earlier attacks appeared primarily
symbolic. It is unclear whether the perpetrators of this
bombing intended their device to be lethal, but both pro- and
anti-government figures have been arming and spoiling for a
fight. Some Thais suspect that former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra is stoking political tensions, which appear likely
to increase as a result of this most recent attack.


2. (C) Comment: Bangkok enjoyed a pause in political strife
during the mourning period associated with the late Princess
Galyani Vadhana's cremation rites, which concluded November

19. The lethal November 20 bombing clearly marks the end of
that respite. A renewed cycle of protests and
counter-protests could distract from the celebrations
surrounding the King's December 5 birthday, Thailand's
National Day, which customarily becomes the focus of public
attention. End Summary and Comment.

EARLY MORNING EXPLOSION
--------------


3. (SBU) An explosive device detonated at the Government
House compound in the pre-dawn hours of November 20, killing
one person and wounding at least 20 others. The only visible
sign of the explosion during a mid-afternoon walkthrough of
the Government House compound was a gash in the overhead
canvas, reportedly made as the device fell to the ground.
The anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
protestors, who took over the official seat of government on
August 26, continue to occupy the Government House compound.



4. (SBU) A Royal Thai Police official told ARSO that the
explosive device was an augmented "flash-bang" grenade (see
Ref H for more details). PAD personnel at Government House
did not allow police investigators to access the scene,
however; relations between the PAD and police have been
particularly strained since the October 7 violence.

PRECEDENTS AND ESCALATION
--------------


5. (C) As detailed in ref G, numerous small-scale bombings in
Bangkok took place during the Thaksin administration. The
perpetrators, who invariably remain unidentified, seem to use
such attacks to send a political message. Several such
bombings took place during the Surayud administration, with
the December 31, 2006 bombings (ref G) being by far the most
lethal and notable. In late October, small explosive devices
detonated at the homes of two royalist judges (ref C).
(Note: these types of bombings in Bangkok appear unconnected
to the insurgency in southern Thailand, although some of the
devices used in Bangkok and in the South have been similar.)


6. (SBU) Incidents of bombings and reports of armed PAD
personnel increased noticeably in the wake of October 7
violence between police and PAD supporters, who used firearms
and improvised weapons in the clashes (ref E). According to
media reports, from October 30 through November 19, six small
bombs exploded in or around the Government House compound,
causing some injuries to PAD suporters but no fatalities.

BANGKOK 00003426 002.2 OF 002


During the same period, there have been three shooting
incidents, either by or at PAD guards (see ref B, for
example). There also have been several incidents in which
the police arrested PAD sympathizers for carrying firearms or
explosives.

POLITICAL FIGURES THREATENING, RALLYING
--------------


7. (SBU) Pro-government figures have recently intensified
their warnings to their opponents. Leaders of the United
Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) have warned
that they will fight against any soldiers who launch a coup.
A former high-ranking police officer threatened to forcibly
evict PAD from Government House (ref D). Most recently,
Major General Khattiya "Sae Daeng" Sawatdiphon -- a rare
high-ranking soldier who speaks out aggressively on behalf of
the current pro-Thaksin administration, in defiance of the
military command's position to stay out of politics (ref D)
-- predicted ominously that further bombings of the
PAD-occupied compound would take place after the funeral
rites of Princess Galyani if PAD refused to decamp (the final
ceremonies ended November 19). Khattiya also made offhand
threatening remarks about the possible "disappearance" or
mistreatment in custody of the PAD co-leaders, according to
media reports.


8. (SBU) Khattiya has publicly associated himself with
retired General Pallop (phonetic: Panlop) Pinmanee -- a
self-described assassin (ref F) who in the fall of 2006
appeared to be one of the most ardent foes of then-Prime
Minister Thaksin. In a stunning reversal, Pallop recently
traveled abroad to play golf with Thaksin; after returning to
Thailand, he adopted a belligerent tone toward the PAD,
noting that, were it up to him, he would use authorities in
the Internal Security Act to clear the PAD from Government
House.


9. (C) The PAD has focused its concerns on former Prime
Minister Thaksin, and both PAD sympathizers and relatively
neutral Thais may well surmise that Thaksin, or allies trying
to further his interests, orchestrated the November 20 and
previous attacks, no matter who is actually behind them. As
reported in ref A, Thaksin is currently adrift (in both
geographic and marital terms) and appears increasingly
determined to shape Thai political developments. He has
promised to address by phone a large rally of his supporters
on December 13. For its part, PAD leaders have called for a
large rally of their own November 23 to protest the November
20 attack and efforts to re-write the constitution.
JOHN