THAILAND IN TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003289

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KJUS TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND IN TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
POLARIZATION LIKELY TO PERSIST

REF: A. BANGKOK 3255 (GRENADE ATTACKS)

B. BANGKOK 3251 (ARMY ON SIDELINES)

C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPE FOR MEDIATION)

D. BANGKOK 3209 (SUPREME COMMANDER)

E. BANGKOK 3192 (PRIVY COUNCILORS: NO COUP)

F. BANGKOK 3080 (QUEEN SUPPORTS PROTESTS)

G. BANGKOK 3059 (SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION)

BANGKOK 00003289 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Immediate concerns of a threat of a coup d'etat in
Thailand have ebbed for now, but we see no viable course of
action that appears likely in the near term to heal the deep
political divisions in contemporary Thai society and the body
politic. There are street fighters on both sides willing to
engage in violence which could prove an unpredictable trigger
for military intervention, despite Army Commander Anupong's
avowed refusal to bring the army back into politics after the
2006 coup. The interests of the royalist elite and urban
middle class seem diametrically opposed to those of former
Prime Minister Thaksin and his allies, including upcountry
rural dwellers. Queen Sirikit, departing from the example
set by King Bhumibol over decades, has dragged an ostensibly
apolitical monarchy into the political fray, to the
institution's probable future detriment.


2. (C) At the same time that executive power has been
weakened in a reversion to pre-Thaksin patterns, the
judiciary seems increasingly politicized. The status quo
appears unstable, in part because of the likelihood that the
People's Power Party will soon be dissolved. But any
follow-on pro-Thaksin party would almost certainly command a
plurality, if not majority, were new elections to be held,
preserving the current political equilibrium. Steps the two
sides might take to improve their lot -- including forming a
new administration, dissolving the House of
Representatives/new elections, or launching a coup -- all
seem unlikely to resolve the current tension. The political
turmoil may well persist for years, until the passing of the
King and the subsequent redefinition of the place of the
monarchy in 21st century Thailand. The Ambassador continues
to stress to all key players the negative ramifications of a
coup and the need for all parties to avoid violence and
respect democratic norms. End Summary and Comment.

THAILAND POLARIZED, LOOKING FORWARD
--------------


3. (C) The battle lines in Thailand's political environment
are clearly drawn, even if there are multiple actors in play.
However, reductionist arguments that the crisis is about
"the King vs. Thaksin" are overly simplified; neither camp
controls all who claim allegiance to each, and key secondary
figures in both camps have differing agendas. While all
countries have their unique dynamics--Thailand's revolves
around the institution of monarchy--Thailand nevertheless is
experiencing a version of a scenario that has played out in
other East Asian countries: economic growth outstripping the
pace of democratic institutional maturation, and new groups
challenging the prerogatives of old elites.


4. (C) Although both sides in this polarized society have
independent-minded and middle-class participants, former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra provides direction and, we
assume with confidence, financing for his allies, relying on
a loyal electorate in the northeast and north of Thailand
which benefited from his populist policies from 2001-06. The
Thaksin machine faces off against a mix of royalists, Bangkok
middle class, and southerners, with Queen Sirikit having
emerged as their champion, as King Bhumibol largely fades
from an active role. The two sides are competing for
influence and appear to believe, or fear, that the other will
use the political power it has to marginalize (if not
eliminate) the opposing side. They are positioning

BANGKOK 00003289 002.2 OF 004


themselves for what key actors on both sides freely admit to
us in private will be Thailand's moment of truth--royal
succession after the King passes away.

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT IN FLUX: WEAK EXECUTIVE, ACTIVIST COURT
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) This conflict comes at a time when the dynamics
between the three branches of government are in flux. The
terms of the 2007 Constitution and the banning of the most
talented 111 executives of Thai Rak Thai had the effect of
weakening the strong executive enshrined in the 1997
Constitution and realized in practice by Thaksin. Thai
politics have thus returned to the status quo ante: a weak
executive branch, based on fractious coalition politics often
focused more on feeding at the public trough than in
governing the country effectively. At the same time, the
Senate has become much more activist, with appointed Senators
in particular acting as a check against coalition attempts to
ram its agenda through the legislative branch.


6. (C) We have also seen in the last few years the
politicization of the judiciary. The 2007 Constitution,
drafted by selectees of the 2006 coup leaders, provided an
enhanced political role for the judiciary. (For example, top
judges, along with others, sit on a committee that selects
Senators for nearly half the Senate's seats.) Judges have
driven some major political developments of the past few
years, such as the annulment of the 2006 election, the
dissolution of the Thai Rak Thai party, and the expulsion
from office of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej. Thaksin and
his wife have both recently been convicted (for tax evasion
and improperly doing business with a state agency); Thaksin
allies have complained to us repeatedly that the judiciary is
biased against them. Perhaps in response to this perception,
or other political activism, two leading judges who appear to
be members of the royalist clique (ref C and E) were recently
targeted in bombings that appear not to have been intended to
kill, but to send threatening signals (ref A).

ENTER STREET POLITICS
--------------


7. (C) Another important relatively new trend is the rise of
politically-aligned informal groups with components seemingly
tailor-made for street fighting. The People's Alliance for
Democracy (PAD),which began as a peaceful protest movement
in 2006 to oust Thaksin, has for more than two months
illegally occupied Government House, the formal seat of
government, with far sharper tactics. It now deploys armed
guards and used firearms and other weapons in its October 7
clash with police at the parliament. On the other side, the
pro-Thaksin United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship
(UDD) has initiated clashes with PAD supporters, such as on
September 2, and is loosely coordinating with other informal
actors in planning (at least conceptually) how to fight Army
troops in the event of a coup. At the moment, these
quasi-militias seem under the control of the political
leaders, but their presence heightens the stakes for both
sides, and we do not rule out spontaneous actions by one
group or another leading to a spiral of violence.

SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK - FOUR SCENARIOS
--------------


8. (C) While Thailand's political environment is highly
dynamic, we can envision four main scenarios for near-term
developments, although none of them appears certain:

- STATUS QUO: The status quo, with Prime Minister Somchai
Wongsawat at the helm, appears untenable beyond the short
term of Princess Galyani's funeral (mid-November),the King's
Birthday (early December),and ASEAN Summits (mid-December).
Dissolution proceedings targeting the People's Power Party
(PPP) are moving forward, following the disqualification of a
PPP executive for election improprieties. Conventional
wisdom holds that the Constitutional Court will dissolve PPP

BANGKOK 00003289 003.2 OF 004


within a few months; such a step would strip all PPP
executives, including Somchai, of their political rights.
Since coming into office, Somchai's administration has been
focused on its own survival, and current circumstances appear
not to allow the RTG to undertake bold or long-term
initiatives. Most experts predict the status quo will only
hold until mid-December, after which something significant
will occur.

- NEW ADMINISTRATION: Whether because of PPP dissolution or
as a response to other developments, Somchai could leave
office and pave the way for the election of a new Prime
Minister by the House, without need for a new legislative
election; opposition Democrat Party deputy leader Kraisak
Choonhaven suggested to us October 30 that this option was
now more likely than house dissolution/new elections.
Because the constitution mandates that the Prime Minister be
a member of the House of Representatives, however, there is a
dwindling pool of talent from which Thaksin's allies can draw
in selecting a new leader, assuming (as we do) that the PPP
legislators would move largely en masse to a new political
party and maintain a cohesive governing coalition. We
believe the odds are low that a new administration would take
the form of a "government of national unity" or, by virtue of
its composition or policies, heal the divisions in society.

- HOUSE DISSOLUTION: The Prime Minister could dissolve the
House, presumably to renew a mandate for pro-Thaksin
legislators and to allow new figures to enter the parliament
and replenish the pro-Thaksin ranks, if PPP's current
leadership is barred from office. It is unclear whether a
pro-Thaksin party competing in a new election would fare
better or worse than PPP did in 2007, but the two sides in
the current environment both have large constituencies, and
neither appears ready to defer to the other based on election
results. We also have heard members of the pro-Thaksin camp
worry that they might not be able to arrange a new election
in a smooth fashion, as their opponents might see House
dissolution as providing an opportunity to upend the
political system. (The Constitution requires that elections
take place between 45 and 60 days after House dissolution.)

- COUP: We do not preclude the possibility of a military
coup, but recent events have indicated that Army Commander
Anupong Paojinda appears deeply reluctant to seize power.
The October 7 clash between police and PAD protesters
provided the Army with a pretext to launch a coup, and the
Army did not do so -- an encouraging sign. High-ranking
military contacts and Palace figures (refs B, D, and E) have
told the Ambassador repeatedly that the Army will not launch
a coup, but many others tell us another bout of significant
violence and bloodshed might force Anupong's hand. We
continue to stress the negative ramifications of a coup for
Thailand's domestic and international interests. The 2006
coup leaders proved unable to eradicate Thaksin's influence
in the year-plus that they held power, and we believe a coup
would severely exacerbate, rather than resolve, Thailand's
current problems. And, unlike in 2006, pro-Thaksin forces
are now vowing they would fight back against a coup, with
violence and sustained opposition.

MONARCHY POLITICIZED, FACING UNCERTAIN FUTURE
--------------


9. (C) In our last review of scenarios looking forward (ref
G),we included another: an extraordinary intervention by
King Bhumibol, as he did in 1973 and 1992, to stop bloodshed
and allow a deeply divided Thai society a time out to
recalibrate. Thais consistently claim publicly that the King
is and should be above politics, and he personally appears to
appreciate the boundaries of his limited role. However,
throughout his reign, others have sought to use the
institution of the monarchy for their own political purposes,
starting with Field Marshal/PM Sarit (1957-63). That is
again the case now, particularly with the PAD, but at a time
the King himself has withdrawn from public life for all but
the most important ceremonial functions. Therefore, we

BANGKOK 00003289 004.2 OF 004


believe this intervention scenario remains unlikely.


10. (C) Faced with a future without the revered monarch of
the past six decades, many royalists view Thaksin as posing
an existential threat to the monarchy, and some of them --
such as Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda -- became
vocal critics of his administration and targets of Thaksin's
allies. The anti-government PAD has consistently portrayed
itself as a defender of the monarchy, and a reasonable belief
by many Thais that important royalists support the PAD has
likely been critical in saving the group from harsher
treatment by the authorities--and the mainstream media--than
it has received to date. That may change in the wake of
several recent signals sent by two figures seen as close to
the King: Princess Sirindhorn in Connecticut October 9 stated
that the PAD was acting on its own behalf, not the
monarchy's; and Chairman of the King's Rajanukhrao Foundation
Disathorn Watcharothai told an October 29 seminar: "If you
love the King, go back home."


11. (C) In contrast, Queen Sirikit herself made a bold
political statement practically without precedent in
presiding over the funeral of a PAD supporter from humble
roots who died during the October 7 clash between PAD and the
police (ref F). Even some figures close to the Queen have
expressed their private unease at the overtly political act,
since it seems to erode the concept, which the King has long
sought to promote, of an apolitical monarchy. After the
Queen's funeral appearance, there was a notable increase in
public complaints about acts of lese majeste, with many
seemingly targeting the Queen; PPP-affiliated politicians
have expressed a combination of fear and loathing for the
Queen in private conversations with us in recent months.
Such politicization of the monarchy at this time appears to
create extra uncertainty around the eventual royal
succession, and it could well boomerang on royalists when the
time comes to redefine the role of the monarchy after the
King's passing. In the meantime, the Thai body politic will
continue to bubble.
JOHN