SOUTHERN VIOLENCE IN THAILAND: VIEWS OF THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003142

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE IN THAILAND: VIEWS OF THE
MALAYSIAN MISSION IN BANGKOK

REF: A. BANGKOK 02808 (MEDIATOR HAS GOOD NEWS AND BAD
NEWS)

B. BANGKOK 02871 (PEACE TALKS IN INDONESIA)

C. BANGKOK 3033 (CHAVALIT ENTERS EXISTS)

BANGKOK 00003142 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (
B) AND (D)


Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) In a rare meeting with representatives from the
Malaysian embassy to discuss southern Thailand, Minister
Counselor Roslan A. Rahman told us in late September that
Malaysia saw the multiple tracks of negotiations for a
resolution of the conflict in southern Thailand as a positive
development. He said Malaysia was not involved in any of
these efforts, and would only become involved if it was
convinced the Thai government was serious about resolving the
conflict. Rahman acknowledged that Task Force 2010 was
Malaysia's vehicle for involvement in southern Thailand, but
he insisted that TF 2010 was primarily involved in economic
development, education, and vocational training.


2. (S) Comment: The official Malaysian presence in Bangkok is
not usually an enthusiastic interlocutor on southern
Thailand, and we were surprised at Rahman's willingness to
discuss the situation in the South. Rahman, though less than
forthcoming on the important issue of Malaysia's activities
in southern Thailand, appeared to be well versed on the
overall situation and left the door open for future
engagement. Michael Vatikiotis, our contact on the secret
Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) track of
peace talks, however, has repeatedly been dismissive of
Malaysian attempts to play a part in peace negotiations and
has described Malaysian efforts in the South as meddlesome.
However, the porous nature of the border between Thailand and
Malaysia, the presence in Malaysia of retired and exiled
insurgent leaders, and ethnic, religious, and family
connections between Malayu Muslims in southern Thailand and
Malaysians in Kelantan, argue that any resolution of the
conflict will need to involve Malaysia on some level. End
Summary and Comment.

Malaysian Embassy views on peace tracks
--------------

3. (C) In a meeting in late September to discuss the violence
in southern Thailand and Malaysia's ability to affect the
situation, Roslan A. Rahman, Minister Counselor from the
embassy of Malaysia, told us that Malaysia currently had no
role in any of the negotiating tracks now underway to resolve
the insurgency in southern Thailand. Countering arguments
that the seemingly multiple tracks of negotiations now
underway were counter-productive, he said it was an
encouraging sign that multiple parties were reaching out for
a solution to the problem.


4. (C) Malaysia, Roslan emphasized, was not involved in any
of these talks, and would only get involved in negotiations
when there was a clear commitment from the Thai government
that it was interested in resolving the conflict. At that
point, he said, Malaysia could act as a facilitator, not a
mediator. They would offer a venue, guarantee security,
etc., but not be involved in the negotiations themselves. He
said the Thais needed to decide if and how they would like
negotiations proceed before any peace process would be
successful. He said he does not believe the Thai government
was currently serious about resolving the conflict.

Bogor effort
--------------

5. (C) Moving on to the Bogor track of peace talks (ref b-c),
Roslan told us the negotiations were sanctioned by the Thai
government through former Prime Minister Samak, but he said
he did not know the extent to which Prime Minister Somchai
had embraced them. He told us that his understanding was
that the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was

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purposefully not informed of the negotiations because they
were intended to be secret - although he acknowledged it was
odd that the Indonesian Ambassador to Thailand, Mohammad
Hatta, was involved without his Embassy being aware. Roslan
said the concept grew out of Samak,s trip to Indonesia and
an interest among high level Indonesian officials in
brokering a solution. Roslan said he was unable to comment
on whether the separatists involved in these talks had any
ability to control developments on the ground in the South.
He said the insurgents groups in the South are very
disparate; they needed some kind of new political
organization or umbrella group to organize around. He
speculated that these negotiations may be able to provide
that. The Bogor negotiations represented an attempt at
forward movement, he said, and thus were positive even if
they received little official backing.

HDC process
--------------

6. (S) Roslan ended the meeting by making unsolicited
comments about the secret Henri Dunant Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) brokered peace negotiations. He
said HDC was trying to broker talks and forge reconciliation,
but he did not think the primary actors in the insurgency in
the South, the BRN-C, was truly involved. He said the BRN-C
saw the talks as an intelligence gathering operation, and
would not show themselves. Roslan claimed that he did not
know what was being discussed in the HDC sponsored track, but
said he was reasonably certain independence was not on the
table. He said this reflected his understanding that the
insurgents were not fighting for independence: "They are not
talking about independence. They are looking for cultural
rights and probably autonomy."

Malaysian efforts in the south: Task Force 2010
-------------- --

7. (C) Speaking briefly about Task Force 2010, Roslan
admitted that it was Malaysia's vehicle for involvement in
southern Thailand, but he insisted that TF 2010 was primarily
involved in economic development, education, and vocational
training. It was not involved in establishing a channel for
negotiations. (Note: According to Thai and Malaysian press,
Task Force 2010 was formed by Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi
in early 2007 as a vehicle to bring peace to southern
Thailand. Sporadic press reports have indicated TF 2010 has
been involved in various attempts to broker negotiations in
the South. End note.)
ENTWISTLE