THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS: CHARGES AGAINST PAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003059

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS: CHARGES AGAINST PAD
LEADERS REDUCED, SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 3042

B. BANGKOK 3032

C. BANGKOK 3020

D. BANGKOK 3006

E. BANGKOK 2882

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and d)


1. (C) Summary. The streets of Bangkok remained quiet
October 9. The major development came in the courts, when
the Appeal Court threw out the most serious charges (of
insurrection/treason) against the nine leaders of the
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The two arrested PAD
leaders then made bail, and the seven other PAD leaders
announced they would turn themselves in. For his part, PM
Somchai Wongsawat announced that he would set up two
independent commissions to examine the October 7 violence and
compensating the victims of the violence.


2. (C) Comment. While the Court's actions and Somchai's
announcement may provide renewed space for a possible
negotiated resolution to the conflict between the PAD and
government, success should not be taken for granted. After
the arrest warrants were first issued in late August, the PAD
leaders announced their willingness to be arrested and named
a slate of second tier PAD figures to continue leadership of
the protest movement, keeping their goal of removing
pro-Thaksin political forces from power intact. Other
options to resolve the impasse, if only temporarily, include
House dissolution/new elections, favored by many academics
and the opposition Democrats, a coup, and intervention from
the King, as in 1992. Final resolution of the deep fissures
in Thai politics and society, however, will likely only be
possible once King Bhumibol passes from the scene. End
Comment and Summary.

COURT THROWS OUT MOST SERIOUS CHARGES AGAINST PAD LEADERS
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3. (U) The Appeals Court on October 9 annulled the warrants
that had been issued for the arrest of nine core leaders of
the PAD following the August 26 takeover of Government House
and brief occupation of other buildings, including the
headquarters of the National Broadcasting Services of
Thailand (NBT). The court dropped charges of insurrection,
plotting insurrection, and failure to comply with orders by
authorities to disperse under Articles 113, 114, and 216 of
the Constitution, ruling that there was insignificant
justification for the charges.


4. (SBU) However, the Court upheld charges of inciting
disturbances and causing a breach of the peace under Articles
116 and 215 of the Constitution and ordered the issuance of
new arrest warrants for the seven leaders of the PAD still at
large. Two other PAD leaders, Chaiwat Sinsuwong and MGEN
(Ret.) Chamlong Srimuang, had been arrested October 3 and 5,
respectively, but were released on bail October 9 following
the Court's decision to drop the more serious charges.


5. (SBU) Speaking after the Appeal Court's decision, PAD
leader Sondhi Limthongkul publicly announced that he and the
remaining PAD leaders would report to the police in order to
fight in the court. Somkiat Pongpaiboon, another PAD leader,
confirmed to us that remaining leaders would soon turn
themselves in.

GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO MANAGE FALLOUT FROM OCTOBER 7
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6. (U) With accusations continuing to be traded over who was
responsible for the October 7 violence, injuries, and deaths,
PM Somchai publicly announced October 9 that he would set up
two independent committees, one to investigate the violence,
and the other to look into remedies for the victims. Somchai
vowed that the committees would be non-partisan.

FOUR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE IMPASSE

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7. (C) With two days of mostly calm following the October 7
violence, speculation continues to focus on ways to resolve,
if only temporarily, the ongoing political conflict. Four
avenues appear the most plausible: 1) Negotiations succeed
between the government and the PAD or opposition Democrats;
2) House dissolution with new elections; 3) royal
intervention similar to that in 1992; or 4) a coup by the
military.


8. (C) Negotiations: Prior to the October 3 arrest of PAD
leader Chaiwat, many hoped that then-deputy Prime Minister
Chavalit Yongchaiyuth would be able to negotiate some sort of
accommodation between the PAD and the government; even PAD
leaders told us they put faith in Chavalit's efforts, which
had defused tensions. The arrests, the October 7 violence,
and Chavalit's resignation squelched hopes for a negotiated
solution, however.


9. (C) That said, PM Somchai has demonstrated the capacity to
take a much more accommodative stance than former-PM Samak.
He originally convinced the opposition Democrats to work with
him to form a commission to examine constitutional
amendments, another possible negotiated solution which could
have undercut the PAD. In visiting injured PAD demonstrators
October 8 and promising to set up independent commissions to
look into the violence October 9, Somchai has taken positive
steps. It remains to be seen, however, whether he will be
able leverage these measures into more substantial actions
that would move the country towards resolution of the
long-term conflict, particularly since nearly everyone
presumes the Somchai government will have a very short
shelf-life.


10. (C) House dissolution: Democrats, many Senators,
academics, and Army Commander Anupong favor dissolution with
new elections. However, elections would almost assuredly
return similar results, if anything strengthening the showing
of whatever post-Thaksin political force competes; Thaksin
confidently predicted a landslide to Ambassador September 23
(ref E). Such results would lead Thailand back into a
balance of forces similar to the current one. Prasong
Sunsiri, a co-leader with Chamlong of the May 1992
anti-military protests and the primary drafter of the 2007
constitution during the military-installed interim
government, told the Ambassador in a October 9 meeting that
the same "cast of characters" would return to power if a new
election were held.


11. (C) Deus ex machina: Prasong suggested during the meeting
with the Ambassador that, as in May 1992 following a violent
military clampdown against anti-military demonstrators,
intervention by King Bhumibol may be necessary in order to
lift Thailand out of the current political stalemate.
Prasong admitted that was it was very difficult to predict
what would happen in the coming days and weeks but projected
that an extraordinary event could likely be the only way out
of the conflict. Others, citing Queen Sirikit's increasingly
transparent patronage of the PAD cause, have suggested she
too could send a signal to PAD to declare victory and vacate
Government House; there is no indication she plans to do so.


12. (C) Coup: Despite RTA Commander Anupong's steady hand,
rumors continue to swirl that there are some in the Army who
advocate for military intervention. For instance, the
English-language Bangkok Post cited Army sources October 9 to
claim that colleagues of Anupong had recommended that the RTA
do more to resolve the conflict. Pro-Thaksin firebrand
Jakkraphob Penkair and his associates have repeatedly claimed
to us that RTA Chief of Staff Prayuth is more inclined
towards interventionism than his mentor Anupong. Set against
this is reality: Prasong confirmed to Ambassador that he had
heard from Army friends that the military had (again) learned
post-September 2006 coup how difficult it was to run the
country. PM Somchai, like PM Samak before him, clearly plans
on taking few chances; he has asked Anupong to accompany him

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on a round of visits to ASEAN capitals, starting in Phnom
Penh on October 13.
JOHN