Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3251
2008-10-30 06:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

PRIVY COUNCILOR PREM SAYS SITUATION CALM; ARMY TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PBTS TH CB 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003251 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PBTS TH CB
SUBJECT: PRIVY COUNCILOR PREM SAYS SITUATION CALM; ARMY TO
STAY ON THE SIDELINES BUT SURPRISED BY CAMBODIAN ACTIONS

BANGKOK 00003251 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003251

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STATE FOR EAP/MLS
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PBTS TH CB
SUBJECT: PRIVY COUNCILOR PREM SAYS SITUATION CALM; ARMY TO
STAY ON THE SIDELINES BUT SURPRISED BY CAMBODIAN ACTIONS

BANGKOK 00003251 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and d)


1. (C) Summary: Privy Council Chair Prem Tinsulanonda told
the Ambassador October 29 that the political situation was
getting calmer and that he was not worried about a planned
November 1 rally by pro-Thaksin supporters. In a separate
October 29 meeting, Deputy Army Commander General Jiradej
Kotcharat agreed with the Ambassador that the Army would
serve the country best by allowing political situation to be
resolved through the democratic process. Jiradej also told
the Ambassador that Thai and Cambodian military commanders
along the disputed border with Cambodia were committed to
avoiding future clashes.


2. (C) Comment: Prem's welcomed views about a calming
situation come against the backdrop of considerably fewer
rumors of a coup in recent days and less fiery public
rhetoric from all sides of the political conflict. We are
also reassured by continued Thai Army insistence that the
military would not become involved in politics, though the
wildcard remains unanticipated violence/bloodshed that could
be sparked by armed thugs in the street on both sides
(People's Alliance for Democracy - PAD - and United Front for
Democracy against Dictatorship - UDD). Army Commander
Anupong designated Jiradej to meet with the Ambassador
because of Anupong's desire in recent weeks to stay entirely
out of the political and diplomatic realm. That Jiradej
openly expressed Thai Army commitment to allowing the current
conflict to be resolved through democratic means is
reassuring, given that he was a close aide to former Thai
Third Army Region Commander General Saprang Kalayanaramitra,
who was active in the September 2006 coup. End Summary and
Comment.

PREM SAYS SITUATION CALM
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador and British Ambassador Quayle met Privy
Council President Prem Tinsulanonda and the King's Deputy
Private Secretary Ambassador Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn for

lunch October 29. Prem said the political situation was
currently calm and predicted it would remain that way. Prem
also said he was unconcerned about the planned November 1 UDD
rally despite reports that former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra would address via telephone a large number of
pro-government supporters who plan to gather in a Bangkok
sports stadium. Even though he expected the weekend to pass
peacefully, Prem agreed with the Ambassador that the leaders
of the UDD and their PAD rivals had raised tensions to the
point that the supporters in the two groups could may easily
take actions that could inadvertently spark a violent
confrontation. (Note: overnight on October 30 at about 0320,
an unidentified party threw a grenade into a group of PAD
supporters, injuring at least eight).

ARMY SEES NO ROLE FOR MILITARY IN POLITICAL CONFLICT
-------------- --------------


4. (C) During a subsequent October 29 meeting with Royal Thai
Army Deputy Commander General Jiradej Kotcharat, the
Ambassador stressed that the current political situation
should only be resolved through the democratic process.
Jiradej agreed and told the Ambassador that the Army viewed
the current situation as a political rivalry between
supporters of Thaksin and those who opposed the former Prime
Minister. As this was a political conflict, the Army saw no
role for itself other than to assist the police in
maintaining order if a violent confrontation broke out and
the police were unable to control the situation.


5. (C) The Ambassador emphasized to Jiradej that he believed
that in every crisis there was an opportunity. With the
political crisis based on a deep-seated rivalry between
anti-Thaksin groups, with the PAD as themost public face,

BANGKOK 00003251 002.2 OF 002


and Thaksin supporters, the Thai Army had so far maintained
an important role by keeping the conflict within the
political realm. The Thai Army would perform a very
productive role in facilitating an environment for political
resolution by allowing democratic institutions to more
strongly define themselves and their role in resolving the
crisis. The Thai general election in December 2007 was not
sufficient to bridge the political divide; rather more time
was needed to work out the political difficulties, the
Ambassador said. With the Army on the sidelines, democratic
institutions such as political parties, civil society, the
courts, and the media could mature and strengthen. The coup
of 2006 only delayed this maturation process, andQother
coup would further set back democratization. Jiradej said he
fully agreed and told the Ambassador that despite attempts by
many sides to draw the Army into the conflict, Army Commander
General Anupong Paochinda and other senior Thai Army leaders
were committed in their belief that the only wQto resolve
the situation was through the political process. There would
be no military involvement, Jiradej stated.

BORDER CLASH WITH CAMBODIA "ACCIDENTS"
--------------


6. (C) Jiradej told the Ambassador that Thai and Cambodian
local military commanders near the disputed border area
adjacent to the Preah Vihear temple continued to communicate
well and maintained good relationships. Neither side wanted
further clashes, the Deputy Commander said. Considering good
relations between local commanders on the border, the Thai
Army had been surprised by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's
October 13 ultimatum that the Thai withdraw from disputed
border areas. Jiradej suggested to the Ambassador that it
was likely that incorrect information about the border
situation had been passed to Hun Sen, because the Thai Army
had been unable to understand why else the Cambodian Prime
Minister had decided to heighten tensions.


7. (C) The Thai military viewed the October 15 clash between
the two sides as an "accident", Jiradej said. Thai troops in
the disputed area adjacent to the temple had returned fire
only after Cambodian troops shot first, and in the ensuing 40
minutes, the clash had taken on a life of its own. Jiradej
said Army Commander General Anupong was concerned for the
protection of the Preah Vihear temple and had given specific
orders for Thai troops not to use force in the area of temple
and not to escalate the use of force in the case of future
clashes.
JOHN