SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: DAS MARCIEL HEARS CONTRASTING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000300

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: DAS MARCIEL HEARS CONTRASTING
VIEWS OF THE SITUATION

REF: A. BANGKOK 06821 (SOUTHERN DIALOGUE FACILITATOR

GIVES OPTOMISTIC READ-OUT)

B. BANGKOK 06161 (SURAYUD TALKS TO THE BRN-C)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: In meetings to discuss the situation in
southern Thailand on January 23 and 24, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Scot Marciel received widely contrasting views on

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Thai government efforts to end the violence. Dr. Mark
Tamthai, National Reconciliation Committee member and advisor
to interim Prime Minister Surayud on the southern Thailand
peace process, told Marciel that he was optimistic about the
prospects of the secret peace process now underway, and that
militant leaders were actively engaged in discussing power
sharing arrangements with the Thai government. Tamthai
emphasized that the US should seek no role in the South.
Human Rights Watch contact Sunai Phasuk, in contrast,
described a situation where security forces were intent on
suppressing the violence through intimidation and human
rights abuses. These contrasting views highlighted the
difference between national level efforts to seek a solution
to the unrest, and the reality on the ground as perceived by
human rights advocates. End Summary.

Optomistic View on Secret Negotiations
--------------


2. (S/NF) On January 23, Dr. Mark Tamthai, National
Reconciliation Committee member and advisor to Interim Prime
Minister Surayud on the southern Thailand peace process, had
a wide ranging discussion with Deputy Assistant Secretary
Scot Marciel about the current situation in the South and the
prospects for peace. Without providing details, Tamthai
admitted to Marciel that there was a secret peace process
underway, and he was optimistic about its chances for
success. He said the process had been going on for at least
a year, and now was ready to transition to a new less secret
phase. For it to be successful, he said, more people need to
be brought into the process. Once this process becomes
public knowledge, however, he knows critics will pick it
apart.


3. (C) According to Tamthai, the government understands the
current military solution to the violence is not working.
Southern Thai Muslims see the Army as occupiers and will
never cooperate with it. To resolve the situation in the
south, Tamthai said, the Thai government must address two
issues: justice sector reform and power sharing with the
central government. The two must be done together. Either
alone will not work. Legal reforms may alleviate some of the
conditions underlying the violence, but will not solve the
issue. People coming from Bangkok to run things in the south
will remain a grievance. Only when both these issues are
addressed can there be discussions on things like development
and education. The population generally does not support the
insurgency, but they will not work against it either.


4. (S/NF) Tamthai said he does not know how the new
government in Bangkok will react to the peace process. It
will be up to outgoing Prime Minister Surayud to convince the
new Prime Minister that this process holds the best chance of
success for resolving the situation. He believes the new
government does not have a firm position on the south and is
optimistic it will appoint people who know the issue to
continue work on it.


5. (S/NF) Talking about the reason behind his optimism for
reconciliation, Tamthai believes he has seen a shift in the
negotiating positions of both the militants and the
government. The leadership of the insurgency is no longer
demanding independence because they know it is impossible.
Now they are looking at some type of power sharing. On the
government side, the change is that they are now actually
able to talk about power sharing. The issue is now one of

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characterizing the arrangements being considered. He said,
in Thai, the language of self government, such as the word
autonomy, sounds too much like independence for the Thais to
accept. Calling it power sharing is more palatable.
According to Tamthai, however, the big change is that this is
now a topic for discussion. "What shall we call it," not
whether we can talk about it.


6. (S/NF) Continuing to emphasize language as a measure of
progress, Tamthai said another change is hearing insurgents
saying things like "the population is having problems with
the state." He believes this reflects an implicit acceptance
of the state's authority. He said the recent parliamentary
election was not disrupted because the militant,s know they
need a stable government to deal with. The military
government had no checks and balances and people in the south
are aware that elections would help them move forward on
their own goals.


7. (S/NF) Anticipating questions about whether the militant
leaders they were dealing with could actually control the
violence, Tamthai asserted they could. According to Tamthai,
the leaders told them they can deliver on "organized"
violence, or large scale attacks, but there were many smaller
groups he termed "youth level" that were harder to control.
The militants said it would take more time to bring these
groups under control and would involve discussing the
situation with them. Tamthai said the leaders told him that
they would need about a month to bring 80 to 90 percent of
the violence under control. In the short term, they could
deliver on about 60 percent.


8. (S/NF) Tamthai said that the level of violence is a poor
measure for understanding the situation. He noted the wild
swings in statistics about the number of attacks,
assassinations, etc., and said a lull in the violence means
nothing. Explaining further, he said if the militants feel
the peace process is going well, they voluntarily slow their
operations. If they feel challenged, however, or need to
show they still have the capacity to fight, they stage
attacks.


9. (S/NF) Marciel asked Tamthai how the Buddhist minority in
the south would react to power sharing. Tamthai said
different Buddhist communities might react differently. Some
Buddhist communities in the south are well established and
will take it in stride. Some, however, are worried - like
the ones with the village defense volunteers. Considering
further, Tamthai said the arming of civilian groups needs to
be stopped because the profusion of weapons among these
groups just makes the situation worse.


10. (C) Marciel asked Tamthai why we do not see foreign
actors in the south, and whether any foreign governments have
influence over the groups responsible for the violence.
Tamthai responded by describing the nationalistic nature of
the insurgency. "This is about nationalism and control." It
is not driven by fundamental Islam. The militants believe if
they accept outside help, those outsiders will want a stake
in control of the deep south -- which the militants cannot
accept. Some individuals may accept help from outsiders, but
the movement will not accept it. Tamthai went on to say that
he would not be surprised if "outsiders" did manage to get
into the south. Although the people would not work with
them, they also would not turn them in. Explaining further
Tamthai said that Islam in southern Thailand is not the
conservative fundamentalist brand embraced by the likes of
JI. Islam in southern Thailand is less restrictive and more
pragmatic. People in this part of the world have confidence
in their practice of Islam and do not look to those groups
for guidance on the practice of their religion. "There is a
history of Islam here."


13. (C) Closing the meeting, Tamthai emphasized that the US
has no role in resolving the situation in southern Thailand.

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He praised the US for not becoming involved in the conflict.

Human Rights Watch Pessimistic
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14. (C) In a separate meeting on January 24 with Human Rights
Watch (HRW),Thailand representative Sunai Phasuk told DAS
Marciel that the human rights situation in the South had not
improved since the September 2006 coup d'etat. Sunai said
the post-coup interim government led by Prime Minister
Surayud Chulanont had missed a key opportunity for
reconciliation by failing to take steps to reduce tension
between the ethnic Malay Muslim and ethnic Thai Buddhist
communities, and by not adequately controling security
forces' use of strong-arm tactics. Sunai complained that
human rights abuses, such as the extra-judicial killing,
arbitrary arrest, and torture of suspected militants have
continued. He claimed that the Royal Thai Army routinely
abused suspected insurgents, subjecting them to forced
nudity, sleep deprivation, lack of food and water, and
prolonged isolation and confinement.


15. (C) Sunai explained how the South had entered a "warlord
period" wherein army commanders in each province have each
taken a different approach in combating the violence. Sunai
praised the army divisional commander in Yala Province, whom
he characterized as committed to winning "hearts and minds"
by promoting coordination between the military, police and
civilian officials. Sunai also said the Yala commander had
promised to court martial subordinates who violated human
rights. Nevertheless, Sunai described Narathiwat and Pattani
provinces as "hell," where army commanders continue to turn a
blind eye to abuses committed by their subordinates.


16. (C) Sunai emphasized that the interim government has
generally failed to promote justice, accountability, and
respect for human rights. In particular Sunai said the
government's failure to investigate abuses committed by the
Thaksin government has reinforced the perception by many in
the South that security officials can act with impunity.
Sunai recounted a particularly chilly encounter with Surapong
Suebwonglee, the Secretary General of the People's Power
Party (PPP),who disturbingly told Sunai in early January
that the PPP plans to "start another drug war" soon after
forming a government. (Note: From 2003-2005, the Thaksin
government's "War on Drugs" is believed to have resulted in
the extra-judicial killings of approximately 2,000 people,
particularly in Thailand's South, North, and other border
areas. End note.) Sunai feared that abuses would continue
as several PPP leaders have not exhibited a prior respect for
human rights and the rule of law.


17. (S/NF) Comment: These two conversations put the
contrasting understanding of the situation in southern
Thailand in sharp relief. The conversation with Tamthai
demonstrates that some in the Thai government do understand
the issues driving the conflict. It is unclear to what
extent that "big picture" understanding affects what is
happening on the ground. Sunai Phasuk, the Human rights
Watch representative, maintains a wide network of grass roots
contacts throughout the south. While we are waiting for firm
evidence to support his allegations, his statements reflect,
at a minimum, the perception of human rights NGOs monitoring
the conflict.


18. (S/NF) Comment continued: It is apparent that interim
Prim Minister Surayud was a driving force behind
reconciliation efforts. Given the small circle of government
officials supporting the reconciliation efforts, and the
pending change in government, it is difficult to share
Tamthai,s optimism regarding the future of peace in the
south, as Surayud's departure will remove the chief proponent
of the negotiations from authority.


19. (U) DAS Marciel has cleared on this message.

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JOHN