Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3255
2008-10-30 11:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAILAND,S UDD LEADERS DISMISS CONCERNS ABOUT

Tags:  PHUM PGOV KPAO TH 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301120Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4878
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6463
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9156
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5333
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5014
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5780
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003255 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, DRL, IO; NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND,S UDD LEADERS DISMISS CONCERNS ABOUT
NOVEMBER 1 RALLY; GRENADE ATTACKS ON PAD, JUDGES

REF: A. BANGKOK 3226 (THAKSIN ASSOCIATE)

B. BANGKOK 3192 (PRIVY COUNCILORS)

C. BANGKOK 3154 (PEACEFUL PROTEST)

D. BANGKOK 2856 (PAD DEFIANCE CONTINUES)

E. BANGKOK 6654 (ANTI-COUP SUICIDE)

BANGKOK 00003255 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003255

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, DRL, IO; NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND,S UDD LEADERS DISMISS CONCERNS ABOUT
NOVEMBER 1 RALLY; GRENADE ATTACKS ON PAD, JUDGES

REF: A. BANGKOK 3226 (THAKSIN ASSOCIATE)

B. BANGKOK 3192 (PRIVY COUNCILORS)

C. BANGKOK 3154 (PEACEFUL PROTEST)

D. BANGKOK 2856 (PAD DEFIANCE CONTINUES)

E. BANGKOK 6654 (ANTI-COUP SUICIDE)

BANGKOK 00003255 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Leaders of the pro-government United Front of
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) assured us that a major
UDD rally on November 1, at which former PM Thaksin is
expected to speak via phone, would be non-violent. A leading
UDD figure stressed UDD's role as the primary obstacle to
future coups. Another UDD leader expressed concern about
possible arrests of UDD leaders following the rally.
Opinions of other observers about the potential for violence
are mixed; some are concerned that the large crowd could move
beyond the control of UDD leaders, while others see the real
danger not from planned events like the UDD rally but in
unplanned clashes or incidents, such as the grenade attack
which injured ten security guards from the anti-government
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in the early hours of
October 30. A second small bomb exploded at a royalist
judge's house several hours earlier. The police have yet to
identify suspects in these incidents which, like many similar
politically-motivated attacks in years past, are likely to go
unsolved.


2. (C) Comment: The likelihood of violence at the November 1
rally appears slim, at least according to UDD leaders.
However, we do not rule out the possibility of violence if
UDD supporters were to encounter PAD protesters. The size of
the expected crowd at the November 1 rally at a suburban
sports stadium (organizers predict up to 100,000) offers the
potential for moving beyond the control of UDD leaders,
although street violence, insofar as it might prompt military
intervention against the government, does not appear to be in
the UDD's interest. Ambassador and other Embassy officials
continue to emphasize to contacts on all sides the importance
of demonstrations remaining peaceful. End Summary and

Comment.

UDD ORGANIZERS' PERSPECTIVE ON RALLY SECURITY
--------------


3. (C) A variety of UDD leaders and PPP-affiliated
politicians have told us in recent days that the high-profile
rally planned for November 1, at which ex-PM Thaksin is
expected to phone in, would be peaceful. While widely seen
as a UDD demonstration, the event is nominally organized as a
live version of the pro-government "Truth Today" television
program, though it will not be carried live on NBT. UDD
leader Charan Ditthaphichai told us October 29 that he
expected a crowd of as many as 100,000 UDD supporters at the
rally. Julapun Amornwiwat, a legislator from the People's
Power Party (and son of the Foreign Minister),emphasized to
us separately October 29 that the fundamental purpose of the
rally was to send a signal of mass support for the
government, in order to offset the extensive press coverage
of PAD demonstrations.


4. (C) We spoke on October 30 with Jakrapob Penkair, one of
the UDD's founders and leading organizers, to emphasize USG
interest in all political processes remaining non-violent.
Jakrapob assured us that the UDD's rally would be peaceful.
He said the UDD had moved the demonstration site to the
suburban stadium near Ramkhamhaeng University in order to be
distant from downtown sites used by the anti-government PAD.
UDD had ensured adequate space inside the stadium so that its
supporters would not mill about outside the venue, and had
arranged for security to be provided by approximately 800
police and 400 student "guards," who would help to maintain
order.


5. (C) Jakrapob claimed the UDD constituted a primary
obstacle to the military carrying out a coup. He said one of

BANGKOK 00003255 002.2 OF 003


the principal themes of the November 1 rally would be an
exhortation to the public to actively impede any coup
attempt. For example, speakers would explain to the crowd
that they should surround tanks on the street to block them
from moving forward. Separately, Poowanida Kunpalin, a
former legislator who co-founded the Thai Rak Thai party with
Thaksin, similarly told us on October 21 that the UDD aimed
to engage in large-scale activities primarily in order to
deter the military from launching a coup, by showing that
Thaksin loyalists were able to mobilize in large numbers in
Bangkok.


6. (C) We asked Jakrapob whether the UDD was coordinating its
activities with those of former top police official Salang
Bunnag or Major General Khattiya "Sae Daeng" Sawasdipol (see
ref C on their public statements). Jakrapob said the UDD did
not know these men's day-to-day activities, but there was
loose coordination among them. The separate (pro-Thaksin)
networks would need to work together in the event of an
actual or seemingly-imminent coup.


7. (C) UDD leader Charan brushed aside any discussion of
violence or possible coup d'etat as a result of the rally.
He claimed there would be no mass movement of the crowd,
because it would create disorder and the conditions for
military intervention. On the other hand, UDD was stoking
supporters' emotions, focusing attention on the second
anniversary of the suicide of a taxi driver who hanged
himself (ref E) in protest of the 2006 military coup. Charan
lauded the driver's dedication to us, flashing a thumbs-up
sign as he related the man was "prepared for death" in
support of his ideals.


8. (C) Charan expressed fear of mass arrests of UDD figures,
including himself, following the November 1 rally. He
worried that the Army would claim UDD leaders were insulting
the monarchy and violating lese majeste provisions of Thai
law. He alleged PAD was planning to send some of its
members, posing as UDD supporters, to infiltrate the UDD
gathering and distribute anti-monarchy propaganda to provide
the Army with a pretext to intervene. Charan asked if he
could seek refuge at the U.S. Embassy - an option which we
discouraged. He interpreted the recent public threat by the
Army to crack down on lese majeste offenses as a prelude to a
coup d'etat, as Army leaders typically justify coups by
claiming they were defending the monarchy. However, Charan
did not expect a coup to take place imminently; he predicted
one would not occur before the ASEAN summit, which Thailand
will host December 15-18.

GRENADE ATTACK ON PAD ENCAMPMENT INJURES 10
--------------


9. (C) While some observers fear spin-off effects of the
November 1 rally, most observers and political actors we have
talked to in recent days suggest the real danger of clashes
or bloodshed that might provoke military intervention would
come from unplanned incidents, rather than scheduled rallies
like the UDD event. One such incident occurred at
approximately 3:20 a.m. October 30, when a hand grenade
attack on PAD guards stationed near Government House resulted
in 10 injuries, two serious. A policeman specializing in
post-blast investigations told us the grenade was an M-67.
Manager Media, owned by PAD leader Sondhi Limthongthul, also
reported a separate attack in which four to five men
allegedly emerged from Metropolitan Police Headquarters and
fired shots at PAD guards near the Government House at 4:25
a.m. Other media accounts of the middle-of-the-night
incidents did not mention any connection to the police.


10. (U) The media also reported that an unidentified, dead
male was discovered behind the Metropolitan Police
HeaQuarters, around 150 meteQfrom the PAD staging area,
early on the morning of October 30 after the police secured
the area following the grenade attack. PAD guards did not
recognize the body. A press report identified the man as a
Bangkok resident shot once above his left eye and said that
his body was "battered by hard objects." A police officer
said he saw the man, who appeared drunk, walking past a

BANGKOK 00003255 003.2 OF 003


police checkpoint, shouting, "fight them."

BOMBS EXPLODE AT JUDGES' HOMES
--------------


11. (SBU) A small bomb exploded at the residence of
Constitutional Court Justice Jarun Pakditanakul at 1:00 a.m.
on October 30, according to the police, but did not result in
any injuries. A similar bomb attack occurred at the home of
Administrative Court President Akaratorn Chularat on the
morning of October 21; no injuries were reported. Both
judges are viewed by the Thaksin-camp as royalists connected
to one of the Privy Councilors trying to engineer the
downfall of the Somchai administration (refs A-B). There
have been no claims of responsibility or leads on whom might
be behind the attacks.
JOHN