PROPOSALS ON BURMA FROM ASSK CONFIDANT DE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000297

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPAO KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: PROPOSALS ON BURMA FROM ASSK CONFIDANT DE
RIEDMATTEN

REF: 2007 BANGKOK 5736

BANGKOK 00000297 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Leon de Riedmatten (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
representative and former International Committee of the Red
Cross head of delegation in Burma during which he acted as a
liaison between ASSK and SPDC) viewed the prospects for
change in Burma as growing weaker every day unless the
international community - in coordination with those working
inside Burma - considered a new, proactive approach. In his
view, India and China were not willing to play the
influential role many Western countries hoped for. While de
Riedmatten praised U.S. efforts to keep alive Burma's story,
he presented options the USG and others could support and
that focused on regionally-driven initiatives. These
included an advisory committee formed earlier this month by
the Indonesian government, and the assignment of support
staff in Rangoon for UN Special Envoy for Burma Ibrahim
Gambari that operated independently of the UN country team in
Burma. End Summary.

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BURMA GOING NOWHERE
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2. (C) During a mid-January meeting with Embassy officer, de
Riedmatten described the situation in Burma as at a
standstill, with the ruling State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) once again having proven that it was
completely intolerant of any form of protest and that leader
Than Shwe had no plans to begin a genuine dialogue towards
reconciliation and democratization. The protests of last
September demonstrated that change would not come from within
Burma or as a result of international criticism of the SPDC,
but only by way of a concerted, coordinated effort between
the two. In de Riedmatten's view, as the ruling generals and
their cronies continued to amass wealth via flagrant abuse of
their power, they gained greater incentives to retain this
power through any means necessary, regardless of the rights
and well-being of their citizens. He remarked that it
appeared easier than ever for Burmese to obtain new
passports, permitting those with the means to depart Burma,
and ultimately leaving behind only those without the skills
or the ability to effectively oppose the junta, much less
govern the country should a transition ever occur.


3. (C) While much of the international community was focused
on pressuring India and China to use their influence with the
SPDC, de Riedmatten viewed both countries as having little
interest in creating waves inside Burma. China in particular
was hesitant to do anything to disrupt the upcoming Olympic
Games. Therefore, de Riedmatten believed that the
international community needed to begin examining
alternatives. De Riedmatten had several suggestions for new
diplomatic initiatives that the USG and other governments
could undertake to try to begin moving things forward in
Burma.

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INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES HIGH LEVEL ADVISORY GROUP
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4. (C) De Riedmatten described the formation of a high level
committee in Indonesia whose purpose was to analyze regional
options to reach out to the ruling junta and address the
situation in Burma. This Indonesian Burma study group
included Burma experts such as de Riedmatten and Michael
Vatikiotis, Indonesian President Yudhoyono foreign affairs
advisor Dino Djalal, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas, director for International Security and Disarmament
at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry Desra Percaya, and current
Indonesian legislators. Although this committee had yet to
be announced publicly, they have had at least one meeting in
Jakarta that de Riedmatten attended. As of December 2007,
the committee had hoped to take advantage of Burmese PM Thein
Sein's visit to Indonesia scheduled for January 14-15,
although that visit was subsequently postponed due to the
illness of former President Suharto. While Indonesia
demonstrated the initiative in organizing the group, it
planned to include others in the region in any future
efforts, particularly Vietnam and Thailand.


5. (C) De Riedmatten explained the group's interest in
including Vietnam was due to that country's own experiences
with substantive economic reform and offering a way out to
recalcitrant leaders. In addition, Vietnam could point to
its previous difficult relationship with countries like the
U.S. and describe how a little effort on the part of both
countries brought about what was today a politically
productive relationship that was also economically mutually
beneficial. At the same time, Vietnam was in constant
competition with China, economically and in terms of regional
standing for influence. Vietnam viewed its membership in
ASEAN as a valuable counterweight to China and therefore
recognized the importance of supporting a strong ASEAN, which
Burma threatened. When pressed for indications that Vietnam
would be interested in participating in this committee, de
Riedmatten conceded that as of yet he had no evidence that
Vietnam would go along with Indonesia's plans, but offered
that it was an idea worth exploring.


6. (C) De Riedmatten stated it was clear Thailand was content
with the status quo vis-a-vis Burma and that the interim
government had been satisfied to use the excuse that without
a clear leadership to craft foreign policy, the MFA would
continue to take a back seat in any regional discussions
about Burma. He believed that the newly elected government
would also be willing to continue sucking natural resources
out of Burma for its own use, and allowing Burmese workers to
illegally enter Thailand with substantial benefits to the
Thai economy. (Comment: Overall, de Riedmatten did not make
a clear distinction between the interim and the incoming
governments' policies towards Burma. Until the new Foreign
Minister and other cabinet officials are in place, it is not
clear to us just how the RTG will approach Burma.) But
regardless of these complacent positions, the reality was
that the RTG would have to actively engage in any regional
efforts regarding Burma, due to its geo-strategic
relationship with Burma, the Thais' upcoming presidency of
ASEAN, and because former Thai Foreign Minister Surin
Pitsuwan currently holds the position of ASEAN Secretary
General. At the same time, however, de Riedmatten did not
view Surin as a man of action and expected Surin to do very
little of substance about Burma. He described Surin as a man
of words, which had served Surin well as a diplomat but which
would prevent Surin from bringing the necessary pressure on
ASEAN to get members to act on Burma.

BANGKOK 00000297 003.2 OF 004



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INDEPENDENT SUPPORT STAFF FOR GAMBARI
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7. (C) Contacts inside Burma told de Riedmatten that many in
Burma believed that Gambari's trips to the country
accomplished nothing except for earning him gifts from the
junta upon his departure. De Riedmatten added that many of
his sources inside and outside Burma described Gambari as
having no credibility with the junta, with the opposition, or
with the ethnic groups. De Riedmatten believed that the
moment Gambari allowed the junta to take him hostage in Nay
Pyi Taw during his November 2007 visit, Gambari lost any
remaining standing among all dialogue partners. de
Riedmatten did not view Gambari as committed to the resolving
the situation in Burma, unlike his predecessor Ismail Razali,
but rather viewed Gambari as committed to maintaining his UN
position and all the generous trappings that followed with
it. Now that the UN had funded Gambari's budget for the
coming year, de Riedmatten said that Gambari would settle in
to his routine of making the rounds of the Asian capitals and
attending relevant meetings under the guise that he was
making progress on Burma, but without any real
accomplishments. When de Riedmatten met with Ban Ki-moon in
Dili a few weeks ago, the UNSYG indicated that he planned to
continue supporting Gambari's efforts as the UN could not
allow the SPDC to return to the status quo. De Riedmatten
told us that he replied to the UNSYG that it was already too
late, as the junta had done worse than return to the status
quo -- the junta had taken several steps backward.


8. (C) De Riedmatten acknowledged that he did not see any
chance for Gambari being replaced in the near future.
Therefore, he believed that the USG and the international
community must examine how best to use Gambari and his
position. De Riedmatten supported the idea of establishing
staff inside Burma that could act as a small antenna on the
ground for Gambari. However, he believed that this liaison
must have first-hand knowledge of Burma and carry some weight
inside the country as well as with the international
community. The advantage of appointing such a person was
that he/she would have a greater likelihood of obtaining the
trust and credibility necessary to lay the substantive
groundwork to make Gambari's subsequent visits to Burma
worthwhile. De Riedmatten disagreed with proposals that this
new position be co-located with the UN country team in
Rangoon. In his view, the very nature of the UN in Burma is
apolitical, as its focus is on humanitarian assistance.
Gambari's representative must be perceived as independent of
these humanitarian efforts and move about the country
accordingly, meeting with a variety of people. De Riedmatten
viewed three people as capable of taking on such an
assignment:

- Charles Petrie - although de Riedmatten acknowledged that
Petrie's removal from Burma in December 2007 meant this was
not a likely option;

- Richard Horsey - former ILO representative currently
working out of Bangkok; although de Riedmatten told us Horsey
had applied for a Burmese visa three times in recent months
and the SPDC had denied him all three times;

- Leon de Riedmatten himself - had performed this role in the
past, although it was not clear he would be welcomed back by


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