PRIVY COUNCILORS TELL AMBASSADOR: NO COUP, KING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003192

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM ASEC MOPS TH
SUBJECT: PRIVY COUNCILORS TELL AMBASSADOR: NO COUP, KING IN
RELATIVELY GOOD HEALTH

REF: A. BANGKOK 3167 (THAKSIN CONVICTED)

B. BANGKOK 3154 (EX-COP THREATENS)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Privy Councilors Prem Tinsulanonda and Siddhi
Savetsila separately told the Ambassador on October 22 that
the Thai Army would not launch a coup. The Ambassador
welcomed this assurance and explained the USG could not
accept a coup or coup-like action. Prem spoke well of Prime
Minister Somchai Wongsawat and specifically praised Somchai's
public acceptance of former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra's recent conviction. Prem indicated he was open
to some form of constitutional amendment, so long as changes
were not intended simply to help alleviate pressure on
Thaksin. The Ambassador reiterated USG policy to Siddhi, who
said he did not envision any military solution to the
standoff, but he had a vague vision of some sort of "people's
power" movement that would establish a committee of reputable
figures to assist in governance for a period of two to three
years. Both Prem and Siddhi remarked that King Bhumibol was
in relatively good health. Siddhi claimed the King had
supported the Queen's appearance at the recent funeral of a
PAD supporter.


2. (C) Comment: Prem's remarks about PM Somchai were
surprisingly positive, and we hope that this is a meaningful
sign that the government and its opponents can, if not reach
an accommodation, tolerate each other. We are hopeful that
both men were sincere in their statements to the effect that
they recognize the current standoff cannot be solved through
a coup. Siddhi clearly is trying to formulate some other way
forward; he appears not yet ready to operationalize the
concept he sketched out for the Ambassador. The King's
"healthy" public appearance belies accounts which surfaced
while he was out of the limelight during the past month that
he was failing. End Summary and Comment.

MODERATE TONE FROM PREM
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador called on Privy Council President Prem
Tinsulanonda for a one-hour one-on-one discussion on October

22. Prem, in an upbeat mood, said he did not foresee a coup.
Both sides in the current stalemate wanted to avoid
violence, he said. The Ambassador welcomed Prem's statement,
explaining that any coup or coup-like action would not be
acceptable to the USG. Prem said that he and all his
compatriots understood well the USG position.


4. (C) Prem said Prime Minister Somchai was a "good man" and
was doing a "very good job." He said sympathetically that
Somchai was in a difficult position, because he was Thaksin
Shinawatra's brother-in-law, but he lauded Somchai's public
reaction to Thaksin's October 21 conviction (Somchai publicly
accepted the court's decision, according to local press
reports) as appropriate and helpful.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Prem's view on possible
constitutional amendment (which Somchai had raised --
septel). Prem said the current constitution was fairly good
and did not require radical revisions. Prem said he was open
to some form of amendment, but this would not be acceptable
if changes were intended simply to help Thaksin. He said he
would not support Somchai, moreover, if he attempted to
redraft the entire constitution.


6. (C) Prem condemned Thaksin for failing to show remorse
after his conviction. He said Thaksin was intelligent but
unable to accept that he had done anything wrong.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Prem's view of former top police
officer Salang Bunnag, who had threatened to clear
anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
protestors from Government House (ref B). Prem laughed
dismissively, saying that Salang was an irrational person who

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had little influence and did not deserve to be taken
seriously. He also added that he did not believe PAD would
leave the Government House compound in the near future.
(Note: Later in the day, Salang did gather a crowd of
thousands for a religious ceremony at which speakers
criticized anti-government protestors, but he postponed his
plan to evict demonstrators from Government House. End Note.)


8. (C) The Ambassador asked Prem's view of recent
Thai-Cambodia border tension. Prem recounted the history of
the two countries' rival claims to Preah Vihear temple,
expressed support for continued bilateral dialogue, and said
that existing mechanisms for Thai-Cambodian coordination on
border issues had not functioned well.

SIDDHI LOOKING FOR NEW MECHANISM
--------------


9. (C) Later in the day on October 22, the Ambassador and
poloff called on Privy Councilor Siddhi Savetsila. The
Ambassador reiterated the USG position that a coup or
coup-like action would not be acceptable. Siddhi said he did
not know how political actors would resolve the current
standoff, but he did not envision a coup. He also said the
Democrat Party and a large portion of the Senate would refuse
to go along with Somchai's plan for constitutional amendment.
Siddhi spoke vaguely of a type of "people's power" action,
similar to that by opponents of President Marcos in the
Philippines, adding that the people engaged in such a
movement would need the military "to protect them," although
there was no military solution to the standoff.


10. (C) Siddhi envisioned the establishment of a "Committee
to Revive Democracy," consisting of respected figures such as
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, scholar Pramote
Nakhorntap, Democrat Party officials Abhisit Vejjajiva and
Korn Chatikavanij, as well as other unnamed "clean people"
from the military and the (now seemingly defunct) Palang
Dharma party, formerly associated with PAD co-leader Chamlong
Srimuang. Siddhi said this Committee could play a (not
clearly defined) role in governance for two to three years;
during that time, the parliament could also be reshaped to
include (selected) representatives of various social groups,
as the PAD had advocated, although they would comprise less
than the 70 percent representation that PAD initially
proposed.


11. (C) Siddhi said that, under his vision, the Prime
Minister could be any figure acceptable to all sides. As the
Ambassador probed Siddhi's vision, however, it became clear
that Siddhi's concept was notional and far from fully
thought-out. Siddhi mentioned that some of the figures who
had gathered at his home to discuss the way forward included
Chamlong Srimuang; academic Pramote Nakhorntap, academic
Chai-anam Samudavanija; Army General Saprang Kalayanamitra;
and Constitutional Court Justice Jarun Pakditanakul. Siddhi
was accompanied at the October 22 meeting with the Ambassador
by MFA Deputy Director General of the East Asian Department
Pisanu Suvanajata.


12. (C) The Ambassador noted that elected officials would
need to be at the heart of any democracy; Siddhi did not
respond directly, but reiterated that Thailand needed
officials who would work honestly for the King and the people
of Thailand.


13. (C) Siddhi clearly remained antagonistic toward Thaksin,
saying the former Prime Minister was still "damaging the
country," and had sought to publish a book in China that
contained material critical of King Bhumibol. Siddhi
denounced PM Somchai for having in the past worked on
Thaksin's behalf, including by bribing judges, and he said
that the Royal Thai Police Chief would testify that Somchai
himself had ordered the October 7 crackdown on PAD protestors
at the parliament. Siddhi claimed Somchai's wife, Yaowapa (a
sister of Thaksin),was receiving a 30 percent payoff in
return for government contracts, far in excess of traditional
rates. (Comment: This is the first time we have heard a
claim that Yaowapa is exploiting her husband's position for

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personal gain; we do not consider the claim implausible. End
Comment.)


14. (C) Siddhi viewed PAD as providing essential support to
the monarchy. "If we lose PAD, we lose the battle," he said.
He related that he and Prem had advised the King to show
support for the PAD after the October 7 clash, and he claimed
the King had supported the Queen's appearance at the funeral
of one of the PAD supporters killed in the incident. The
King subsequently thanked Siddhi for his advice (according to
Siddhi). Siddhi said he and Prem were the only Privy
Councilors advising the King and Queen on the political
standoff.


15. (C) When he saw television coverage of the crackdown on
the morning of October 7, Siddhi said, he had called Prem to
urge military support for the PAD. Siddhi lamented that Army
Commander Anupong simply assembled 200 men from each branch
of the military, who stood by and did not intervene.

KING'S HEALTH
--------------


16. (C) The Ambassador remarked to Prem that King Bhumibol
had looked healthy in an October 20 public appearance. Prem
said the King was healthier than he had been in recent
months; the King was able to walk without needing a cane.
Prem remarked that the King had a very determined
personality, which carried him through difficult times.
Siddhi echoed Prem's view, claiming that the King did regular
walking exercises in a water tank at his Hua Hin Palace.
(Siddhi, who looked less energetic than the last time he met
with the Ambassador, remarked that he (Siddhi) had emphysema
and was unable to stand for long without having pain in his
leg and back.)
JOHN