THAI PM SOMCHAI AIMS FOR CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003191

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KJUS TH CB
SUBJECT: THAI PM SOMCHAI AIMS FOR CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT;
EX-PM THAKSIN PROMISES RESISTANCE TO A COUP

REF: A. BANGKOK 3167 (THAKSIN CONVICTED)

B. BANGKOK 3154 (EX-COP THREATENS)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat told the Ambassador
he was committed to a peaceful resolution of political
disputes. He welcomed the Ambassador's expression of USG
support for democracy and the rule of law, and Somchai said
the way forward entailed a fact-finding commission's report
on the October 7 clash between police and protestors, and
constitutional amendment, likely followed by elections.
Somchai also said he looked forward to meeting Cambodian
Prime Minister Hun Sen in Beijing during the Asia-Europe
meeting, to ease bilateral tension. Separately, former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra phoned the Ambassador and
predicted that, despite his recent conviction in a Supreme
Court case, his political allies would continue winning
elections. Thaksin said Queen Sirikit was pressuring Army
Commander Anupong Paojinda to launch a coup, although Anupong
resisted, knowing King Bhumibol did not favor a coup.
Thaksin called for the recision of lese majeste laws.


2. (C) Comment: Previous attempts by Prime Minister Samak
Sundaravej to amend the constitution energized
anti-government protests, and it is unclear that Somchai will
be able to forge a consensus on an amendment process. The
fact-finding committee looking into the October 7 clash may
be able to buy Somchai some time, but the committee's work
and findings may stir up antagonism from one side or the
other. Thaksin may be correct that his allies still command
significant popular support, but his conviction does
represent a setback for them. We take at face value
Thaksin's threat that his supporters would resist a coup.
End Summary and Comment.

PRIME MINISTER ON DOMESTIC POLITICS
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3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by poloff, called on Prime
Minister Somchai Wongsawat on October 21. (Ref A reported
Somchai's comment on the just-released court verdict against
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.) The Ambassador
explained that the United State Government was closely
watching developments in Thailand and wanted to help ensure
that political conflicts would be resolved peacefully, within
the rule of law, and in accordance with the constitution.


4. (C) Somchai, who was joined in the meeting by numerous
notetakers and advisors (and with a large press spray at the
top),welcomed this USG policy. He assured the Ambassador
that he was committed to a peaceful settlement of political
disputes. He emphasized his establishment of a fact-finding
committee to investigate and report on the October 7 clash
between the police and People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
protestors. Somchai predicted that all sides would be able
to accept the committee's explanation.


5. (C) Speaking more broadly, Somchai said that it would be
necessary to amend the Constitution in order that Thailand
could move toward "genuine democracy." He said that a group
of self-selected protestors would not be appropriate leaders
of the amendment process; amendment should be done by "the
people" or by the parliament, acting as the people's elected
representatives. Somchai alluded to the possibility of
forming a Constitution drafting assembly similar to the one
that drafted the 1997 Constitution, saying it would be ideal
if "the people" could choose their representatives to amend
the Constitution. An election could then ensue, Somchai
said. (According to October 22 local press reports, a
government spokesman suggested that a proposed constitution
drafting assembly complete its work within 120 days of the
assembly's formation.)


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6. (C) The Ambassador raised the public threat of former top
Royal Thai Police official Salang Bunnag to use former police
officers to clear PAD demonstrators from Government House
(ref B). The Ambassador asked if Somchai, having affirmed
his opposition to violence, felt confident that the
threatened confrontation would not take place. Somchai
reiterated his commitment against violence but, when pressed
on the specific threat by Salang (which had been widely
covered by the local media),Somchai simply said he did not
know who was involved in that effort, that the RTG would
operate under the law, and the RTG would not support any act
of violence.

CAMBODIA
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador also asked Somchai's view of the recent
border tension between Thailand and Cambodia. Somchai
assured the Ambassador that there would be no further armed
conflict between the two countries, and he planned to have a
bilateral meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in
Beijing during the October 24-25 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).
Somchai said he had already spoken with Hun Sen, that
Thailand and Cambodia were neighbors with peaceful relations,
and that any problems should be resolved through dialogue.
Somchai welcomed the Ambassador's statement that the border
tension represented a bilateral issue for the two countries,
rather than a multilateral issue.

THAKSIN ON PARTY POLITICS, MONARCHY
--------------


8. (C) Shortly after the October 21 meeting with Somchai,
former Prime Minister Thaksin phoned the Ambassador. (Ref A
reported Thaksin's reaction to his conviction.) In a
rambling but spirited exposition of his views, Thaksin
recalled how his Thai Rak Thai party had won the 2005
election in a landslide, only to be evicted by the 2006 coup
d'etat. Thaksin affirmed that he remained popular and said
"my party" (now the People's Power Party, but presumably he
also referred to any subsequent incarnation) would continue
to win elections by a significant margin.


9. (C) Thaksin said he had sent a message to Army Commander
Anupong Paojinda that the Army should not seize power.
Thaksin said he could guarantee that a coup in current
circumstances would not resemble General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin's 2006 coup -- it would not be peaceful, and
Anupong would regret it, Thaksin said.


10. (C) Thaksin told the Ambassador that Anupong did not want
to launch a coup, but Queen Sirikit was pressing him to do
so. Thaksin also asserted that Anupong knew that King
Bhumibol did not favor a coup. Thaksin highlighted that, at
the same time when the Queen presided over the funeral of a
PAD protestor, the King granted an audience to PM Somchai,
sending a more positive public message than the Queen's.
Thaksin added that he had been on the verge of releasing a
letter in response to his conviction, but his staff had
discouraged him from doing so, saying his tone would have
been too angry and negative toward the monarchy. Thaksin
said one item on his agenda (and presumably in his draft
letter) was the need to remove lese majeste provisions from
the criminal code; Thailand could not rightfully claim to be
democratic so long as there remained a threat of prosecution
for lese majeste.


11. (C) The Ambassador advised that violence by any side in
the current political climate would be severely damaging, and
urged Thaksin to do what he could to prevent it. The
Ambassador also reiterated U.S. opposition to a coup, but
noted that we were equally committed to a peaceful, legal
resolution of the political standoff. Threats of violence by
either side would be counterproductive.
JOHN